53 Wash. 2d 611, 335 P.2d 600 (1959)
The plaintiffs, Clayton and Hanna Buchanan, brought this action against the defendants, Charles and Laurel Cassell, to quiet title to real property under the ten-year adverse possession statute.1 The land in question is a strip of unplatted property lying between the east boundary of the plaintiffs’ tract and the high-water mark of the west bank of the Snake river.2 All of the land originally belonged to the Lewiston-Clarkston Improvement Company.3 The plaintiffs purchased their tract from Gertrude Woodring in 1952 and seek to tack their possession to that of the Woodrings to satisfy the statutory period.4
W. A. Woodring and Gertrude L. Woodring contracted for the purchase of lots 2 and 3, block “O” of Vineland, from the Lewiston-Clarkston Improvement Company.5 They moved onto the property about 1919.6 The Woodrings developed the tract by building a home and barn and constructing boundary fences running east and west from the highway to the Snake river.7 They used the disputed area for farming potatoes, grain, and corn, pasturing stock, and later built a boathouse on the disputed area, remaining in possession for thirty-two years.8
Shortly before his death on June 13, 1951, W. A. Woodring conveyed the land to his wife Gertrude by quitclaim deed signed with an “X,” using a metes and bounds description that coincided with the government surveyed meander line and omitted the disputed strip. On October 28, 1952, Gertrude Woodring sold the property to the plaintiffs using the same description.9 The defendants received a quitclaim deed from the successor in interest to the Lewiston-Clarkston Improvement Company establishing their record title.10 The disputed area is not assessed to anyone for tax purposes, and no taxes have been paid by anyone.11
At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the defendants moved for dismissal with prejudice, which the trial court granted, entering findings of fact and conclusions of law quieting title in the defendants.12 The plaintiffs appealed, assigning error to the granting of the motion to dismiss and to the trial court’s finding that their predecessors did not claim or intend to hold the lands adversely. The state of Washington was joined as a defendant to foreclose any inheritance tax claim but did not appear.13
Whether the plaintiffs may tack their predecessors' possession to satisfy the ten-year adverse possession statute?14
This state follows the rule that a purchaser may tack the adverse use of its predecessor in interest to that of his own where the land was intended to be included in the deed between them, but was mistakenly omitted from the description.15 In Faubion v. Elder, the court held that where there is privity between successive occupants holding adversely to the holder of the true title continuously, the successive periods of occupation may be united or tacked to each other to make up the time of adverse holding.16
Yes. The Woodrings possessed the disputed strip for thirty-two years through farming, pasturing stock, and building a boathouse while treating the land as their own.17 Gertrude Woodring then conveyed the property to the plaintiffs using the identical description that omitted the strip.18 Privity exists through the chain of conveyances.19
The Woodrings intended to claim the land to the river.20 Therefore, the plaintiffs may tack the Woodrings' possession period to their own to satisfy the ten-year requirement under the adverse possession statute.21
The plaintiffs may tack their predecessors' possession to satisfy the ten-year adverse possession statute.22
Whether the metes and bounds description in the quitclaim deed from W. A. Woodring to his wife rebuts the presumption of adverse holding?23
The actual occupation, use, and improvement of the premises of the claimant as if he were in fact the owner thereof will, in the absence of explanatory circumstances showing the contrary, be sufficient to raise a presumption of his entry and holding as absolute owner, and, unless rebutted, will establish the fact of a claim of right.24
No. The Woodrings' thirty-two years of continuous use and occupancy of the disputed area raised the presumption of adverse holding as absolute owners.25 The metes and bounds description in the quitclaim deed from W. A. Woodring to his wife does not rebut this presumption.26
No evidence in the record establishes that a survey occurred or that W. A. Woodring understood the description excluded the strip, rendering any contrary inference speculative and insufficient to overcome the presumption created by long-term possession.27
The metes and bounds description in the quitclaim deed from W. A. Woodring to his wife does not rebut the presumption of adverse holding.28
Whether the trial court's finding that the predecessors did not claim or intend to hold the land adversely is supported by substantial evidence in the record?29
The finding that the respondents are the legal owners of the said disputed property, is nothing more than a conclusion of law unsupported by the record, since the appellants have established a prima facie case of ownership by adverse possession.30 The above rule does not apply to conclusions of law.31
No. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiffs' case and entered a finding that the Woodrings did not claim or intend to hold the lands adversely.32 This finding rested solely on the metes and bounds description in the deed yet lacks any substantial evidence in the record to support it.33 The plaintiffs established a prima facie case of adverse possession through the Woodrings' extended use and occupancy.34 The trial court's conclusion of law therefore cannot stand.35
The trial court's finding that the predecessors did not claim or intend to hold the land adversely is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.36