265 Ill. App. 542 (1932)
Chicago Coliseum Club, an Illinois corporation incorporated for the promotion of boxing and athletic exhibitions, brought an action against William Harrison Dempsey, the world heavyweight boxing champion, to recover damages for breach of a written contract executed on March 13, 1926, but dated March 6 of that year.1 The contract required the club to promote a boxing match between Dempsey and Harry Wills in September 1926.2
Dempsey was to receive a $10 payment acknowledged in the contract along with $300,000 on August 5, 1926, $500,000 ten days before the contest, fifty percent of net profits exceeding $2,000,000, and fifty percent of moving picture revenues.3 He also agreed to obtain insurance in the club's favor and to avoid other matches before the contest.4 Separately, the club had contracted with Wills on March 6, 1926, requiring a $50,000 escrow deposit that was never made according to the record.5 The club also contracted with Andrew C. Weisberg on March 8, 1926, for promotional services to be paid from receipts.6
On July 10, 1926, the club wired Dempsey in Colorado Springs regarding insurance examinations and training.7 Dempsey replied by telegram denying the contract's existence and stating he was busy training for a match with Gene Tunney.8 The club then filed suit in the superior court of Marion County, Indiana.9 On September 13, 1926, after personal service and Dempsey's appearance, the court entered a decree that perpetually enjoined Dempsey from participating in the Tunney match or any other boxing engagement except as designated by the club.10
The club pursued its damage claims in the circuit court of Cook County, Illinois, seeking to prove lost profits from the exhibition, pre-contract expenses, costs of the Indiana injunction proceeding, and post-contract pre-breach expenses including $300 paid to an architect for plans for Soldier Field and other promotional costs.11 The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.12
Whether lost profits from the proposed Dempsey-Wills boxing exhibition are recoverable as damages for breach of contract?13
Compensation for damages for a breach of contract must be established by evidence. A court or jury must be able to ascertain the extent of such damages by the usual rules of evidence and to a reasonable degree of certainty.14
No. The character of the undertaking was such that it would be impossible to produce evidence of a probative character sufficient to establish any amount which could be reasonably ascertainable.15 The success or failure of such an undertaking depends largely upon the ability of the promoters, the reputation of the contestants and the conditions of the weather at and prior to the holding of the contest, the accessibility of the place, the extent of the publicity, the possibility of other and counter attractions and many other questions which would enter into consideration.16 Such an entertainment lacks utterly the element of stability which exists in regular organized business.17 This fact was practically admitted by the plaintiff by the allegation of its bill filed in the Marion county court of Indiana asking for an injunction against Dempsey.18
Lost profits from the proposed Dempsey-Wills boxing exhibition are not recoverable as damages for breach of contract. They are speculative and incapable of reasonable ascertainment.19
Whether expenses incurred prior to the execution of the contract with Dempsey are recoverable as damages?20
In an action for a breach of contract a party can recover only on damages which naturally flow from and are the result of the act complained of.21
No. The Wills contract was entered into prior to the contract with the defendant and was not made contingent upon the plaintiff obtaining a similar agreement with the defendant Dempsey. Under the circumstances the plaintiff speculated as to the result of his efforts to procure the Dempsey contract.22 Any obligations assumed by the plaintiff prior to that time are not chargeable to the defendant.23 Moreover, an examination of the record discloses that the $50,000 named in the contract with Wills, which was to be payable upon a signing of the agreement, was not and never has been paid.24
Expenses incurred prior to the execution of the contract with Dempsey are not recoverable as damages because they do not naturally flow from the breach and were incurred before the contract existed.25
Whether expenses incurred in obtaining an injunction to prevent Dempsey from fighting another opponent are recoverable as damages for breach of the contract?26
The expenses incurred by the plaintiff in procuring that decree are not collectible in an action for damages in this proceeding. Neither are such similar expenses as were incurred in the trips to Colorado and Philadelphia, nor the attorney's fees and other expenses thereby incurred.27
No. After the repudiation of the agreement by the defendant, plaintiff was advised of defendant's match with Tunney which, from the evidence, it appears, was to take place in Philadelphia in the month of September and was in direct conflict with the terms of the agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant.28 Plaintiff's bill, filed in the superior court of Marion county, Indiana, was an effort on the part of the plaintiff to compel defendant to live up to the terms of his agreement.29 The plaintiff having been informed that the defendant intended to proceed no further under his agreement, took such steps at its own financial risk.30 There was nothing in the agreement regarding attorney's fees and there was nothing in the contract in regard to the services of the defendant from which it would appear that the action for specific performance would lie.31
Expenses incurred in obtaining an injunction to prevent Dempsey from fighting another opponent are not recoverable as damages for breach of the contract because they were undertaken at the plaintiff's own risk after the clear repudiation.32
Whether post-contract expenses such as architect fees and promotional services incurred before the repudiation are recoverable as damages?33
The items recoverable are such items of expense as were incurred between the date of the signing of the agreement and the breach of July 10, 1926, by the defendant and such as were incurred as a necessary expense in furtherance of the performance.34
Yes. After the signing of the agreement plaintiff attempted to show expenses incurred by one Weisberg in and about the furtherance of the project.35 We find in the record, however, evidence which should have been submitted to the jury on the question of damages sustained by the plaintiff.36 The contract on which the breach of the action is predicated shows a payment of $10 by the plaintiff to the defendant and the receipt acknowledged.37
It appears that the stadium located in the South Park District, known as Soldier's Field, was considered as a site for the holding of the contest and plaintiff testified that it paid $300 to an architect for plans in the event the stadium was to be used for the performance.38 There were elements in regard to wages paid assistant secretaries which may be substantiated by evidence showing that they were necessary in furtherance of the undertaking.39 The expenses of Hoffman in going to Colorado for the purpose of having Dempsey take his physical examination for insurance, if before the breach and reasonable, are recoverable.40
Post-contract expenses such as architect fees and promotional services incurred before the repudiation are recoverable as damages if they were necessary expenses in furtherance of performance and proven under the usual rules of evidence.41
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to at least nominal damages for breach of the valid contract?42
Under the evidence in the record in this proceeding there appears to have been a valid subsisting agreement between the plaintiff and Dempsey, in which Dempsey was to perform according to the terms of the agreement and which he refused to do, and the plaintiff, as a matter of law, was entitled at least to nominal damages.43
Yes. We are unable to conceive upon what theory the defendant could contend that there was no contract. It appears to be admitted in the proceeding here and bears his signature. The amounts involved are sufficiently large to have created a rather lasting impression on the mind of anyone signing such an agreement.44
It amounts, however, to a repudiation of the agreement and from that time on Dempsey refused to take any steps to carry out his undertaking.45 For this reason, if for no other, judgment should have been for the plaintiff.46
The plaintiff is entitled to at least nominal damages for breach of the valid contract because a valid subsisting agreement existed and Dempsey repudiated it.47