441 U.S. 281 (1979)
Chrysler Corporation holds numerous federal government contracts and therefore must comply with Executive Orders 11246 and 11375, which direct the Secretary of Labor to ensure equal employment opportunity regardless of race or sex.1 The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs has issued regulations requiring contractors to submit written affirmative action programs, annual Employer Information Reports known as EEO-1 Reports, and to undergo compliance reviews and complaint investigations that generate Compliance Review Reports and Complaint Investigation Reports.2 The Defense Logistics Agency of the Department of Defense serves as the designated compliance agency responsible for monitoring Chrysler's employment practices.3
On May 14, 1975, the Defense Logistics Agency informed Chrysler that third parties had filed Freedom of Information Act requests seeking the 1974 affirmative action program for its Newark, Delaware assembly plant and an October 1974 Complaint Investigation Report for the same facility.4 Chrysler objected to release of the documents.5 The agency responded that the materials were subject to disclosure under both the Freedom of Information Act and Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs disclosure rules and scheduled release five days later.6 On the scheduled release date Chrysler filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware seeking to enjoin disclosure of the Newark documents.7
The District Court granted a temporary restraining order barring release of the Newark documents and requiring five days' advance notice before any similar disclosures.8 Pursuant to that order, Chrysler learned on July 1, 1975, of a comparable request for information concerning its Hamtramck, Michigan plant; Chrysler amended its complaint and obtained a second restraining order covering the Hamtramck documents.9 The District Court conducted a trial de novo in August 1975 at which both sides presented extensive expert testimony.10
On April 20, 1976, the District Court issued its opinion.11 Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which vacated the District Court's judgment in 1977.12 Because of a conflict among the circuits and the importance of reverse-FOIA cases, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.13
Whether the Freedom of Information Act bars federal agencies from disclosing information falling within any of its nine exemptions?14
The FOIA is exclusively a disclosure statute. Its nine exemptions in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) demarcate only the agency's obligation to disclose under subsection (a). The exemptions do not impose affirmative duties to withhold exempted material or create private rights of action to enjoin disclosure.15
No. The FOIA's structure places a general obligation on agencies to make information available.16 The exemptions simply state that specified material is not subject to those disclosure obligations.17 In this case the District Court and Court of Appeals correctly recognized that the Act does not compel withholding of Chrysler's 1974 affirmative action program and October 1974 Complaint Investigation Report even if those documents fall within Exemption 4.18
Chrysler filed suit seeking to enjoin release after the Defense Logistics Agency determined the materials were subject to disclosure under both the FOIA and Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs rules.19 The Act's judicial relief provision grants district courts jurisdiction only to order production of improperly withheld records and supplies no authority to bar disclosure.20 Legislative history confirms that Congress intended the exemptions to permit rather than mandate nondisclosure.21 The Supreme Court therefore held that the FOIA affords Chrysler no private right of action to enjoin agency disclosure of the Newark and Hamtramck plant documents.22
The Freedom of Information Act does not bar disclosure of information within its exemptions and supplies Chrysler no basis for injunctive relief.23
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1905 applies to formal agency action disclosing information submitted by government contractors?24
Section 1905 addresses formal agency action. The statute prohibits disclosure of trade secrets and confidential statistical data not authorized by law. It binds agency heads as well as employees and requires inquiry into whether any claimed authorization satisfies the statutory standard.25
Yes. The Trade Secrets Act's legislative history demonstrates that Congress consolidated earlier statutes to reach formal agency disclosures and intended the phrase authorized by law to retain its traditional meaning.26 In this case the Defense Logistics Agency's decision to release Chrysler's affirmative action program and Complaint Investigation Report constitutes formal agency action subject to § 1905.27 Chrysler, as a government contractor required to submit written affirmative action programs, EEO-1 Reports, and to undergo compliance reviews generating Compliance Review Reports and Complaint Investigation Reports, supplied the information under Executive Orders 11246 and 11375.28
The statute therefore applies to the Defense Logistics Agency's contemplated disclosure of the Newark and Hamtramck documents.29
Section 1905 applies to the formal agency action at issue and requires that any disclosure be authorized by law.30
Whether disclosure regulations issued by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs supply the authorization by law required under 18 U.S.C. § 1905?31
For agency regulations to supply authorization by law under § 1905 they must possess the force and effect of law. This requires that they be substantive rules affecting individual rights and obligations, promulgated pursuant to a clear congressional grant of legislative authority, and issued in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act's notice-and-comment procedures under 5 U.S.C. § 553.32
No. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs disclosure regulations were published without notice of proposed rulemaking.33 They were characterized by the Secretary of Labor as interpretive rules and statements of policy exempt from 5 U.S.C. § 553 procedures.34 They rest on § 201 of Executive Order 11246 and 29 CFR § 70.71 (1978).35 Neither supplies the requisite legislative authority for public disclosure of trade secrets or confidential business information submitted by contractors such as Chrysler.36
In this case the regulations therefore do not authorize the Defense Logistics Agency to release Chrysler's 1974 affirmative action program and Complaint Investigation Report.37 The thread between the regulations and any congressional grant is too attenuated to give them the binding effect of law.38 Because the regulations lack both substantive force and procedural validity, disclosure pursuant to them is not authorized by law within the meaning of § 1905.39
The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs disclosure regulations do not supply the authorization by law required by 18 U.S.C. § 1905.40
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall joined the Court's opinion and emphasized that the controlling issue is whether the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs regulations provide the degree of authorization contemplated by congressional action.41 He stressed that Congress meant to allow only disclosures sanctioned by legislation so that agencies could not create their own exceptions to § 1905 simply by promulgating disclosure rules.42 Marshall further noted that the Administrative Procedure Act's requirement that agency action be in accordance with law permits courts to prevent any disclosure violating § 1905.43
He clarified that the holding does not question the general validity of the regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act or decide whether the Executive Order itself must rest on legislative enactment.44 The decision addresses only whether these particular regulations authorize disclosure for purposes of § 1905.45
Whether the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes judicial review of an agency decision to disclose records that may be covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1905?46
The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes judicial review of agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 702 for any person suffering legal wrong or adversely affected or aggrieved. Review is available unless statutes preclude it or the action is committed to agency discretion. Section 706(2)(A) requires courts to set aside action that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law, including violations of § 1905.47
Yes. Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act entitles a person adversely affected by agency action to judicial review, and the substantive limits imposed by § 1905 supply law to apply.48 In this case Chrysler is a person adversely affected by the Defense Logistics Agency's decision to disclose its affirmative action program and Complaint Investigation Report.49 The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to review the disclosure decision under the Administrative Procedure Act.50
Because any disclosure violating § 1905 would be not in accordance with law within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), the Court of Appeals must consider on remand whether the contemplated disclosures fall within § 1905.51 The Supreme Court therefore vacated the Third Circuit's judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.52
The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes judicial review of the Defense Logistics Agency's disclosure decision and permits courts to prevent any release that would violate 18 U.S.C. § 1905.53