494 U.S. 558, 571, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1348, 108 L. Ed. 2d 519 (1990)
McLean Trucking Company and the Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement that governed the terms and conditions of employment at McLean's terminals.1 The 27 respondents were employed by McLean as truckdrivers in bargaining units covered by the agreement, and all were members of the Union.2
In 1982 McLean implemented a change in operations that resulted in the elimination of some of its terminals and the reorganization of others.3 As part of that change, McLean transferred respondents to the terminal located in Winston-Salem and agreed to give them special seniority rights in relation to inactive employees in Winston-Salem who had been laid off temporarily.4
After working in Winston-Salem for approximately six weeks, respondents were alternately laid off and recalled several times.5 Respondents filed a grievance with the Union contesting the order of the layoffs and recalls. Respondents also challenged McLean's policy of stripping any driver who was laid off of his special seniority rights.6 On the basis of the grievance committee's decision, McLean recalled respondents and laid off the drivers who had been on the inactive list when respondents transferred to Winston-Salem.7 The committee also ordered McLean to recognize respondents' special seniority rights until the inactive employees were properly recalled.8
McLean subsequently recalled the inactive employees, thereby allowing them to regain seniority rights over respondents.9 In the next round of layoffs, respondents had lower priority than inactive drivers and were laid off first.10 Respondents filed another grievance alleging that McLean's actions were designed to circumvent the initial decision of the grievance committee.11 At the conclusion of the hearing, the committee held that McLean had not violated the committee's first decision.12 When respondents filed a third grievance, the Union declined to refer the charges to a grievance committee on the ground that the issues raised in the third grievance had been determined in the prior proceedings.13
In July 1983, respondents filed an action in District Court.14 They alleged that McLean had breached the collective-bargaining agreement in violation of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.15 They also alleged that the Union had violated its duty of fair representation.16 Respondents requested a permanent injunction requiring the defendants to cease their illegal acts and to reinstate them to their proper seniority status. In addition, they sought compensatory damages for lost wages and health benefits and requested a jury trial.17 In 1986 McLean filed for bankruptcy. Subsequently, the action against it was voluntarily dismissed along with all claims for injunctive relief.18 The Union moved to strike the jury demand on the ground that no right to a jury trial exists in a duty of fair representation suit.19 The District Court denied the motion to strike.20 After an interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court.21 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict on this issue and now affirms the judgment of the Fourth Circuit.22
Whether an employee who seeks relief in the form of backpay for a union's alleged breach of its duty of fair representation has a right to trial by jury?23
The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in suits at common law.24
Yes. The 27 respondents filed a hybrid action. They alleged that McLean Trucking Company breached the collective-bargaining agreement at the Winston-Salem terminal. They also alleged that the Union breached its duty of fair representation by mishandling grievances over layoffs and seniority rights.25 The claim against the employer is analogous to a breach-of-contract action triable to a jury.26 The duty-of-fair-representation claim is more analogous to breach of fiduciary duty by a trustee, an equitable claim.27
Nevertheless the remedy of compensatory damages for lost wages and health benefits is the traditional form of legal relief.28 It is not restitutionary.29 It is not incidental to the injunctive relief that was dismissed after McLean's bankruptcy filing.30
The Seventh Amendment entitles respondents to a jury trial on all issues in the case.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but reached the result by a different route.32 He would focus the historical inquiry strictly on whether the particular claim would have been tried to a jury in 1791.33 Although the duty of fair representation did not exist then, the claim is closely analogous to common-law breach of contract or malpractice.34
In either case, the action would have been legal and tried to a jury.35 The remedy of damages confirms that the action is legal.36
Joined by Justice White
Justice Brennan joined the holding that the remedy is legal and that a jury trial is required.37 He would simplify the entire Seventh Amendment analysis by discarding the comparison to 18th-century forms of action. He would decide these questions solely on the basis of whether the relief sought is the kind historically available in courts of law.38
Justice Brennan explained that the nature of the remedy has always been the more important factor and that continued reliance on abstruse historical inquiries into ancient writs is impracticable and unnecessary.39
Justice Stevens joined the judgment but declined to join the historical comparison in Part III-A.40 He viewed the duty of fair representation action as resembling a common-law attorney malpractice suit more closely than a trust action.41 He noted that such issues are typical grist for jury judgment because they require an understanding of the realities of employment relationships.42
He observed that the doctrine itself developed in cases tried to juries, including Vaca v. Sipes and others.43 In his view, the commonsense understanding of the jury is appropriately invoked when disputes in the factory, the warehouse, and the garage must be resolved.44
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist And Justice O'connor
Justice Kennedy dissented.45 He agreed that the action most closely resembles an equitable suit by a beneficiary against a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty.46 Once that controlling historical analogy is identified, the inquiry should end and no jury trial is required.47
The request for money damages does not convert the equitable claim into a legal one because courts of equity could award monetary relief as part of their equitable powers.48 Justice Kennedy also concluded that the hybrid nature of the action does not change the equitable character of the fair representation claim against the union.49