471 U.S. 462 (1985)
In 1978 John Rudzewicz, a Michigan resident and senior partner in a Detroit accounting firm, was approached by Brian MacShara about jointly applying for a Burger King franchise in the Detroit area.1 They submitted their application to Burger King’s Birmingham, Michigan district office, which forwarded it to the company’s Miami headquarters.2
During the ensuing four months Rudzewicz and MacShara negotiated with both the Birmingham district office and Miami headquarters over site-development fees, building design, computation of monthly rent, and assignment of liabilities.3 With some misgivings they obtained limited concessions from the Miami headquarters, signed the final agreements, and commenced operations in June 1979 for the Drayton Plains facility.4 The agreements stated that the franchise relationship was established in Miami and governed by Florida law, required all royalty, advertising, and rent payments to be sent to Miami, and obligated Rudzewicz to attend training in Miami.5 MacShara completed the training course there and the franchisees purchased $165,000 in equipment from Burger King’s Miami division.6
The Drayton Plains restaurant enjoyed steady business during the summer of 1979 but patronage declined after a recession began later that year.7 Rudzewicz and MacShara fell far behind on their monthly payments to Miami.8 Burger King headquarters sent notices of default and conducted prolonged negotiations by mail and telephone with the franchisees, but the negotiations failed and headquarters terminated the franchise.9 Rudzewicz and MacShara refused to vacate and continued to operate the facility as a Burger King restaurant.10
Burger King commenced suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in May 1981.11 It invoked diversity and federal trademark jurisdiction.12 Burger King alleged breach of the franchise agreements by failure to make required payments in Miami together with trademark infringement.13 The district court denied Rudzewicz’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, conducted a three-day bench trial, entered judgment against Rudzewicz and MacShara jointly and severally for $228,875 in contract damages, ordered them to close the restaurant or surrender possession, and awarded costs and attorney’s fees.14 Rudzewicz appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed on the ground that the circumstances left Rudzewicz without reasonable notice of suit in Florida.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the jurisdictional ruling.16
Whether the District Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Rudzewicz pursuant to Florida’s long-arm statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?17
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant.18 A forum may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where an alleged injury arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.19 The constitutional touchstone is whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum State such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.20
No. Rudzewicz deliberately reached out beyond Michigan and negotiated with a Florida corporation for the purchase of a long-term franchise.21 His actions were not random or fortuitous.22 Rudzewicz knew that the franchise agreement required him to send payments to Miami and to submit to the supervision of Burger King’s Miami headquarters.23 He also agreed that the contract would be governed by Florida law.24
These actions demonstrate that Rudzewicz purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of Florida law.25 The contract documents establish that the franchise relationship was centered in Florida, requiring attendance at training in Miami and payments to Miami.26 The assertion of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice.27 The quality and nature of Rudzewicz’s relationship to Burger King and Florida makes it such that he should reasonably have anticipated being haled into court there.28
The District Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Rudzewicz did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.29
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by O’connor, J.
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that Rudzewicz maintained no place of business in Florida, had no employees there, and conducted all day-to-day operations in Michigan.30 He argued that the Michigan office handled negotiations and supervision, so the payments and choice-of-law clause did not create a substantial connection sufficient for jurisdiction.31 Stevens would affirm the Court of Appeals judgment because the circumstances left Rudzewicz without reasonable notice of suit in Florida and financially unprepared for distant litigation.32