479 U.S. 272 (1987)
California amended its Fair Employment and Housing Act in September 1978 to prohibit certain forms of employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.1
The amendment, codified at California Government Code section 12945(b)(2), requires employers subject to Title VII to provide female employees an unpaid pregnancy disability leave of up to four months.2 The state agency interpreting the statute has construed it to require reinstatement to the same or a substantially similar job upon return from leave, unless business necessity prevents it.3
Petitioner California Federal Savings & Loan Association maintains a facially neutral leave policy permitting employees with three months of service to take unpaid leaves for disability and pregnancy.4 The policy attempts to provide a similar position upon return but reserves the right to terminate the employee if no similar position is available.5 In January 1982, employee Lillian Garland took pregnancy disability leave from her receptionist position at Cal Fed.6 Upon notifying the employer in April 1982 that she was able to return, Garland learned that her job had been filled and no similar positions were available.7
Garland filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing.8 The Department issued an administrative accusation against Cal Fed on her behalf charging violation of the state leave provision.9 Before the scheduled hearing, Cal Fed, along with the Merchants and Manufacturers Association and the California Chamber of Commerce, brought an action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California seeking a declaration that the state statute is preempted by Title VII and an injunction against its enforcement.10 The District Court granted summary judgment to the petitioners.11 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that judgment.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the preemption issue.13
Whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, pre-empts a state statute that requires employers to provide leave and reinstatement to employees disabled by pregnancy?14
Federal law preempts a state statute only if the state law requires or permits the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under Title VII or is inconsistent with the purposes of the federal statute.15 The PDA establishes a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop and not a ceiling above which they may not rise.16 This allows states to mandate additional protections for pregnant workers.17
No. The PDA amended Title VII to define sex discrimination to include pregnancy and was intended to provide relief for working women by ending discrimination against pregnant workers.18 The state statute promotes equal employment opportunity by ensuring that women do not lose their jobs on account of pregnancy disability.19 Because the PDA establishes a floor and not a ceiling, the state law is consistent with federal law.20 Employers can comply with both by providing comparable benefits to other disabled employees, making physical compliance possible.21
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens concurred in part and in the judgment.25 He agreed that the PDA allows some preferential treatment of pregnancy because it is consistent with the interpretation of Title VII in Weber, which permits preferential treatment for disadvantaged classes when it accomplishes the goal of equality of employment opportunities.26 Stevens concluded that the California statute meets this test and that a California employer would not violate the PDA by complying with the state law without affording the same protection to men suffering similar disabilities.27
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment on narrower grounds.28 He emphasized that section 708 of Title VII is an antipreemption provision that precludes preemption unless the state law purports to require or permit any act that would be an unlawful employment practice under the PDA.29 Scalia concluded that the California statute does not purport to require or permit any refusal to accord equal treatment and therefore cannot be preempted, making it unnecessary to decide whether the PDA prohibits preferential treatment.30
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice Powell
Justice White dissented, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Powell.31 He argued that the second clause of the PDA mandates that pregnant employees shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes as other persons similar in their ability or inability to work, leaving no room for preferential treatment.32 White concluded that the California law is in square conflict with the PDA on its face because it requires a disability leave policy for pregnancy even if none exists for other disabilities and is therefore preempted.33