336 Ark. 379, 985 S.W.2d 724 (1999)
The parties divorced in 1993.1 Michael Scott Campbell was awarded custody of Natasha Nicole and Michael Scott, Bonnie Campbell received visitation and was ordered to pay child support, and both parents were prohibited from having overnight guests of the opposite sex when the children were present.2
In 1996, Bonnie filed a motion alleging that a change of circumstances had occurred that warranted placement of the children with her.3 After a two-day hearing, the chancellor transferred custody to Bonnie.4
Scott appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, which affirmed the chancellor's decision in a 3-3 decision.5 Scott then petitioned the Arkansas Supreme Court for review, and the court granted the petition.6
Evidence presented at the hearing showed that both parents had violated the overnight guest prohibition.7 The children were ten and eight years old when Bonnie filed the motion.8 Although the children were happy and doing well in school with no apparent physical problems, they appeared to be suffering from emotional anxiety.9 A psychologist who interviewed the children expressed concerns about their emotional health.10 The chancellor interviewed the children and noted Michael's strong desire to live with his mother.11 The guardian ad litem voiced concerns about Bonnie's living arrangement with a man without marriage.12
Whether a change of circumstances in the life of the noncustodial parent alone is sufficient to justify modifying an existing custody order?13
Arkansas law is well settled that a judicial award of custody will not be modified unless it is shown that there are changed conditions which demonstrate that a modification of the decree will be in the best interests of the children.14 The party seeking modification of the custody order has the burden of showing a material change in circumstances.15 A change of circumstances of the noncustodial parent is not sufficient to justify modifying custody.16
No. The chancellor’s expressed findings dealt only with Bonnie’s change in circumstances since the parties’ 1993 decree, including that she has a good job, she appears to be emotionally stable unlike before, and she is in an apparent stable relationship with a man.17 Under the rule from Jones v. Jones, such changes in the life of the noncustodial parent are insufficient to warrant transfer of custody to her.18
A change of circumstances in the life of the noncustodial parent alone is not sufficient to justify modifying an existing custody order.19
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Arnold And Justice Brown
Justice Thornton concurs in the result because the chancellor did not make sufficient findings of fact upon which an appellate court could rest an affirmance.20 The de novo review conducted in the prevailing opinion of the Court of Appeals discloses that there was some evidence to support a finding that a material change in circumstances existed.21 However, the chancellor expressed concerns about the children’s insecurity and stress shown both by words and actions of the children and ordered a change in custody based upon those concerns without articulating particular findings.22
Thornton notes that if particular findings supporting the change of custody have been articulated by the chancellor, great deference should be given.23 Yet the chancellor appears to have concluded that it was in the best interest of the children to live with their mother based upon the desire of the eight-year-old son.24 That is not sufficient.25
Whether the evidence presented at the hearing established material changes in circumstances affecting the best interests of the children since the 1993 divorce decree?26
The only other time a change is permissible is when there is a showing of facts affecting the best interests of the children that were either not presented to the chancellor or were not known by the chancellor at the time the original custody order was entered.27 It is well settled that chancery cases are reviewed de novo on the record, but the reviewing court does not reverse a finding of fact by the chancellor unless it is clearly erroneous.28 A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.29
No. The evidence reveals that Scott has performed an outstanding job in raising the parties’ children against tough odds.30 While the children appear to be suffering from emotional anxiety, Dr. Barling was uncertain as to the exact cause and gave several possible sources from which the children’s distress could have originated, not the least of which is the parents’ inability to deal with one another.31 Michael’s preference to be with his mother is not controlling, especially when testimony was presented indicating Bonnie may have implanted improper suggestions in the children’s minds.32 To uproot the children from Scott’s custody when the preponderant evidence shows they are doing well would be wrong.33
The evidence presented at the hearing did not establish material changes in circumstances affecting the best interests of the children since the 1993 divorce decree.34