471 U.S. 386 (1985)
On May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Agency Agent Robert Williams watched respondent Charles Carney approach a youth in downtown San Diego.1 The youth accompanied Carney to a Dodge Mini Motor Home parked in a nearby lot. Carney and the youth closed the window shades in the motor home, including one across the front window.2 Agent Williams had previously received uncorroborated information that the same motor home was used by another person who was exchanging marihuana for sex. Williams, with assistance from other agents, kept the motor home under surveillance for the entire one and one-quarter hours that Carney and the youth remained inside.3
When the youth left the motor home, the agents followed and stopped him. The youth told the agents that he had received marihuana in return for allowing Carney sexual contacts.4 At the agents’ request, the youth returned to the motor home and knocked on its door; Carney stepped out. The agents identified themselves as law enforcement officers. Without a warrant or consent, one agent entered the motor home and observed marihuana, plastic bags, and a scale of the kind used in weighing drugs on a table.5 Agent Williams took Carney into custody and took possession of the motor home. A subsequent search of the motor home at the police station revealed additional marihuana in the cupboards and refrigerator.6
Respondent was charged with possession of marihuana for sale. At a preliminary hearing, he moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the motor home. The Magistrate denied the motion.7 Respondent renewed his suppression motion in the Superior Court. The Superior Court also rejected the claim. Respondent then pleaded nolo contendere to the charges against him, and was placed on probation for three years.8
Respondent appealed from the order placing him on probation. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction.9 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.10
Whether law enforcement agents violated the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless search, based on probable cause, of a fully mobile motor home located in a public place?11
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.12 This fundamental right is preserved by a requirement that searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an independent judicial officer.13 There are exceptions to the general rule that a warrant must be secured before a search is undertaken. One exception is the automobile exception at issue in this case. This exception to the warrant requirement was first set forth by the Court in Carroll v. United States.14 The Court recognized that the privacy interests in an automobile are constitutionally protected. However, it held that the ready mobility of the automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests.15 The reasons for the vehicle exception are twofold. Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office.16 When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes, the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play.17 The vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not actually moving. There is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling.18
No. The motor home was readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not actually moving.19 It was licensed to operate on public streets, serviced in public places, and subject to extensive regulation and inspection.20 The vehicle was parked in a public lot in downtown San Diego, a place not regularly used for residential purposes.21 The agents had abundant probable cause from the youth's statement that he had received marihuana in return for allowing Carney sexual contacts after one and one-quarter hours of surveillance.
The search was plainly one that a magistrate could authorize if presented with these facts, as the agents had fresh, direct, uncontradicted evidence that the respondent was distributing a controlled substance from the vehicle.22
The warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the California Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan And Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented.24 He argued that the motor home is a hybrid which combines the mobility attribute of an automobile with most of the privacy characteristics of a house.25 Stevens contended that the Court erred in three respects by choosing to follow the automobile exception route: it entered new territory prematurely, accorded priority to an exception rather than the general rule, and abandoned the limits on the exception imposed by prior cases.26
He maintained that the motor home was parked in an off-the-street lot only a few blocks from the courthouse where dozens of magistrates were available, with no evidence of exigency.27 Stevens maintained that searches of places that regularly accommodate a wide range of private human activity are fundamentally different from searches of automobiles which primarily serve a public transportation function.28 In his view, a warrantless search of living quarters in a motor home is presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances.29