327 Conn. 540, 175 A.3d 1 (2017)
Emily Byrne received gynecological and obstetrical care and treatment from Avery Center for Obstetrics and Gynecology, P.C. before July 12, 2005.1 The defendant provided its patients, including Byrne, with notice of its privacy policy regarding protected health information and agreed that it would not disclose her health information without authorization.2
Byrne began a personal relationship with Andro Mendoza in May 2004 that lasted until September 2004.3 In October 2004 she instructed the defendant not to release her medical records to Mendoza.4 She moved from Connecticut to Vermont in March 2005.5 On May 31, 2005, Mendoza filed paternity actions against her in Connecticut and Vermont.6
The defendant received a subpoena directing the custodian of its records to appear before the issuing attorney on July 8, 2005, at the New Haven Regional Children's Probate Court and to produce all medical records pertaining to Byrne.7 The defendant did not alert Byrne of the subpoena, file a motion to quash it, or appear in court.8 Instead, around July 12, 2005, it mailed a copy of her medical file to the court.9
Mendoza informed Byrne by telephone that he had reviewed her medical records in the court file.10 On September 15, 2005, she filed a motion to seal her medical file, which was granted.11 Byrne alleges that she suffered harassment and extortion threats from Mendoza since he viewed her medical records.12
Byrne brought this action against the defendant.13 The operative complaint alleged breach of contract, negligence by failing to use proper care in protecting her medical file including by disclosing it without authorization in violation of General Statutes § 52-146o and HIPAA regulations, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.14 After discovery the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.15
The trial court dismissed the negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress counts on preemption grounds.16 Byrne appealed and the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.17 On remand the defendant moved for summary judgment on those counts, claiming no Connecticut court had recognized a common-law cause of action for breach of confidentiality by a health care provider responding to a subpoena.18 The trial court granted the motion.19 Byrne appealed again, and the appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court.20
Whether a patient has a civil remedy against a physician if that physician, without the patient's consent, discloses confidential information obtained in the course of the physician-patient relationship?21
A duty of confidentiality arises from the physician-patient relationship.22 Unauthorized disclosure of confidential information obtained in the course of that relationship gives rise to a cause of action sounding in tort against the health care provider, unless the disclosure is otherwise allowed by law.23
Yes. The defendant Avery Center for Obstetrics and Gynecology, P.C. maintained a physician-patient relationship with Emily Byrne by providing her gynecological and obstetrical care and by agreeing in its privacy policy not to disclose health information without authorization.24 The defendant received a subpoena but responded by mailing Byrne's medical file directly to the court without notifying her, without filing a motion to quash, and without appearing, thereby failing to follow the notice or protective-order procedures required by HIPAA regulations.25 Section 52-146o(b) permits disclosure without consent only pursuant to a statute, regulation, or rule of court, and a subpoena alone does not qualify.26
These facts establish a genuine issue of material fact whether the common-law duty was breached, so summary judgment was improper.27
Yes, Connecticut common law recognizes a civil remedy for unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information by a health care provider.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Robinson concurs in the judgment but writes separately to emphasize that recognizing this new cause of action is a proper and sparing exercise of the court's common-law authority.29 He notes that it complements the limited remedies under HIPAA and the policy expressed in § 52-146o without disturbing settled expectations, given the long-standing ethical and legal bases for the duty.30 Robinson highlights the broad support in sister-state case law and concludes that the expectations of citizens would be more unsettled if the courthouse doors were closed to such claims.31