531 U.S. 70 (2000)
Following the presidential election held on November 7, 2000, the Florida Division of Elections reported that Governor George W. Bush had received 2,909,135 votes while respondent Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., had received 2,907,351 votes, producing a margin of 1,784 votes in Bush's favor.1 Because the margin was equal to or less than one-half of one percent of the votes cast, an automatic machine recount took place pursuant to Florida statute.2 The recount produced a smaller margin for Bush.3 Vice President Gore then submitted written requests for manual recounts in Volusia, Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade counties.4
On November 14, 2000, in proceedings initiated by Volusia County and joined by the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, Vice President Gore, and the Florida Democratic Party, the Florida Circuit Court ruled that the statutory seven-day deadline for returns was mandatory but permitted the Volusia board to amend its returns at a later date.5 The court further determined that the Secretary of State could exercise discretion in deciding whether to include late amended returns in the statewide certification after considering all attendant facts and circumstances.6 The Secretary responded by issuing criteria for late filings and required counties to submit statements by November 15 justifying any extension.7 After review, the Secretary concluded that none of the submissions justified an extension of the deadline.8
The Florida Democratic Party and Vice President Gore filed an emergency motion arguing that the Secretary had acted arbitrarily, but the court denied the motion on November 17, finding the Secretary's actions reasonable.9 The Democratic Party and Gore appealed to the First District Court of Appeal, which certified the matter to the Florida Supreme Court.10 That court accepted jurisdiction and entered an order enjoining the Secretary and the Elections Canvassing Commission from certifying the election results until further order.11
On November 21, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court issued its decision.12 It held that discrepancies between machine returns and sample manual recounts due to ballot markings constituted errors in vote tabulation warranting full manual recounts.13 The court extended the deadline for county returns to November 26 at 5 p.m. and directed the Secretary to accept manual counts submitted by that time.14 Governor Bush then filed a petition for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted on two questions regarding the Florida Supreme Court's decision.15
Whether the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, by effectively changing the State’s elector appointment procedures after election day, violated the Due Process Clause or 3 U.S.C. § 5?16
As a general rule, this Court defers to a state court’s interpretation of a state statute, but in the case of a law enacted by a state legislature applicable to the selection of Presidential electors, the legislature is not acting solely under the authority given it by the people of the State, but by virtue of a direct grant of authority made under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution.17
No. The Florida Supreme Court extended the seven-day deadline under Fla. Stat. § 102.111 by twelve days to November 26 at 5 p.m. and directed acceptance of manual counts submitted by that time.18 The opinion of the Florida Supreme Court leaves considerable uncertainty as to the precise grounds for the decision, including the extent to which it saw the Florida Constitution as circumscribing the legislature’s authority under Art.
II, § 1, cl. 2, and the consideration accorded to 3 U.S.C. § 5.19 This uncertainty is sufficient reason for the Court to decline at this time to review the federal questions asserted to be present.20
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.21
Whether the decision of that court changed the manner in which the State’s electors are to be selected, in violation of the legislature’s power to designate the manner for selection under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution?22
No. Expressions in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida may be read to indicate that it construed the Florida Election Code without regard to the extent to which the Florida Constitution could circumscribe the legislative power under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2.25 One example is the opinion's statement that election laws must be liberally construed in favor of the citizens’ right to vote.26
The Court is unclear as to the extent to which the Florida Supreme Court saw the Florida Constitution as circumscribing the legislature’s authority under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2.27 The Court therefore declines to review the federal question at this time.28
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.