364 U.S. 587, 81 S. Ct. 321, 5 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1961)
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri a jury convicted petitioner on two counts under the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act.1 Count I charged conspiracy to obstruct commerce by extorting money and Count II charged the substantive offense of obstructing commerce by extortion.2 The district court imposed consecutive twelve-year terms on each count but suspended the sentence on Count II and replaced it with a five-year probation term to commence upon expiration of the Count I sentence.3
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.4 Petitioner then filed a motion in the district court under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking correction of the sentence.5 He asserted that the Act established a maximum penalty of twenty years for obstructing interstate commerce by any means and that Congress had not intended to authorize two separate penalties.6
The district court denied relief. It held that the Hobbs Act gave no indication of any departure from the usual rule allowing cumulative punishment for conspiracy and the substantive crime that was its object.7 Petitioner appealed the denial to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because it deemed the question raised by petitioner of sufficient importance.9
Whether the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act permits separate convictions and cumulative sentences for conspiracy to obstruct commerce by extortion and the completed substantive offense of obstructing commerce by extortion?10
The commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct offenses, and Congress is presumed to intend that they may be cumulatively punished unless the statute expresses a contrary intent.11
Yes. The petitioner was convicted on Count I charging conspiracy to obstruct commerce by extorting money. He was also convicted on Count II charging the substantive offense of obstructing commerce by extortion under the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act. The district court imposed consecutive twelve-year terms on each count. It suspended the Count II sentence in favor of probation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and the denial of relief under Rule 35.12
These facts fit the settled principle that conspiracy and its substantive object remain distinct crimes even when both are defined in a single statutory provision.13 Therefore, the trial judge acted within discretion in fixing separate sentences.14
The Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act permits separate convictions and cumulative sentences for conspiracy to obstruct commerce by extortion and the completed substantive offense.15
Related opinions on this issue
The language of the Hobbs Act can fairly be read as imposing a single maximum twenty-year sentence for each actual or threatened interference with interstate commerce accomplished by any of the proscribed means.16 He relied on the legislative history showing that Congress viewed twenty years as the maximum penalty that could be imposed upon conviction under the statute.17
The original Senate Committee Report treated restraints accompanied by extortion as felonies whether in the form of conspiracies or not.18 In his view the rule of lenity required resolving any ambiguity against cumulative punishments for what he regarded as a single basic criminal transaction.19