577 U.S. 153 (2016)
The United States Navy contracted with petitioner Campbell-Ewald Company beginning in 2000 to develop a multimedia recruiting campaign.1 In 2005 and 2006 Campbell proposed sending text messages to young adults who had opted in to receive marketing solicitations on Navy service topics, and the Navy approved the proposal on that condition.2 Campbell subcontracted with Mindmatics LLC, which generated a list of cellular numbers for consenting 18- to 24-year-old users and transmitted the Navy’s recruiting message to over 100,000 recipients in May 2006.3
Respondent Jose Gomez received one such message. He alleged he had never consented, was nearly 40 years old, and therefore outside the Navy’s target age group.4 In 2010 Gomez filed a nationwide class-action complaint in the Central District of California alleging that Campbell violated the TCPA by using an automatic dialing system to send text messages without prior express consent.5 He sought treble statutory damages, costs, attorney’s fees, and an injunction on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals.6
Before the deadline for Gomez to move for class certification, Campbell served a Rule 68 offer of judgment offering Gomez $1,503 per message for the May 2006 message and any others he could prove he received, plus costs excluding attorney’s fees, together with a stipulated injunction that denied liability. Gomez did not accept the offer, which lapsed after 14 days.7 Campbell then moved under Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss the entire action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the unaccepted offer had mooted Gomez’s individual claim and, because no class-certification motion had been filed, the putative class claims as well.8
The district court denied the motion to dismiss.9 After limited discovery Campbell moved for summary judgment on the separate ground that, as a Navy contractor, it was entitled to derivative sovereign immunity.10 The district court granted that motion.11 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding both that the unaccepted offer did not moot the case and that Campbell was not entitled to derivative sovereign immunity.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the mootness and immunity questions.
Whether an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment moots a plaintiff’s individual claim and any putative class claims?13
Article III requires an actual controversy at all stages of review. A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.14 An unaccepted settlement offer or Rule 68 offer of judgment is a legal nullity with no operative effect under basic principles of contract law and Rule 68, leaving the parties adverse with the same concrete interest in the litigation they had at the outset.15
No. Campbell served Gomez with a Rule 68 offer of judgment proposing $1,503 per message plus costs and a stipulated injunction that denied liability.16 Gomez did not accept the offer, which lapsed after fourteen days.17 With no operative settlement offer remaining, the parties retained the same stake in the litigation as at the outset, so Gomez’s individual TCPA claim was not mooted.18 Because Gomez retained a live individual claim, the putative class claims likewise remained live during the time needed to determine whether class certification was warranted.19
An unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff’s individual claim or any putative class claims.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment that an unaccepted offer does not moot the claim but would rest the conclusion on the common-law history of tenders rather than modern contract law principles or Rule 68.21 At common law a mere offer without actual production of the sum and an admission of liability was insufficient to end a case, and courts would not have understood such an offer to strip them of jurisdiction.22 Campbell-Ewald made only offers to pay without further steps such as actual payment or deposit, so the District Court retained jurisdiction under that historical practice.23
Joined by Scalia, Alito
Chief Justice Roberts dissents, contending that when a defendant offers to fully satisfy the plaintiff’s individual claim the case becomes moot even if the plaintiff refuses the offer.24 The federal courts exist to resolve real disputes, not to issue advisory opinions on a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief already available.25 Once Campbell offered complete relief the necessity for the court to expound the law ended, and the District Court’s finding that the offer would have fully satisfied Gomez’s claims rendered the action moot regardless of Gomez’s rejection.26
Justice Alito joins the Chief Justice’s dissent but writes separately to emphasize that an offer of complete relief moots a damages claim only if it is absolutely clear the defendant will actually pay.27 In this case there is no real dispute that Campbell would make good on its promise if the case were dismissed, satisfying the voluntary-cessation standard translated to the damages context.28 Absent that assurance the case would not be moot because a court could still grant effectual relief.29
Whether a federal contractor is entitled to derivative sovereign immunity from suit under the TCPA when performing work pursuant to a contract with the Navy?30
Federal contractors do not enjoy the absolute immunity of the United States and its agencies. A contractor performing work pursuant to a validly conferred government contract may be shielded only when it simply performs as directed and does not exceed its authority or violate federal law.31 Derivative sovereign immunity does not exist when the contractor has exceeded its authority or when its authority was not validly conferred.32
No. The Navy authorized Campbell to send text messages only to individuals who had opted in to receive solicitations, as required by the TCPA.33 Gomez presented evidence that the Navy relied on Campbell’s representation that the recipient list complied with that condition.34 When Campbell’s subcontractor transmitted messages to recipients who had not opted in, Campbell violated both federal law and the Navy’s explicit instructions. Because the contractor exceeded its authority, no derivative sovereign immunity shields it from suit under the TCPA.35
A federal contractor is not entitled to derivative sovereign immunity from suit under the TCPA when performing work pursuant to a contract with the Navy if the contractor violates federal law or the government’s explicit instructions.36