450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981)
The question presented in this Title VII class action is whether an interlocutory order of the District Court denying a joint motion of the parties to enter a consent decree containing injunctive relief is an appealable order.
I
Petitioners, representing a class of present and former black seasonal employees and applicants for employment at the Richmond Leaf Department of the American Tobacco Co., brought this suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Alleging that respondents1 had discriminated against them in hiring, promotion, transfer, and training opportunities, petitioners sought a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and money damages.
After extensive discovery had been conducted and the plaintiff class had been certified,2 the parties negotiated a settlement and jointly moved the District Court to approve and enter their proposed consent decree. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(e).3 The decree would have required respondents to give hiring and seniority preferences to black employees and to fill one-third of all supervisory positions in the Richmond Leaf Department with qualified blacks. While agreeing to the terms of the decree, respondents “expressly den[ied] any violation of . . . any . . . equal employment law, regulation, or order.” App. 25a.
The District Court denied the motion to enter the proposed decree. 446 F. Supp. 780 (1977). Concluding that preferential treatment on the basis of race violated Title VII and the Constitution absent a showing of past or present discrimination, and that the facts submitted in support of the decree demonstrated no “vestiges of racial discrimination,” id., at 790, the court held that the proposed decree illegally granted racial preferences to the petitioner class. It further declared that even if present or past discrimination had been shown, the decree would be illegal in that it would extend relief to all present and future black employees of the Richmond Leaf Department, not just to actual victims of the alleged discrimination. Id., at 789.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, dismissed petitioners’ appeal for want of jurisdiction. 606 F.2d 420 (1979). It held that the District Court’s refusal to enter the consent decree was neither a “collateral order” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,4 nor an interlocutory order “refusing” an “injunctio[n]” under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).5 Three judges dissented, concluding that the order refusing to approve the consent decree was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
Noting a conflict in the Circuits,6 we granted certiorari. 447 U.S. 920 (1980). We hold that the order is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals.7
II
The first Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, established the general principle that only final decisions of the federal district courts would be reviewable on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 178-179 (1955); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-325 (1940). Because rigid application of this principle was found to create undue hardship in some cases, however, Congress created certain exceptions to it. See Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, supra, at 180-181. One of these exceptions, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), permits appeal as of right from “[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions . . . .” (Emphasis added.)8
Although the District Court’s order declining to enter the proposed consent decree did not in terms “refus[e]” an “in-junctio[n],” it nonetheless had the practical effect of doing so. Cf. General Electric Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430, 433 (1932). This is because the proposed decree would have permanently enjoined respondents from discriminating against black employees at the Richmond Leaf Department, and would have directed changes in seniority and benefit systems, established hiring goals for qualified blacks in certain supervisory positions, and granted job-bidding preferences for seasonal employees. Indeed, prospective relief was at the very core of the disapproved settlement.9
For an interlocutory order to be immediately appealable under § 1292(a)(1), however, a litigant must show more than that the order has the practical effect of refusing an injunction. Because § 1292(a)(1) was intended to carve out only a limited exception to the final-judgment rule, we have construed the statute narrowly to ensure that appeal as of right under § 1292(a)(1) will be available only in circumstances where an appeal will further the statutory purpose of “permit[ting] litigants to effectually challenge interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence.” Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, supra, at 181. Unless a litigant can show that an interlocutory order of the district court might have a “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,” and that the order can be “effectually challenged” only by immediate appeal, the general congressional policy against piecemeal review will preclude interlocutory appeal.
In Switzerland Cheese Assn., Inc. v. E. Horne’s Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23 (1966), for example, petitioners contended that the District Court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment was appealable under § 1292(a)(1) simply because its practical effect was to deny them the permanent injunction sought in their summary-judgment motion. Although the District Court order seemed to fit within the statutory language of § 1292(a)(1), petitioners’ contention was rejected because they did not show that the order might cause them irreparable consequences if not immediately reviewed. The motion for summary judgment sought permanent and not preliminary injunctive relief and petitioners did not argue that a denial of summary judgment would cause them irreparable harm pendente lite. Since permanent injunctive relief might have been obtained after trial,10 the interlocutory order lacked the “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence” that is a prerequisite to appealability under § 1292(a)(1).
Similarly, in Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978), petitioner in a Title VII sex discrimination suit sought a permanent injunction against her prospective employer on behalf of herself and her putative class. After the District Court denied petitioner’s motion for class certification, petitioner filed an appeal under § 1292(a)(1). She contended that since her complaint had requested injunctive relief, the court’s order denying class certification had the effect of limiting the breadth of the available relief, and therefore of “refus[ing] a substantial portion of the injunctive relief requested in the complaint.” 437 U.S., at 480.
As in Switzerland Cheese, petitioner in Gardner had not filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and had not alleged that a denial of her motion would cause irreparable harm. The District Court order thus had “no direct or irreparable impact on the merits of the controversy.” 437 U.S., at 482. Because the denial of class certification was conditional, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(c)(1), and because it could be effectively reviewed on appeal from final judgment, petitioner could still obtain the full permanent injunctive relief she requested and a delayed review of the District Court order would therefore cause no serious or irreparable harm. As Gardner stated:
“The order denying class certification in this case did not have any such ‘irreparable’ effect. It could be reviewed both prior to and after final judgment; it did not affect the merits of petitioner’s own claim; and it did not pass on the legal sufficiency of any claims for injunctive relief.” 437 U.S., at 480-481 (footnotes omitted).11
III
In the instant case, unless the District Court order denying the motion to enter the consent decree is immediately appealable, petitioners will lose their opportunity to “effectually challenge” an interlocutory order that denies them injunctive relief and that plainly has a “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence.” First, petitioners might lose their opportunity to settle their case on the negotiated terms. As United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971), stated:
“Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation has produced agreement on their precise terms. The parties waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with the litigation.”
Settlement agreements may thus be predicated on an express or implied condition that the parties would, by their agreement, be able to avoid the costs and uncertainties of litigation. In this case, that condition of settlement has been radically affected by the District Court. By refusing to enter the proposed consent decree, the District Court effectively ordered the parties to proceed to trial and to have their respective rights and liabilities established within limits laid down by that court.12 Because a party to a pending settlement might be legally justified in withdrawing its consent to the agreement once trial is held and final judgment entered,13 the District Court’s order might thus have the “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence” of denying the parties their right to compromise their dispute on mutually agreeable terms.14
There is a second “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence” of the District Court order that justifies our conclusion that the order is immediately appealable under § 1292(a)(1). In seeking entry of the proposed consent decree, petitioners sought an immediate restructuring of respondents’ transfer and promotional policies. They asserted in their complaint that they would suffer irreparable injury unless they obtained that injunctive relief at the earliest opportunity.15 Because petitioners cannot obtain that relief until the proposed consent decree is entered, any further delay in reviewing the propriety of the District Court’s refusal to enter the decree might cause them serious or irreparable harm.16
In sum, in refusing to approve the parties’ negotiated consent decree, the District Court denied petitioners the opportunity to compromise their claim and to obtain the injunctive benefits of the settlement agreement they negotiated. These constitute “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequences” that petitioners can “effectually challenge” only by an immediate appeal. It follows that the order is an order “refusing” an “injunctio[n]” and is therefore appealable under § 1292(a)(1).
Reversed.