441 U.S. 380 (1979)
Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed began living together in New York City in September 1968.1 They continued until the end of 1973.2 During this time they held themselves out as husband and wife even though Caban remained married to another woman until 1974.3 Mohammed gave birth to two children during this period: David Andrew Caban on July 16, 1969, and Denise Caban on March 12, 1971.4 Caban was named as the father on both birth certificates.5 The couple jointly supported the children while living together as a family.6
In December 1973, Mohammed left Caban with the children and began residing with Kazin Mohammed, whom she married on January 30, 1974.7 For the following nine months, the children visited their maternal grandmother weekly, allowing Caban to see them regularly.8 In September 1974, the grandmother moved to Puerto Rico and took the children with her at the Mohammeds' request.9 Caban maintained contact through his parents in Puerto Rico.10 In November 1975, he traveled there to retrieve the children, returning with them to New York.11
Upon learning of the children's location, Maria Mohammed attempted to recover them with police assistance.12 The Mohammeds then initiated custody proceedings in New York Family Court.13 That court awarded temporary custody to the Mohammeds and granted visiting rights to Caban and his new wife, Nina.14 In January 1976, the Mohammeds filed a petition for adoption of the children under section 110 of the New York Domestic Relations Law.15 The Cabans responded with a cross-petition for adoption in March 1976.16
A hearing occurred before a Law Assistant to the Surrogate in Kings County, where both parties presented evidence and cross-examined witnesses.17 The Surrogate granted the Mohammeds' adoption petition.18 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the decision, relying on the Court of Appeals' ruling in In re Malpica-Orsini.19 The New York Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, leading to review by the United States Supreme Court.20
Whether § 111 of the New York Domestic Relations Law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by according different consent rights to unwed mothers and unwed fathers in adoption proceedings?21
Gender-based distinctions must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.22
Yes. Section 111 draws an inflexible gender-based line that treats unwed mothers and unwed fathers differently even when both have established substantial parental relationships.23 Abdiel Caban lived with Maria Mohammed and their children David and Denise as a family unit from the children's births in 1969 and 1971 until late 1973.24 He jointly supported them and appeared on their birth certificates as father. After the Mohammeds obtained custody, Caban maintained contact through family in Puerto Rico and successfully retrieved the children in 1975, demonstrating ongoing involvement.25
The Surrogate granted the Mohammeds' adoption petition solely because Maria withheld consent.26 Caban could block the adoption only by proving it was not in the children's best interests.27 The State's interest in promoting adoptions of illegitimate children is important.28 The statute's distinction is not substantially related to that goal.29 Fathers who have participated in rearing older children can be identified and located without the broad presumption that all unwed fathers are less committed than mothers.30 The classification therefore rests on overbroad generalizations rather than a fair and substantial relation to the legislative objective.31
The gender-based distinction in § 111 violates the Equal Protection Clause.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart dissented on equal protection grounds.33 He argued that unwed mothers and fathers are not similarly situated with respect to newborn children.34 The statute reflects a careful accommodation of interests by giving the mother the power to consent.35
At the same time it still allows a non-custodial father with an established relationship an opportunity to be heard on the child's best interests.36 He concluded that the classification bears a close and substantial relationship to the State's goal of promoting the welfare of illegitimate children.37 The statute therefore does not violate equal protection as applied to Caban, whose relationship was terminated only after a best-interests determination.38
Justice Stevens dissented on equal protection grounds.39 He maintained that the physical and social differences between mothers and fathers from conception through infancy justify giving the mother the exclusive right to consent in most cases.40 The statute's general rule remains valid even if it produces an arguably arbitrary result in the rare case of an older child whose father has established a substantial relationship.41
He argued that the challenger must demonstrate unfairness in a significant number of situations before a generally justified classification can be invalidated.42 No such showing was made here.43
Whether an unwed father possesses a due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to maintain a parental relationship with his children absent a finding that he is unfit as a parent?44
The Due Process Clause protects against arbitrary state action that severs an established parental relationship.45 A decree terminating that relationship may be justified by a finding that adoption serves the best interests of the child when the natural family unit has already been destroyed and the father has taken no prior steps to legitimate the child.46
No. The Court did not reach or decide whether the Due Process Clause independently requires a finding of unfitness before an unwed father's rights may be terminated, because the statute was invalidated on equal protection grounds.47 Abdiel Caban received notice, participated fully in the hearing with counsel, and presented evidence on the best interests of the children, satisfying the procedural protections recognized in Stanley v. Illinois.48 The Surrogate's decision rested on the best-interests determination rather than any presumption of unfitness.49 The Court expressed no view on whether substantive due process would bar termination without an unfitness finding in this setting.50
The Court did not resolve whether the Due Process Clause requires a finding of parental unfitness before terminating an unwed father's rights.51
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart concluded that the Constitution does not require an unmarried father's substantive parental rights to be coextensive with those of married fathers.52 The absence of a legal tie with the mother provides a constitutionally valid ground for distinction between unwed and married fathers.53 He found no due process violation because Caban received a full opportunity to litigate the best-interests question before the Surrogate.54
Unlike the situation in Stanley v. Illinois, where custody was removed without any hearing, here the unwed mother initiated the adoption proceeding after marrying and Caban participated with counsel.55 The procedural protections afforded were therefore sufficient under the Due Process Clause.56
Justice Stevens rejected the due process claim on the ground that termination of parental rights is justified by a finding that adoption serves the child's best interests.57 This holds when the natural family has dissolved, the father has not legitimated the child, and requiring unfitness would deprive the child of the benefits of adoption and legitimacy.58 He assumed that an established relationship between a father and his natural child is entitled to protection against arbitrary state action.59
Nevertheless, the best-interests standard is adequate to avoid arbitrary state action in these circumstances and overcomes any further protection that may exist in the Due Process Clause.60