402 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 1535, 29 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1971)
On August 20, 1966, respondent Byers was involved in a motor vehicle accident in California resulting in property damage.1 On August 22, 1966, the State filed a two-count criminal complaint charging Byers with misdemeanor violations of the California Vehicle Code arising from that incident.2 Count 1 charged that Byers passed another vehicle without maintaining the safe distance required by section 21750.3 Count 2 charged that Byers failed to stop at the scene of the accident and identify himself as required by section 20002(a)(1).4
It is stipulated that both charges arose out of the same accident.5 Section 20002(a)(1) provides that the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to any property shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene and locate and notify the owner or person in charge of such property of the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle involved.6
Byers demurred to Count 2 on the ground that the statute violated his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.7 The Justice Court overruled the demurrer.8 Byers sought a writ of prohibition from the Superior Court, which granted the writ.9
The California Court of Appeal reversed that decision.10 The California Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's issuance of the writ after construing the statute to include a use restriction on the compelled disclosures.11
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to assess the validity of the California Supreme Court's premise that without a use restriction the statute would violate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.12
Whether the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is infringed by California's hit-and-run statute which requires the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an accident to stop at the scene and give his name and address?13
The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects only against compelled disclosures that create substantial hazards of self-incrimination in areas permeated with criminal statutes and directed at highly selective groups inherently suspect of criminal activities; it does not extend to essentially regulatory statutes directed at the public at large where the mere possibility of incrimination is insufficient to defeat strong policies favoring disclosure, as articulated in United States v. Sullivan and distinguished from Albertson, Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes.14
No. The statute applies to all persons who drive automobiles in California, a group numbering in the millions.15 It is directed at the public at large rather than a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.16 The purpose of the statute is to promote satisfaction of civil liabilities arising from automobile accidents, not to facilitate criminal convictions.17 Compliance does not confront the driver with substantial hazards of self-incrimination because most accidents occur without creating criminal liability.18
The constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is not infringed by the statute.19
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Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment.20 He emphasized that the presence of a real and not imaginary risk of self-incrimination is not a sufficient predicate for extending the privilege to regulatory schemes of this character.21
He reasoned that the public regulation of driving behavior through a pattern of laws which includes compelled self-reporting to ensure financial responsibility for automobile accidents and criminal sanctions to deter dangerous driving entails genuine risks of self-incrimination from the driver's point of view. Yet extending the Fifth Amendment would impair the State's capacity to pursue noncriminal objectives simultaneously.22
Harlan stressed evaluating the noncriminal governmental purpose, the necessity for self-reporting, and the nature of the disclosures required.23 He concluded that the hit-and-run statute predicates the duty to report on an event not inherently suspect and confines disclosure to the minimal level consistent with the regulatory scheme.24
Whether compliance with the statute requires disclosures that are testimonial in nature within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment?25
The Fifth Amendment privilege protects only against compelled communications or testimony of a testimonial or communicative nature and does not bar compulsion that makes a suspect the source of real or physical evidence, such as stopping at the scene of an accident or providing name and address, which are neutral acts akin to standing in a lineup or providing fingerprints or blood samples.26
No. Compliance with section 20002(a)(1) requires a driver involved in an accident to stop at the scene and give his name and address.27 The act of stopping is no more testimonial than requiring a person in custody to stand or walk in a police lineup, to speak prescribed words, or to give samples of handwriting, fingerprints, or blood.28 Disclosure of name and address is an essentially neutral act that identifies but does not by itself implicate anyone in criminal conduct.29 The statutory purpose is to implement the state police power to regulate use of motor vehicles.30
Stopping in compliance with the statute therefore does not provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature within the meaning of the Constitution.31
Compliance with the statute does not require disclosures that are testimonial in nature within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.32
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Justice Black dissented.33 He found unacceptable the holding that the California statute is valid because the disclosures it requires are not testimonial.34
He reasoned that even assuming the Fifth Amendment prohibits the State only from compelling a man to produce testimonial evidence against himself, the California requirement here is still unconstitutional.35 What evidence can possibly be more testimonial than a man's own statement that he is a person who has just been involved in an automobile accident inflicting property damage.36
Black noted that neither United States v. Wade nor any other case of the Court has ever held that the State may convict a man by compelling him to admit that he is guilty of conduct constituting an element of a crime.37
Whether the statute is directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities such that compliance would create substantial hazards of self-incrimination?38
The privilege applies to disclosures extracted from a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities in an area permeated with criminal statutes, but does not apply in an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry directed at the public at large, where the group is not highly selective or inherently suspect of criminal activities.39
No. Although the California Vehicle Code defines some criminal offenses, the statute is essentially regulatory, not criminal.4041 The statute is directed at all persons who drive automobiles in California, a group numbering in the millions and so large as to render the statute directed at the public at large.42 It is difficult to consider this group as either highly selective or inherently suspect of criminal activities.43 Driving an automobile, unlike gambling, is a lawful activity.44
It is not a criminal offense under California law to be a driver involved in an accident.45 No empirical data support a relevant correlation between being a driver and criminal prosecution of drivers, as most accidents occur without creating criminal liability even if one or both of the drivers are guilty of negligence as a matter of tort law.46
The statute is not directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities such that compliance would create substantial hazards of self-incrimination.47
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan dissented and joined Justice Black's opinion.48 He added that the plurality opinion bears little resemblance to the facts of the case or the law upon which it relies.49
He emphasized that all three California courts below found that respondent faced a substantial hazard of self-incrimination if he reported that he was the driver of one of the automobiles involved in the accident.50 The alleged improper passing caused the accident.51
Brennan stressed that the record demonstrates respondent was charged both with illegal passing which resulted in an accident and with failing to report himself as one of the drivers involved.52 This created a more substantial hazard than in Marchetti.53 The plurality lost sight of this concrete record by focusing on abstract generalities about automobile accidents.54