395 U.S. 752 (1969)
On the afternoon of September 13, 1965, three police officers arrived at the Santa Ana, California home of Ted Steven Chimel with a warrant authorizing his arrest for the burglary of a coin shop.1 The officers knocked on the door, identified themselves to Chimel's wife, and asked if they might come inside.2 She admitted the officers, who waited ten to fifteen minutes until Chimel returned from work.3
When Chimel entered, an officer handed him the arrest warrant and asked if he had any coins or medals.4 Chimel replied that he did not.5 The officers then asked if he minded if they looked around.6 Chimel objected, but the officers advised him that on the basis of the lawful arrest they would conduct a search anyway.7 No search warrant had been issued.8
The officers looked through the entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop.9 In the master bedroom and sewing room the officers directed Chimel's wife to open drawers and move their contents so the officers could view any items.10 The search lasted between forty-five minutes and one hour and yielded numerous coins, medals, tokens, and other objects.11
At Chimel's subsequent state trial on two charges of burglary, the seized items were admitted into evidence over his objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized.12 He was convicted.13 The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction, and the California Supreme Court denied review.14 Both lower courts held that the arrest was lawful and that the search was justified as incident to that arrest.15 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the petitioner's constitutional claims regarding the scope of the search.16
Whether the warrantless search of the petitioner's entire house can be constitutionally justified as incident to his arrest?17
The Fourth Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes before searches of a home may be conducted.18 A search incident to a lawful arrest permits officers to search the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control from which he might obtain a weapon or destructible evidence.19 The rule provides no justification for searching other rooms or closed areas without a warrant.20
No. The facts establish that three officers arrived at Chimel's home with an arrest warrant, waited for his return, and then searched the entire three-bedroom house including the attic, garage, and workshop for forty-five minutes to an hour.21 The officers directed his wife to open drawers in the master bedroom and sewing room.22 This search extended far beyond Chimel's person and any area from which he could have reached a weapon or evidence.23 The officers lacked a search warrant.24 The broad rummaging cannot be justified by concerns for officer safety or evidence preservation tied to the arrest itself.25
The California courts upheld the search solely on the ground that it was incident to a valid arrest.26 That conclusion misapplied the Fourth Amendment limits on such searches.27 The items seized, including coins and medals, were therefore inadmissible.28 Application of the rule to these facts shows the search was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.2930
The warrantless search of the entire house was not constitutionally justified as incident to arrest.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan joined the opinion of the Court on the understanding that the decision does not indicate any retreat from the principles set forth in Ker v. California.32 He noted that as a result of Mapp v. Ohio and Ker v. California every change in Fourth Amendment law must now be obeyed by state officials facing widely different problems of local law enforcement.33 Harlan weighed the dilemma of vindicating sound Fourth Amendment principles at the possible expense of state concerns long recognized to be consonant with the Fourteenth Amendment.34
He concluded that he could not in good conscience vote to perpetuate bad Fourth Amendment law even while recognizing the profound changes the incorporation doctrine has wrought on the federal system.35
Joined by Justice Black
Justice White dissented from the limitation on searches incident to arrest.36 He argued that the new rule creates uncertainty for law enforcement and departs from settled precedent in Harris and Rabinowitz.37 He maintained that when probable cause exists to search premises where an arrest occurs the fact of arrest supplies an exigent circumstance.38
That circumstance permits the search without a warrant to prevent removal of evidence by confederates.39 He noted that the arrest itself does not require a warrant in many circumstances under federal statutes authorizing warrantless arrests upon probable cause.40 White viewed the majority's immediate-control limitation as an unwarranted departure that would hamper legitimate police work without advancing Fourth Amendment values.41
Whether the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest extends only to the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control?42
When an arrest is made, officers may search the arrestee's person to remove weapons or seize evidence.43 Officers may also search the area within the arrestee's immediate control.44 That area is defined as the space from which the arrestee might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.45 There is no justification for searching other rooms or closed containers beyond that limited zone.46
Yes. The established facts show the officers searched the attic, garage, workshop, and multiple rooms.47 They directed Chimel's wife to open and move contents of drawers in the master bedroom and sewing room.48 These areas were not within Chimel's immediate control at the time of arrest.49
The rule limits the search to the person and the grab area to protect officer safety and prevent evidence destruction.50 Extending it to an entire house lacks any comparable justification and requires a warrant instead.51
The permissible scope of a search incident to arrest extends only to the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control.52
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Black
Justice White contended that the rule should permit searches of areas under the arrestee's control where probable cause exists.53 An arrest creates exigent circumstances that make obtaining a warrant impractical.54 Those circumstances create risks of loss of evidence by confederates.55
He viewed the majority's immediate-control limitation as an unwarranted departure from Harris and Rabinowitz.56 The limitation would hamper legitimate police work without advancing Fourth Amendment values because the arrest itself supplies the necessary exigency when probable cause independently supports the search.57
Whether Harris v. United States and United States v. Rabinowitz should be overruled to the extent they authorize searches beyond the area from which the arrestee might obtain a weapon or destructible evidence?58
Prior decisions permitted searches of an entire apartment or office incident to arrest.59 Those decisions are inconsistent with Fourth Amendment principles requiring adherence to judicial processes.60 They are therefore overruled insofar as they allow searches broader than the arrestee's person and immediate control area.61
Yes. The facts of this case demonstrate a search of an entire house that went well beyond any immediate-control zone.62 The search mirrored the broad searches upheld in Harris and Rabinowitz.63 Those cases rested on an overly expansive view of the incident-to-arrest exception.64 That view cannot be squared with the Amendment's warrant requirement and historical concerns over general searches.65 The search was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Harris v. United States and United States v. Rabinowitz are overruled to the extent they authorize searches beyond the area from which the arrestee might obtain a weapon or destructible evidence.66
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan joined the opinion of the Court on the understanding that the decision does not indicate any retreat from the principles set forth in Ker v. California. He noted that as a result of Mapp v. Ohio and Ker v. California every change in Fourth Amendment law must now be obeyed by state officials facing widely different problems of local law enforcement. Harlan weighed the dilemma of vindicating sound Fourth Amendment principles at the possible expense of state concerns long recognized to be consonant with the Fourteenth Amendment.
He concluded that he could not in good conscience vote to perpetuate bad Fourth Amendment law even while recognizing the profound changes the incorporation doctrine has wrought on the federal system.