490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989)
In 1985, in response to requests for dance halls open only to teenagers, the city of Dallas authorized the licensing of Class E dance halls.1 The purpose of the ordinance was to provide a place where teenagers could socialize with each other but not be subject to the potentially detrimental influences of older teenagers and young adults.2 Dallas City Code § 14-8.1 restricted admission to Class E dance halls to persons between the ages of 14 and 18.3 Exceptions existed for parents, guardians, law enforcement, and dance-hall personnel.4 The ordinance also limited hours of operation to between 1 p.m. and midnight daily when school was not in session.5
Respondent operates the Twilight Skating Rink in Dallas and obtained a license for a Class E dance hall.6 He divided the floor of his roller-skating rink into two sections with moveable plastic cones or pylons.7 Persons between the ages of 14 and 18 dance on one side while persons of all ages skate on the other to the same music, usually soul and funk music played by a disc jockey.8 The Twilight charges between $3.50 and $5 per person for admission to the dance hall and between $2.50 and $5 per person for admission to the skating rink. It serves as many as 1,000 customers per night. The rink does not serve alcohol, maintains security personnel, and has no selective admissions policy. Most patrons are strangers to each other.9
Respondent sued in the District Court of Dallas County to enjoin enforcement of the age and hour restrictions of the ordinance.10 He contended that the ordinance violated substantive due process and equal protection under the United States and Texas Constitutions.11 He also contended that it unconstitutionally infringed the rights of persons between the ages of 14 and 18 to associate with persons outside that age bracket.12 The trial court upheld the ordinance, finding that it was rationally related to the city's legitimate interest in ensuring the safety and welfare of children.13
The Texas Court of Appeals upheld the ordinance's time restriction but struck down the age restriction. It held that the age restriction violated the First Amendment associational rights of minors.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reviews the decision.15
Whether the Dallas ordinance interferes with associational rights of persons between the ages of 14 and 18 guaranteed by the First Amendment?16
The First Amendment protects freedom of association in two distinct senses: the right to enter into and maintain intimate human relationships, and the right to associate for the purpose of engaging in activities protected by the First Amendment such as speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.17 Laws that do not create suspect classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights are subject only to rational-basis review.18
No. The hundreds of teenagers who congregate each night at Class E dance halls are not members of any organized association. They are instead patrons of the same business establishment. Most are strangers to one another. Admission is open to all who pay the fee.19
This activity of coming together to engage in recreational dancing does not involve the sort of expressive association that the First Amendment has been held to protect. It does not qualify as intimate association given the large numbers involved and the absence of any selective admissions policy.20
The Texas Court of Appeals mistakenly relied on language from Griswold v. Connecticut to recognize a generalized right of social association that includes chance encounters in dance halls. That language recognizes nothing more than that the right of expressive association extends to groups organized to engage in speech that does not pertain directly to politics.21
The Dallas ordinance does not interfere with any constitutionally protected right of association under the First Amendment, so the appropriate level of scrutiny is rational-basis review rather than strict scrutiny.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Blackmun
Justice Stevens wrote separately to emphasize that the opportunity to make friends and enjoy the company of other people in a dance hall or elsewhere constitutes an aspect of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. For that reason, he believed the critical issue in this case involves substantive due process rather than the First Amendment right of association.23 He nevertheless agreed that the city adequately justified the ordinance's modest impairment of teenagers' liberty and joined the judgment.
He suspected that the ordinance might actually give teenagers greater opportunity to associate than invalidation would.24
Whether the age classification imposed by the Dallas ordinance survives rational-basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause?25
Unless laws create suspect classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights, they need only bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.26 Under this most relaxed form of judicial scrutiny, a classification does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because it is imperfect or not made with mathematical nicety, provided it has some reasonable basis.27
Yes. The city has a legitimate interest in protecting minors from the potentially detrimental influences of older teenagers and young adults, including access to drugs and alcohol as well as more mature sexual attitudes. Ray Couch, an urban planner, testified that older individuals prohibited by the ordinance can access drugs and alcohol and hold more liberal sexual attitudes. The city sought to avoid mixing these individuals with youngsters who have not fully matured.28
A Dallas police officer testified that the age restriction was intended to discourage juvenile crime.29 The city could reasonably conclude that limiting dance-hall contacts between juveniles and adults would make less likely illicit or undesirable juvenile involvement with alcohol, illegal drugs, and promiscuous sex.
Although the city permits teenagers and adults to roller-skate together at the same establishment, skating involves less physical contact than dancing. Differentiation between the two activities need not be striking to survive rational-basis scrutiny.30
The age classification imposed by the Dallas ordinance survives rational-basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because it bears a rational relationship to the city's legitimate interest in promoting the welfare of teenagers.31
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Blackmun
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. He observed that the opportunity to make friends and enjoy the company of other people constitutes an aspect of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. He believed the critical issue involves substantive due process rather than the First Amendment right of association.32
He agreed that the city adequately justified the ordinance's modest impairment of teenagers' liberty. Justice Stevens did not join the Court's assessment of the case under the Equal Protection Clause. The equal protection issue received only nominal attention in the trial court.
It was neither reviewed by the Texas Court of Appeals nor briefed before the Supreme Court. Therefore the issue was not properly presented for decision.33