532 U.S. 598 (2001)
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., which operates care homes that provide assisted living to their residents, failed an inspection by the West Virginia Office of the State Fire Marshal because some of the residents were incapable of "self-preservation" as defined under state law.1 On October 28, 1997, after receiving cease-and-desist orders requiring the closure of its residential care facilities within 30 days, Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., on behalf of itself and other similarly situated homes and residents, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia against the State of West Virginia, two of its agencies, and 18 individuals, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the self-preservation requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.2
Respondents agreed to stay enforcement of the cease-and-desist orders pending resolution of the case and the parties began discovery.3 In 1998, the West Virginia Legislature enacted two bills eliminating the self-preservation requirement, and respondents moved to dismiss the case as moot.4
The District Court granted the motion, finding that the 1998 legislation had eliminated the allegedly offensive provisions and that there was no indication that the West Virginia Legislature would repeal the amendments.5 Petitioners requested attorney's fees as the prevailing party under the FHAA and ADA.6 They argued that they were entitled to attorney's fees under the catalyst theory. This theory posits that a plaintiff is a prevailing party if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct.7
The District Court accordingly denied the motion and, for the same reason, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished, per curiam opinion.8 To resolve the disagreement amongst the Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and now affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals.9
Whether the term "prevailing party" in fee-shifting statutes includes a party that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct?10
Under fee-shifting statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 12205, a "prevailing party" is one who obtains a material alteration in the legal relationship of the parties through an enforceable judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree; a defendant's voluntary change in conduct, even if induced by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur.11
No. Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. did not secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree in its favor.12 Instead, after the West Virginia Legislature enacted bills eliminating the self-preservation requirement, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss the case as moot.13 Although petitioners argued that their lawsuit catalyzed the legislative change, this voluntary action by the state did not constitute the required judicially sanctioned change in the parties' legal relationship.14 The precedents establish that only enforceable judgments and consent decrees create the material alteration necessary for prevailing party status, and the catalyst theory falls short of this standard.15
The catalyst theory does not qualify a plaintiff as a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under the FHAA and ADA.16
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia concurred, joined by Justice Thomas.17 He stressed that the term "prevailing party" is a longstanding term of art in the law, traditionally meaning the party that obtains a judgment or a finding of liability.18 Scalia argued that the catalyst theory distorts this meaning by permitting fee awards without any judicial determination of liability or relief, leaving the merits unresolved.19
This could allow plaintiffs with potentially meritless claims to extract fees simply by filing suit and prompting voluntary compliance due to litigation costs.20 He reviewed historical practice and found no support for the catalyst theory in pre-statute cases awarding costs or fees.21 In his view, this approach risks turning the fee-shifting statutes into tools for extortion rather than rewarding genuine legal victories.22
Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, And Breyer
Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer.23 She argued that the majority's insistence on a court document memorializing victory upsets long-standing circuit precedent and undermines Congress's goal of encouraging private enforcement of civil rights laws.24 Ginsburg maintained that a plaintiff prevails when her suit prompts the defendant to provide the precise relief sought, as the ultimate purpose of litigation is actual relief rather than a formal decree.25
The judicial decree, she explained, is merely the means to that end.26 By rejecting the catalyst rule, the Court allows defendants to evade fee obligations despite the suit's merit driving the change, thereby impeding access to courts for those with fewer resources and diminishing incentives for private attorneys general.27