280 P.3d 283 (N.M. 2012)
Bani Chatterjee and Taya King began a committed long-term domestic relationship in 1993 that continued until 2008.1 During the relationship the two women agreed to bring a child into their family.2 In 2000 King adopted a child from Russia with Chatterjee's active participation and financial support.3
Chatterjee and King brought the child to New Mexico.4 They lived together in the family home.5 Chatterjee provided ongoing financial, emotional, and custodial support while openly holding the child out as her daughter.6 The child used a combined surname that included Chatterjee's last name and believed Chatterjee to be her parent.7
After the relationship ended in 2008, King moved to Colorado with the child and sought to prevent any further contact between Chatterjee and the child.8 Chatterjee filed a petition in New Mexico district court to establish parentage and determine custody and timesharing.9 She alleged she was a presumed natural parent under the former codification of the New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act and an equitable or de facto parent entitled to relief.10
King responded with a motion to dismiss under Rule 1-012(B) NMRA.11 King neither admitted nor denied the pleaded facts.12 King argued that Chatterjee was a third party who could not obtain custody or visitation rights absent a showing of King's unfitness under Section 40-4-9.1(K) of the Dissolution of Marriage Act.13 The district court granted the motion and dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.14
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal concerning the opportunity for Chatterjee to seek standing for visitation and remanded to the district court, instructing the district court to determine whether visitation with Chatterjee would be in Child's best interests.15 On remand the district court appointed a guardian ad litem for Child and accepted the guardian ad litem's recommendation that contact and visitation with Chatterjee would be in Child's best interests.16 Chatterjee sought further review, and the New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the standing questions presented by the pleadings.17
Whether Bani Chatterjee pleaded sufficient facts in her petition to establish that she is an interested party under Section 40-11-21 of the New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act with standing to pursue a determination of the existence of a mother and child relationship?18
Section 40-11-21 authorizes any interested party to bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship, applying father-and-child provisions insofar as practicable.19 A person satisfying the hold-out presumption under Section 40-11-5(A)(4) qualifies as an interested party.20
Yes. Chatterjee alleged that she and King maintained a committed relationship from 1993 to 2008, jointly brought Child from Russia in 2000, lived together in the family home until 2008, provided ongoing financial, emotional, and custodial support, and openly held Child out as her daughter with the child using a combined surname and believing Chatterjee to be her parent.21 These facts satisfy the hold-out criteria and establish interested-party status under Section 40-11-21.22
Chatterjee pleaded facts sufficient to establish standing as an interested party under the Uniform Parentage Act.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Bosson concurs in the result on narrower grounds.24 He stresses that the hold-out presumption requires the presumed parent to have acted as a co-parent from the moment the child entered the family unit.25 The presumed parent must have assumed ongoing legal and financial obligations such as naming the child as a dependent.26
The presumed parent must also have been recognized by the child and other parent as a mother.27 Chatterjee alleged these facts, but the standard would not extend to later-formed relationships.28
Whether the hold-out provision in Section 40-11-5(A)(4) of the Uniform Parentage Act, which creates a presumption that a man is the natural father of a child, can be applied to a woman to establish a presumption of natural motherhood?29
Section 40-11-21 directs that father-and-child provisions apply to mother-and-child determinations insofar as practicable.30 Section 40-11-4(A) expressly permits maternity to be established as provided by Section 40-11-21.31 Because the hold-out presumption rests on conduct rather than biology, it is practicable to apply it to women.32
Yes. The plain language of Sections 40-11-4(A) and 40-11-21 together requires application of the hold-out provision to women when conduct-based criteria such as openly holding the child out and establishing personal, financial, or custodial ties are feasible.33 It is practicable here because Chatterjee and King simultaneously formed the parental relationship with Child upon adoption.34
The hold-out provision applies to women and supports a presumption of natural motherhood on the facts pleaded.35
Whether a person who satisfies the requirements for presumed natural parenthood under the Uniform Parentage Act has standing as a natural parent to seek joint custody under Section 40-4-9.1 of the Dissolution of Marriage Act without a showing that the adoptive parent is unfit?36
Yes. Chatterjee's allegations establish that she and King were in a committed relationship when they brought Child into their home from Russia. Chatterjee provided financial and emotional support for years. She openly held Child out as her daughter, and Child used a combined surname including Chatterjee's last name.39
These facts satisfy the hold-out provision of Section 40-11-5(A)(4) and create a presumption of natural motherhood.40 Because Chatterjee acquires standing as a natural parent, she may pursue joint custody under Section 40-4-9.1 without first proving King's unfitness.41
A presumed natural parent has standing to seek joint custody without a showing of unfitness.42