380 U.S. 89 (1965)
The petitioner, a sergeant in the United States Army, entered the service from Alabama in 1946 at the age of 18.1 The State concedes that he has been domiciled in Texas since 1962, and that he intends to make his home there permanently.2
He has purchased a house in El Paso where he lives with his wife and two children.3 He is also the proprietor of a small business there.4 The petitioner’s post of military duty is not in Texas, but at White Sands, New Mexico.5 He regularly commutes from his home in El Paso to his Army job at White Sands.6 He pays property taxes in Texas and has his automobile registered there.7 But for his uniform, the State concedes that the petitioner would be eligible to vote in El Paso County, Texas.8
A provision of the Texas Constitution prohibits any member of the Armed Forces of the United States, who moves his home to Texas during the course of his military duty, from ever voting in any election in that State so long as he or she is a member of the Armed Forces.9 The Supreme Court of Texas construed the provision to prevent a person entering military service as a resident citizen of another state from acquiring a voting residence in Texas during the period of military service.10
The Supreme Court of Texas refused to issue a writ of mandamus ordering petitioner’s local election officials to permit him to vote, two Justices dissenting.11 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.12
Whether the Texas constitutional provision, as construed by the Supreme Court of Texas, deprives the petitioner of a right secured by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?13
Texas has unquestioned power to impose reasonable residence restrictions on the availability of the ballot.14 The States have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised.15 However, the classification drawn in a statute must be reasonable in light of its purpose.16 Fencing out from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.17 By forbidding a soldier ever to controvert the presumption of non-residence, the Texas Constitution imposes an invidious discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.18
Yes. The petitioner has been domiciled in Texas since 1962 with the intention of making his home there permanently.19 He owns a house in El Paso where he lives with his wife and two children and operates a small business.20 Although his military post is in New Mexico, he commutes daily from El Paso and pays Texas property taxes on his home and automobile.21
The State concedes that the petitioner would be eligible to vote but for his status as a member of the armed forces.22 The Texas constitutional provision absolutely denies the vote to all servicemen who were not residents of Texas before induction.23 Unlike students, hospital patients, and civilian federal employees, servicemen receive no opportunity to demonstrate bona fide residence to election officials.24 This absolute denial is not justified by the interest in preventing a military takeover of local elections or in protecting against transients.25
If servicemen are in fact residents with the intention of making Texas their home indefinitely, they have a right to an equal opportunity for political representation.26 The provision goes beyond reasonable steps to ensure bona fide residence by making the presumption of nonresidence conclusive and incapable of being overcome by proof.27
The Texas constitutional provision, as construed by the Supreme Court of Texas, deprives the petitioner of a right secured by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan dissented.29 He argued that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and prior decisions show that the Equal Protection Clause was not intended to apply to state voter qualifications.30 This decision improperly extends federal judicial power into the political affairs of the States.31
The reapportionment cases do not require this extension because they concerned methods of constituting state legislatures rather than voter qualifications.32 Even assuming equal protection applies, Harlan concluded that the Texas differentiation is founded on a rational classification.33 Servicemen from other states are typically transients.34
Texas could rationally decide to treat them as such to avoid administrative costs of determining bona fide residence in each case.35 A distinction may be drawn between voluntary private residents and those ordered into the state by military authority.36 Texas could rationally decide to protect state and local politics against the influences of military voting strength by postponing the privilege of voting until the serviceman becomes a civilian.37