564 U.S. 647 (2011)
In August 2005, Donald Bullcoming drove a vehicle that rear-ended a pickup truck at an intersection in Farmington, New Mexico.1 After the truck driver noticed Bullcoming's bloodshot eyes and smelled alcohol on his breath, Bullcoming left the scene before police arrived.2 An officer later apprehended Bullcoming, who failed field sobriety tests and was arrested for driving while intoxicated.3
Because Bullcoming refused a breath test, police obtained a warrant for a blood-alcohol analysis, and a sample was drawn at a local hospital.4 The blood sample was sent to the New Mexico Department of Health's Scientific Laboratory Division.5 Forensic analyst Curtis Caylor tested the sample using a gas chromatograph machine and prepared a signed report certifying that Bullcoming's blood-alcohol concentration was 0.21 grams per hundred milliliters.6 The report included certifications that the sample seal was intact, procedures were followed, and no circumstances affected the sample's integrity.7
Bullcoming was charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated based on the report.8 At Bullcoming's jury trial in November 2005, the State announced that Caylor had been placed on unpaid leave and would not testify.9 Instead, the prosecution called another SLD analyst, Gerasimos Razatos, who had not participated in or observed the testing of Bullcoming's sample.10 Over defense objection, the trial court admitted Caylor's report as a business record. Razatos testified about laboratory procedures and the testing machine. The jury convicted Bullcoming of aggravated DWI.11
The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.12 While Bullcoming's appeal was pending before the New Mexico Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.13 The New Mexico Supreme Court acknowledged that the report was testimonial.14 It held that Razatos's testimony satisfied the Confrontation Clause because Caylor was a mere scrivener and Razatos qualified as an expert on the machine and procedures. The court affirmed the conviction.15 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Confrontation Clause issue.16
Whether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification, made for the purpose of proving a particular fact, through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the certification or perform or observe the test reported in the certification?17
The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness absent from trial unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.18 A forensic laboratory report prepared to prove a fact at a criminal trial qualifies as testimonial.19
No. In the established facts, Curtis Caylor prepared and signed the blood-alcohol report certifying a concentration of 0.21 grams per hundred milliliters after testing Bullcoming's sample with a gas chromatograph machine.20 Caylor was placed on unpaid leave and did not appear at the November 2005 jury trial.21 The State instead called Razatos, who had neither participated in nor observed the testing of Bullcoming's sample and could not convey Caylor's knowledge or expose any lapses.22 The surrogate testimony therefore failed to satisfy the requirement that Bullcoming confront the analyst who made the certification.23
The New Mexico Supreme Court erred when it treated Razatos as an adequate substitute on the ground that Caylor was a mere scrivener and Razatos qualified as an expert on laboratory procedures.24 The report contained representations about past events and human actions, including receipt of an intact sample and adherence to protocol, that were subject to cross-examination.25 The comparative reliability of the report did not dispense with the constitutional command.26
The admission of the report through Razatos's testimony violated Bullcoming's rights under the Confrontation Clause, requiring reversal of the New Mexico Supreme Court's judgment.27
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Justice Sotomayor concurs in the judgment. She agrees that the certified BAC report is testimonial because its primary purpose is evidentiary, creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.28 She emphasizes that the case does not present situations such as a supervisor with a personal connection to the test, an expert offering an independent opinion on underlying reports not admitted into evidence, or introduction of only machine-generated results.29
The formality of the certification further supports its evidentiary purpose even without notarization.30
Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment. He agrees that the report is testimonial because it is a solemn declaration made for the purpose of proving a fact.31 He would not adopt the primary purpose test used by the plurality.32
He writes separately to emphasize that the Confrontation Clause reaches formal testimonial statements regardless of whether they were made in response to police interrogation.33 Thomas stresses that the Clause applies to formal declarations made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact, focusing on the solemnity of the statement rather than its primary purpose.34 This approach ensures that the Clause covers solemn declarations prepared for use in criminal prosecutions.35
Whether a forensic laboratory report prepared in connection with a criminal investigation ranks as testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause?36
Yes. In the established facts, the report was prepared after Bullcoming's arrest for driving while intoxicated, pursuant to a warrant obtained because he refused a breath test.39 The sample was sent to the state laboratory required by law to assist police investigations, and Caylor certified the blood-alcohol concentration to support the charge of aggravated driving while intoxicated.40 The report was formalized in a signed document containing a legend referring to court rules for admission of such analyses.41
The forensic laboratory report ranks as testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.42
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Joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, And Justice Alito
Justice Kennedy dissents. He argues that the majority expands the Confrontation Clause beyond its original meaning by extending Melendez-Diaz.43 The report was not created to accuse a particular individual but as part of a routine scientific process involving multiple participants.44
The testimony of Razatos, who was qualified as an expert and could explain the laboratory procedures, was sufficient to allow the jury to evaluate the reliability of the report.45 The majority's rule will impose unnecessary burdens on the States without advancing the truth-seeking function of the Confrontation Clause.46 The judgment should be affirmed.47