435 U.S. 247 (1978)
Respondent Jarius Piphus was a freshman at Chicago Vocational High School during the 1973-1974 school year.1 On January 23, 1974, during school hours, the school principal saw Piphus and another student standing outdoors on school property passing back and forth what the principal described as an irregularly shaped cigarette.2 The principal approached the students unnoticed and smelled what he believed was the strong odor of burning marihuana.3 He also saw Piphus try to pass a packet of cigarette papers to the other student.4 When the students became aware of the principal’s presence, they threw the cigarette into a nearby hedge.5 The principal took the students to the school’s disciplinary office and directed the assistant principal to impose the usual 20-day suspension for violation of the school rule against the use of drugs.6
Piphus was allowed to remain at school, although not in class, for the remainder of the school day while the assistant principal tried without success to reach his mother.7 A suspension notice was sent to Piphus’ mother, and a few days later two meetings were arranged among Piphus, his mother, his sister, school officials, and representatives from a legal aid clinic.8 The purpose of the meetings was not to determine whether Piphus had been smoking marihuana, but rather to explain the reasons for the suspension.9 Following an unfruitful exchange of views, Piphus and his mother as guardian ad litem filed suit against petitioners in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart 28 U.S.C. § 1343.10 Piphus was readmitted to school under a temporary restraining order after eight days of his suspension.11
Respondent Silas Brisco was in the sixth grade at Clara Barton Elementary School in Chicago during the 1973-1974 school year.12 On September 11, 1973, Brisco came to school wearing one small earring.13 The previous school year, the school principal had issued a rule against the wearing of earrings by male students because he believed that this practice denoted membership in street gangs and increased the likelihood that gang members would terrorize other students.14 Brisco was reminded of this rule, but he refused to remove the earring, asserting that it was a symbol of black pride, not of gang membership.15 The assistant principal talked to Brisco’s mother, advising her that her son would be suspended for 20 days if he did not remove the earring.16 Brisco’s mother supported her son’s position, and a 20-day suspension was imposed.17
Brisco and his mother as guardian ad litem filed suit in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343.18 The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief together with actual and punitive damages in the amount of $5,000.19 Brisco was readmitted to school during the pendency of proceedings for a preliminary injunction after 17 days of his suspension.20 Piphus’ and Brisco’s cases were consolidated for trial and submitted on stipulated records.21 The District Court held that both students had been suspended without procedural due process.22
The District Court also held that petitioners were not entitled to qualified immunity from damages under the second branch of Wood v. Strickland because they should have known that a lengthy suspension without any adjudicative hearing of any type would violate procedural due process.23 The District Court declined to award damages because plaintiffs put no evidence in the record to quantify their damages and the record is completely devoid of any evidence which could even form the basis of a speculative inference measuring the extent of their injuries.24 The court also stated that the students were entitled to declaratory relief and to deletion of the suspensions from their school records but for reasons that are not apparent the court failed to enter an order to that effect and instead simply dismissed the complaints.25 No finding was made as to whether respondents would have been suspended if they had received procedural due process.26
On respondents’ appeal the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded.27 It first held that the District Court erred in not granting declaratory and injunctive relief.28 It also held that the District Court should have considered evidence submitted by respondents after judgment that tended to prove the pecuniary value of each day of school that they missed while suspended.29 The court said however that respondents would not be entitled to recover damages representing the value of missed school time if petitioners showed on remand that there was just cause for the suspensions and that therefore respondents would have been suspended even if a proper hearing had been held.30 Finally the Court of Appeals held that even if the District Court found on remand that respondents’ suspensions were justified they would be entitled to recover substantial non-punitive damages simply because they had been denied procedural due process.31 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether in an action under § 1983 for the deprivation of procedural due process a plaintiff must prove that he actually was injured by the deprivation before he may recover substantial non-punitive damages.32
Whether the fact that the students' suspensions were ultimately justified precludes recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the denial of procedural due process?33
No. The established facts show that Piphus was observed passing an irregularly shaped cigarette believed to be marihuana and was suspended for twenty days without notice or hearing.36 Brisco was suspended for wearing an earring after refusing to remove it despite claiming it symbolized black pride.37 The District Court found both suspensions violated procedural due process yet awarded only nominal damages because no proof of actual injury appeared in the record.38 The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that justification of the suspensions would not bar recovery for the procedural violation itself.39
This Court agrees that the absolute nature of the due process right permits a § 1983 action even when the substantive outcome might have been the same after a proper hearing.40
The fact that the students' suspensions were ultimately justified does not preclude recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the denial of procedural due process.41
Whether the students are entitled to recover nominal damages for the denial of procedural due process even if their suspensions were justified and even if they did not suffer any actual injury?42
Common-law courts traditionally vindicate deprivations of absolute rights that are not shown to have caused actual injury through the award of a nominal sum of money.43 Because the right to procedural due process is absolute and important to organized society, its denial should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.44
Yes. The established facts establish that the District Court found a complete lack of evidence quantifying any damages or measuring the extent of injuries from the suspensions of Piphus after eight days and Brisco after seventeen days.45 No evidence of mental distress or other actual injury caused by the procedural deficiencies was presented at trial.46 Nevertheless, the denial of notice and an opportunity to be heard occurred in both cases.47
This Court holds that the importance of scrupulously observing procedural due process supports an award of nominal damages not to exceed one dollar even when the suspensions themselves were justified and no actual injury is proved.48
The students are entitled to recover nominal damages for the denial of procedural due process even if their suspensions were justified and even if they did not suffer any actual injury.49
Whether the students are entitled to recover substantial damages for the denial of due process itself without proving actual injury caused by the denial?50
The basic purpose of § 1983 is to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.51 Common-law principles of tort compensation do not support an award of substantial damages absent proof of actual injury.52 The abstract value of a constitutional right may not form the basis for § 1983 damages.53
No. The established facts demonstrate that the District Court explicitly found the record completely devoid of any evidence that could form the basis of even a speculative inference measuring the extent of the students' injuries from the denial of due process.54 The Court of Appeals nevertheless directed an award of substantial non-punitive damages simply because procedural due process had been denied.55
This Court rejects that approach because the compensation principle governing § 1983 requires proof that the denial itself caused actual, compensable injury such as mental distress, and no such proof exists here.56 Presuming damages from every procedural irregularity would depart from the compensation principle without justification.57
The students are not entitled to recover substantial damages for the denial of due process itself without proving actual injury caused by the denial.58
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan concurs in Parts I and II of the Court's opinion but dissents from Part III.59 He maintains that the denial of procedural due process is itself a constitutional injury that is actionable under § 1983 without proof of additional harm because the right is absolute.60 An award of substantial damages would serve the deterrent purpose of § 1983 and recognize the independent constitutional value of procedural fairness.61
He would therefore affirm the Court of Appeals judgment allowing recovery of substantial damages for the denial itself.62
Whether on remand the District Court should determine whether respondents have in fact been deprived of due process, and if so what damages if any they actually suffered as a result of the denial of due process?63
Yes. The established facts indicate that the District Court never made a finding on whether Piphus or Brisco would have been suspended even after a proper hearing.66 The Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of that question along with evidence of pecuniary loss from missed school days.67 This Court directs the District Court on remand to decide whether due process was actually denied and, if so, to award only those damages proved to have been caused by the procedural violation.68
If the suspensions were justified, respondents may recover only the nominal damages for the due process denial and nothing for injuries flowing from the suspensions.69
On remand the District Court should determine whether respondents have in fact been deprived of due process, and if so what damages if any they actually suffered as a result of the denial of due process.70