558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010)
Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation with an annual budget of about $12 million.1 Most of its funds come from donations by individuals, though it accepts a small portion from for-profit corporations.2
In January 2008, Citizens United released a 90-minute documentary film entitled Hillary: The Movie.3 The film mentions Senator Hillary Clinton by name and depicts interviews with political commentators, most of them critical of her.4 Hillary was released in theaters and on DVD, but Citizens United wanted to increase distribution by making the film available through video-on-demand.5
In December 2007, a cable company offered to make Hillary available on a video-on-demand channel called Elections '08 for a payment of $1.2 million.6 The proposal was to make the film available to viewers free of charge.7 To promote the video-on-demand offering, Citizens United produced two 10-second ads and one 30-second ad.8 Each ad includes a short statement about Senator Clinton followed by the name of the movie and the movie's website address.9 Citizens United desired to promote the offering by running the advertisements on broadcast and cable television within 30 days of primary elections.10
Before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, federal law prohibited corporations from using general treasury funds to make independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate in connection with certain federal elections.11 BCRA §203 amended the law to prohibit any electioneering communication.12 An electioneering communication is any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election when publicly distributed so that it can be received by 50,000 or more persons in a relevant state.13
Concerned about possible civil and criminal penalties for violating 2 U.S.C. §441b, Citizens United filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in December 2007.14 It sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that §441b is unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and that BCRA's disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements are unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and the ads.15 The District Court denied Citizens United's motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the Federal Election Commission's motion for summary judgment.16 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.17 The case was reargued after the Court requested supplemental briefs addressing whether Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the relevant portion of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission should be overruled.18
Whether 2 U.S.C. §441b applies to the film Hillary as a matter of statutory interpretation?19
Under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, an electioneering communication is any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office and is publicly distributed so that it can be received by 50,000 or more persons in a state where a primary election is being held within 30 days.20
Yes. The film Hillary refers to Senator Clinton by name and was to be distributed through video-on-demand on a cable system with 34.5 million subscribers nationwide.21 This meets the public distribution threshold under 11 CFR §100.29(b)(3)(ii) because the regulation measures capability by the number of subscribers in the relevant area rather than actual viewership.22 Citizens United's claim that individual transmissions reach only one household therefore fails under a fair reading of the statute.23
Section 441b applies to Hillary.24
Whether the Court must consider the facial validity of §441b because narrower grounds for decision would chill political speech?25
When a statute chills core political speech and narrower statutory or as-applied arguments cannot resolve the claim without prolonging that chill, the Court must address the facial validity of the restriction to fulfill its judicial responsibility.26
Yes. Citizens United's narrower arguments that Hillary is not an electioneering communication, is not the functional equivalent of express advocacy under WRTL, or qualifies for an MCFL exception all fail under a fair reading of the statute.27 The ongoing nationwide chilling effect caused by the corporate expenditure ban, combined with the uncertainty from the Government's litigating position, requires the Court to consider facial validity rather than prolong the suppression of protected speech.28
Facial review of §441b is required.29
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Joined by Justice Alito
Chief Justice Roberts stressed that the Court's standard practice is to refrain from addressing constitutional questions except when necessary to rule on particular claims before us.30 This policy underlies both the willingness to construe ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional problems and the practice never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.31 When constitutional questions are indispensably necessary to resolving the case at hand, the court must meet and decide them.32
The distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is both instructive and necessary. It goes to the breadth of the remedy employed by the Court, not what must be pleaded in a complaint. The consequences of the Court's decision are the same regardless of the label.33
Whether Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce should be overruled?34
Stare decisis does not require adherence to a precedent that was not well reasoned, that conflicts with earlier decisions such as Buckley and Bellotti, that has been undermined by subsequent experience, and that lacks serious reliance interests, particularly when the precedent permits the government to suppress political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity.35
Yes. Austin's antidistortion rationale, which permitted banning corporate independent expenditures to prevent the corrosive effects of aggregated wealth, is inconsistent with the First Amendment principle that the government may not restrict political speech based on the speaker's identity or corporate form.36 The decision bypassed Buckley and Bellotti.37 It has been subject to ongoing dispute among Members of the Court.38
Experience shows that speakers routinely find ways around such restrictions while rapid technological change counsels against upholding them, and no serious reliance interests are at stake.39
Austin is overruled, and §441b's restrictions on corporate independent expenditures are invalid.40
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Alito And In Part Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia argued that the original understanding of the First Amendment protects speech by associations of individuals, including corporations, because the text refers to speech rather than speakers and the founding generation understood that individuals could associate to amplify their voices.41 He rejected the notion that corporations were historically disfavored in a way that would exclude their speech from protection, noting that the common law and early practice did not support categorical exclusion of corporate political expression.42 The First Amendment's unqualified text offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker.
The activities of corporations and voluntary associations in petitioning the Government and expressing views in newspapers and pamphlets at the founding confirm that associational speech was protected.43
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, And Sotomayor
Justice Stevens contended that stare decisis carries special force here.44 Austin and McConnell represent a century of legislative and judicial efforts to address the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate wealth in elections.45 The majority's decision to overrule these precedents without new evidence or changed circumstances undermines the stability of campaign finance law.46
It ignores the compelling governmental interests in preventing both quid pro quo corruption and the appearance of corporate domination of the political process.47
Whether BCRA §§201 and 311's disclaimer and disclosure requirements are valid as applied to the film Hillary and its advertisements?48
Disclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities and do not prevent anyone from speaking. The Court has subjected these requirements to exacting scrutiny, which requires a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest.49
Yes. The advertisements and film fall within the definition of electioneering communications.50 They referred to Senator Clinton shortly before a primary and contained pejorative references to her candidacy.51 The requirements provide the electorate with information about who is speaking without preventing the speech itself.52 Citizens United offered no evidence that its donors face the type of threats or harassment that would render the requirements unconstitutional as applied.53
The disclaimer and disclosure requirements are valid as applied.54
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Justice Thomas maintained that mandatory disclosure and disclaimer requirements unconstitutionally burden the right to anonymous speech.55 They expose donors to retaliation, harassment, and economic reprisals.56 He pointed to recent examples where disclosure of contributions led to threats, property damage, and forced resignations.57
The informational interest does not justify the chilling effect on core political speech.58 This is especially true in an era when internet dissemination makes donor information immediately available for targeting.59 As-applied challenges cannot adequately protect speech because the threat of retaliation arises immediately upon disclosure.60