538 U.S. 760 (2003)
On November 28, 1997, Oxnard, California police officers Maria Peña and Andrew Salinas stopped respondent Oliverio Martinez on a bicycle while investigating suspected narcotics activity in a residential area.1 After Martinez complied with orders to dismount and place his hands behind his head, Salinas conducted a patdown and discovered a knife in Martinez's waistband.2 An altercation followed in which Salinas yelled that Martinez had taken his gun.3 Peña then shot Martinez multiple times, leaving him permanently blinded and paralyzed from the waist down.4
Petitioner Ben Chavez, a patrol supervisor, arrived minutes later with paramedics and accompanied Martinez to the hospital.5 At the hospital, Chavez questioned Martinez in the emergency room for approximately ten minutes spread over a forty-five-minute period while medical personnel treated his injuries.6 Martinez initially responded with statements such as "I don't know," "I am dying," and "I am choking," but later admitted taking the officer's gun and using heroin regularly.7 Martinez also stated at one point, "I am not telling you anything until they treat me," yet Chavez continued the interview.8 No Miranda warnings were given at any time during the questioning, and a tape recording of the exchange was made.9
Martinez was never charged with any crime, and none of his statements were ever used against him in a criminal prosecution.10 He subsequently filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Chavez.11 He alleged that the questioning violated his Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself and his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to be free from coercive questioning.12 The District Court granted summary judgment to Martinez on Chavez's qualified immunity defense with respect to both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.13 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity, holding that Chavez's conduct violated Martinez's clearly established constitutional rights.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's decision.15
Whether coercive police questioning without Miranda warnings violates the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause when the suspect's statements are never admitted in any criminal case?16
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.17 A violation occurs only when compelled statements are introduced as testimony in a criminal proceeding.18 Miranda warnings are a prophylactic measure to protect the core right but do not themselves constitute a constitutional violation actionable under §1983.19
No. The text of the Fifth Amendment requires that the compulsion occur in a criminal case, meaning the initiation of legal proceedings where the statements are used as testimony.20 Here, Martinez was never charged with a crime, and his statements were never admitted as testimony against him in any criminal prosecution.21 The only consequence was the absence of Miranda warnings.22
The Ninth Circuit's view that the failure to give Miranda warnings alone violated the Fifth Amendment is mistaken.23 The privilege is not violated by the introduction of a statement obtained without warnings so long as the statement is otherwise voluntary, and here the statements were never used at all.24
Martinez's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated because his statements were never used in a criminal case.25
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Breyer
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment rejecting the Fifth Amendment claim.26 He explained that recognizing a damages action for the questioning alone would be well outside the core of Fifth Amendment protection.27 Martinez cannot make the powerful showing necessary to expand protection to the point of civil liability.28
Souter noted that the most obvious drawback is the risk of global application in every instance of interrogation producing an inadmissible statement.29 He suggested that any claim of outrageous conduct must sound in substantive due process to be addressed on remand.30
Justice Scalia joined Parts I and II of the plurality opinion rejecting Martinez's Fifth Amendment claim.31 He stressed that § 1983 provides remedies only for violations of actual constitutional or statutory rights, not for breaches of judicially created prophylactic rules like Miranda.32 Scalia agreed that the Self-Incrimination Clause requires that a person be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case.33
Because Martinez was never a witness against himself in any criminal case, his claim fails.34
Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment.35 She agreed with the plurality that Martinez has not stated a claim under the Fifth Amendment.36 O’Connor also agreed that the officer’s conduct did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.37
She wrote separately to emphasize that the Miranda rule is a prophylactic rule designed to protect the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.38 Because Martinez’s statements were never used against him in a criminal case, his Fifth Amendment rights were not violated.39 O’Connor underscored the prophylactic nature of Miranda and confirmed that no constitutional violation occurred here.40
Whether persistent questioning of a severely injured suspect in an emergency room violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause?41
No. Chavez's questioning of Martinez while he was in severe pain does not shock the conscience.44 The officer's questions were not intended to inflict pain or to harm Martinez.45 Chavez was attempting to investigate a serious incident involving the discharge of a firearm.46 Medical personnel were able to treat Martinez throughout the interview.47
Chavez ceased his questioning to allow tests and other procedures to be performed.48 The fact that Martinez was in pain does not transform the questioning into conscience-shocking behavior.49 There is no evidence that Chavez acted with a purpose to harm Martinez by intentionally interfering with his medical treatment.50 The need to investigate whether there had been police misconduct constituted a justifiable government interest.51
This interest existed given the risk that key evidence would have been lost if Martinez had died without the authorities ever hearing his side of the story.52
The interrogation did not violate Martinez's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights.53
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens agreed with the plurality that the Fifth Amendment is violated only when compelled statements are used in a criminal case but dissented on the Fourteenth Amendment claim.54 He concluded that the interrogation of a seriously wounded man in the emergency room while he was in severe pain and receiving treatment shocks the conscience.55 Stevens characterized the questioning as the functional equivalent of an attempt to obtain an involuntary confession from a prisoner by torturous methods.56
He found that the officer's deliberate decision to continue questioning despite obvious pain and suffering violated the Due Process Clause.57
Joined by Justice Stevens (parts I And Ii), Justice Ginsburg (parts I And Iii)
Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice Stevens that the officer's conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment.58 He explained that the Due Process Clause prohibits coercive interrogation techniques that are so offensive as to shock the conscience.59 The facts present a clear violation because Martinez was in critical condition suffering from gunshot wounds while the officer continued to question him without regard for his medical condition.60
Kennedy also argued that the Self-Incrimination Clause is a substantive constraint applicable at the time of compulsion.61 The failure to give Miranda warnings compounded the due process violation.62
Justice Ginsburg joined Parts II and III of Justice Kennedy's opinion.63 She would hold that the Self-Incrimination Clause applies at the time and place police use severe compulsion to extract a statement from a suspect.64 The interrogation in this case would remain a clear instance of the kind of compulsion no reasonable officer would have thought constitutionally permissible.65
This conclusion holds even without a finding concerning Martinez's belief that refusal to answer would delay treatment.66 She noted the striking resemblance to the hospital-bed questioning held involuntary in Mincey v. Arizona.67
Whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged conduct does not violate a constitutional right?68
Yes. Because Chavez's conduct did not violate Martinez's Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, as established by the analysis of those claims, Chavez is entitled to qualified immunity.71 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.72
Chavez is entitled to qualified immunity, and the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed.73