399 U.S. 42 (1970)
During the night of May 20, 1963, two armed men robbed a Gulf service station in North Braddock, Pennsylvania.1 They took currency from the cash register and directed attendant Stephen Kovacich to place coins into his right-hand glove, which they then seized.2 Two teenagers who had seen a blue compact station wagon circling the block observed the same vehicle speed away from a nearby parking lot.3 They reported to arriving police that four men were inside, one wearing a green sweater.4 Kovacich separately described one robber wearing a green sweater and the other a trench coat.5 Police broadcast the description of the car and robbers.6
Within an hour officers stopped a light blue compact station wagon matching the description about two miles from the station.7 Petitioner was among the four occupants.8 He wore a green sweater and a trench coat lay in the car.9 The men were arrested and the vehicle was driven to the police station.10 During a thorough search of the car at the station, officers found two .38-caliber revolvers concealed under the dashboard, one loaded with dumdum bullets, the right-hand glove containing small change, and cards bearing the name of Raymond Havicon.11
Havicon was the attendant at a Boron service station robbed at gunpoint on May 13, 1963.12 The day after the arrest, police executed a warrant-authorized search of petitioner's home and seized .38-caliber ammunition, including dumdum bullets matching those in one of the revolvers.13 Petitioner was indicted separately for the May 13 and May 20 robberies.14 His first trial ended in a mistrial.15 At the second trial both Kovacich and Havicon identified him as one of the robbers.16 The items taken from the station wagon were introduced, and the ammunition from his home was also admitted.17
Petitioner received consecutive sentences of four to eight years for the May 13 robbery and two to seven years for the May 20 robbery.18 Petitioner did not appeal.19 In 1965 he filed a state habeas corpus petition that was denied after an evidentiary hearing.20 The denial was affirmed on appeal.21 He then sought federal habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.22 The district court denied the petition without a hearing on the basis of the state record.23 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the denial, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.24
Whether the warrantless search of the automobile at the police station after the occupants' arrest violated the Fourth Amendment?25
The Fourth Amendment permits the warrantless search of an automobile when officers have probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime because of the vehicle's ready mobility.26 The Court has long distinguished between searches of automobiles and searches of homes or offices. It holds that the opportunity to search a car is fleeting. There is no constitutional difference between seizing the car to obtain a warrant and conducting an immediate search without one.27
No. The police had probable cause to search the station wagon when they stopped it based on the broadcast description from the teenagers and Kovacich.28 The car matched the description of a light blue compact station wagon.29 Petitioner was wearing a green sweater and a trench coat was present in the vehicle.30 Although the search was conducted at the police station after the arrest, the probable cause continued to exist and the mobility of the car justified the search without a warrant.31
The Court concluded that the same considerations that permit a search on the highway apply at the station house.32
The warrantless search of the automobile did not violate the Fourth Amendment.33
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart adhered to the view that the admission at trial of evidence acquired in alleged violation of Fourth Amendment standards is not of itself sufficient ground for a collateral attack upon an otherwise valid criminal conviction, state or federal.34 Until the Court adopts that view, he regarded himself as obligated to consider the merits of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims in a case of this kind.35 Upon that premise he joined the opinion and judgment of the Court.36
Justice Harlan dissented from the disposition of the search issue.37 He found himself in disagreement with the Court's casual treatment of other issues but focused here on the automobile search.38 He argued that the Court should require the police to obtain a warrant after temporarily seizing the car rather than permitting a warrantless search at the station.39
The temporary seizure is the lesser intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests.40 Harlan maintained that departures from the warrant requirement must strictly conform to the exigency presented.41 He concluded that the majority's approach is inconsistent with prior decisions like Preston v. United States.42
Whether the admission at trial of .38-caliber ammunition seized from petitioner's home was harmless error?43
Even if evidence is admitted in error, the conviction will not be reversed if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.44
Yes. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals examined the record and found that if there was error in admitting the ammunition, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.45 The Supreme Court, after studying the record, agreed with the lower courts and declined to differ with their conclusion.46
The admission of the .38-caliber ammunition, if error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.47
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan agreed with the majority that the introduction of the bullets found in petitioner's home, if error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.48 He noted that the Court accepts the conclusion of the two courts below on this point.49 Although he did not agree that this destroyed the relevance of the issue to the ineffectiveness of counsel claim, he agreed that the record supports the lower courts' conclusion that this item of evidence, taken alone, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.50
Harlan therefore joined the majority's harmless-error determination while preserving his separate objection to how the issue affected the counsel claim.51
Whether the late appointment of new counsel for the second trial denied petitioner the effective assistance of counsel?52
The Constitution requires that appointed counsel be given a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense, but a late appointment does not automatically require reversal unless the defendant was prejudiced by the lack of preparation.53
No. The Court of Appeals examined the state court record and found ample grounds for holding that the appearance of a different attorney at the second trial had not resulted in prejudice to petitioner.54 The claim that counsel was unprepared centered on efforts to exclude evidence.55 The Court of Appeals found any error harmless and the evidence admissible.56 The Supreme Court was not inclined to disturb that judgment and declined to fashion a per se rule requiring reversal for tardy appointment of counsel.57
The late appointment of new counsel for the second trial did not deny petitioner the effective assistance of counsel.58
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan dissented on the counsel issue.59 He could not join the Court's casual treatment of the issue presented by both parties as the major issue.60 Petitioner met Mr. Tamburo, his trial counsel, for the first time en route to the courtroom on the morning of trial.61
Although a different Legal Aid Society attorney had represented petitioner at his first trial, apparently neither he nor anyone else from the society had conferred with petitioner in the interval between trials.62 Harlan argued that the record revealed counsel's last-minute entry into the case and his handling of the search and seizure claims and cross-examination called for an evidentiary hearing by the District Court.63 He contended that the late appointment precluded compliance with state rules for motions to suppress.64
Harlan concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in determining lack of prejudice without further exploration of counsel's preparation.65