166 U.S. 226, 239, 17 S.Ct. 581, 585, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897)
The City of Chicago, acting under an 1872 Illinois statute that became part of its charter in 1875, passed an ordinance on October 9, 1880, to open and widen Rockwell Street from West 18th Street to West 19th Street by condemning parcels of land owned by individuals and parts of the right of way of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company within the city limits.1
On November 12, 1890, the city filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking condemnation of the property and asking that just compensation be ascertained by a jury, with the railroad company admitted as a defendant along with other interested parties.2 The jury awarded one dollar as just compensation to the railroad company for the parts of its right of way to be used for the street, while awarding compensation to individual owners for their parcels.3
The railroad moved for a new trial, which was overruled, and final judgment was entered in execution of the award.4 The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 149 Illinois 457.5 After affirmance the railroad company sued out a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court.6
The railroad had raised claims under the Fourteenth Amendment in its motion for new trial and in its assignment of errors filed in the state supreme court.7 The Illinois statute provided no provision for an answer by defendants in condemnation proceedings, but the railroad asserted its federal claims in the written motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.8
Whether a judgment of a state court which failed to award just compensation for private property taken for public use is reviewable in this court by writ of error?9
A judgment of a state court which, it is contended, failed to award just compensation for private property taken for public use is reviewable in this court by writ of error when the federal right under the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically set up or claimed by the defendant in the state court proceedings.10
Yes. The railroad company raised its Fourteenth Amendment claims that the one-dollar award constituted a taking without just compensation in its written motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County.11 It reasserted those claims in its assignment of errors filed in the Supreme Court of Illinois.12 The trial court overruled the motion, necessarily deciding the federal claims adversely.13
The affirmance by the state supreme court had the legal effect of denying the asserted federal rights.14 The record therefore satisfies the requirement that the federal question appear from the face of the proceedings so that this court may exercise jurisdiction under Rev. Stat. § 709.15
The writ of error properly brings the judgment before this court for review.16
Whether the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment in proceedings to take private property for public use includes an opportunity for the owner to be heard on the question of compensation?17
The due process of law enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment upon the states requires that in proceedings to take private property for public use, the owner shall be accorded an opportunity to be heard upon the question of the compensation to be paid for such property, because compensation is an essential element of due process when private property is appropriated to public use.18
Yes. The Fourteenth Amendment binds all instrumentalities of the state, including its judicial authorities, and a state court judgment that takes private property for public use without compensation made or secured violates due process.19 The railroad company received notice of the condemnation petition filed November 12, 1890, in the Circuit Court of Cook County.20 It was admitted as a defendant.21
It participated in the jury trial on compensation and presented evidence and arguments on the amount due before the verdict and judgment were entered.22
Due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires an opportunity to be heard on compensation in eminent domain proceedings.23
Whether a state is bound to provide a method by which the owner of property taken for public use can obtain just compensation?24
A state may regulate the procedure in condemnation cases in its own courts, but it is bound to provide for the owner of property taken for public use a method by which he can obtain just compensation, and the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment is satisfied when the owner has an opportunity to be heard in a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of the amount of compensation.25
Yes. The Illinois statute of April 10, 1872, which became part of the Chicago charter in 1875, required the city to file a petition in a court of record praying that just compensation be ascertained by a jury.26 It provided for a jury verdict on compensation and allowed entry of judgment only after payment or deposit of the award.27 The railroad company availed itself of that statutory procedure by appearing, contesting the amount of compensation, and moving for a new trial after the one-dollar verdict.28
The state satisfied its obligation by providing a jury proceeding in which the owner could litigate the amount of compensation.29
Whether the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment is satisfied when the owner has an opportunity to be heard in a court of competent jurisdiction on the amount of compensation?30
The requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment is satisfied when the owner has an opportunity to be heard in a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of the amount of compensation, because the form of the proceeding is not controlling so long as the substance affords a fair opportunity to contest the compensation due.31
Yes. The Circuit Court of Cook County possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.32 The Illinois statute prescribed a jury trial on compensation.33 The railroad company fully participated by introducing evidence, objecting to rulings, and moving for a new trial.34 The final judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois affirming the one-dollar award therefore met the constitutional standard even though the company contended the amount was inadequate.35
An opportunity to litigate compensation in a competent court satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment.36
Whether the Illinois statute provided such an opportunity for the railroad company?37
The statute of Illinois under which the city of Chicago instituted this condemnation proceeding provided for such an opportunity, and the record shows that the railroad company availed itself of that opportunity through participation in the jury trial and post-trial motions.38
Yes. The 1872 statute authorized the filing of a petition for condemnation and required a jury to ascertain just compensation.39 It permitted the defendant to appear and contest the award.40 It provided for appellate review while protecting the owner's right to additional compensation if a higher award were later obtained.41
The railroad company was admitted as a defendant.42 It litigated the compensation issue before the jury and raised its federal claims in the motion for new trial that the trial court overruled.43
The Illinois statute afforded the railroad company the required opportunity to be heard on compensation.44
Whether the judgment of the state court is reviewable on the ground that the compensation awarded was inadequate?45
The judgment of the state court is not reviewable here upon the ground that the amount of compensation awarded was inadequate, that being a question of fact which it is the province of the state court to determine, because the Seventh Amendment prohibits reexamination of facts tried by a jury in any court of the United States otherwise than according to the rules of the common law.46
No. The jury empanelled under the Illinois constitution returned a verdict of one dollar after hearing evidence on the extent of interference with the railroad's use of its right of way for tracks.47 The Seventh Amendment bars this court from reweighing that factual determination or ordering a new trial on the amount.48 The only permissible inquiry is whether the trial court applied a rule of law that absolutely disregarded the company's right to just compensation.49 The record shows no such legal error in the instructions or evidentiary rulings.50
Inadequacy of the compensation award presents a non-reviewable question of fact.51
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brewer dissented from the conclusion that due process was satisfied.52 He asserted that awarding only nominal compensation while depriving the railroad of the exclusive use of its land and imposing new safety expenses amounted to an uncompensated appropriation.53 He maintained that the verdict could not be reconciled with the principle that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation.54
He argued that the majority's refusal to require payment for the loss of potential uses or the newly created burdens rendered the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees illusory in this case.55
Whether the record shows that the railroad company was denied due process of law?56
The record in this case does not show that the railroad company was denied due process of law when the state provided a jury proceeding for compensation, the company participated fully, and the jury determined that the interference with the right of way was not of substantial monetary value.57
No. The city sought only the right to open a street across the existing tracks, not the fee, and the jury found that the diminution in the company's exclusive use for railroad purposes was worth one dollar.58 The Supreme Court of Illinois correctly held that compensation is measured by the decrease in value for railroad purposes caused by the joint public use.59 This court cannot disturb that factual finding.60 The company's proposed instructions on additional tracks and terminal facilities were properly refused because they would have extended the inquiry beyond the land actually crossed and the uses to which it was devoted.61
The record does not show that the railroad company was denied due process of law.62
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brewer dissented, contending that the one-dollar award effected a taking of the railroad's exclusive use of its fee-simple property without just compensation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 He argued that the majority's strong declaration of the amendment's protective reach was contradicted by sustaining a nominal award.64 He maintained that the value of the property must account for possible future uses such as station houses and switch stands rather than only its current track use.65
He argued that the additional expenses for planking, gates, and gatemen required by the new crossing constituted a burden created by the taking itself and therefore must be compensated.66 Brewer maintained that the public cannot create a right to impose safety costs on the railroad and then escape any duty to pay for the underlying property right taken.67