426 U.S. 668, 96 S. Ct. 2358, 49 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1976)
The city of Eastlake, Ohio, a suburb of Cleveland, has a comprehensive zoning plan codified in a municipal ordinance. Respondent, a real estate developer, acquired an eight-acre parcel of real estate in Eastlake zoned for light industrial uses at the time of purchase.1
In May 1971, respondent applied to the City Planning Commission for a zoning change to permit construction of a multifamily, high-rise apartment building. The Planning Commission recommended the proposed change to the City Council.2 By popular vote, the voters of Eastlake amended the city charter to require that any changes in land use agreed to by the Council be approved by a 55% vote in a referendum.3 The City Council approved the Planning Commission's recommendation for reclassification of respondent's property to permit the proposed project.4
Respondent then applied to the Planning Commission for parking and yard approval for the proposed building. The Commission rejected the application on the ground that the City Council's rezoning action had not yet been submitted to the voters for ratification.5 Respondent filed an action in state court seeking a judgment declaring the charter provision invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the people.6
While the case was pending, the City Council's action was submitted to a referendum, but the proposed zoning change was not approved by the requisite 55% margin.7 Following the election, the Court of Common Pleas and the Ohio Court of Appeals sustained the charter provision.8 The Ohio Supreme Court reversed.9
Whether a city charter provision requiring proposed land use changes to be ratified by 55% of the votes cast violates the due process rights of a landowner who applies for a zoning change?10
A referendum cannot be characterized as a delegation of legislative power.11 Under our constitutional assumptions, all power derives from the people, who can reserve to themselves power to deal directly with matters which might otherwise be assigned to the legislature.12 The referendum process does not in itself violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to a rezoning ordinance.13
Yes. The established facts show that the city of Eastlake amended its charter by popular vote to require 55% approval in a referendum for any land use changes approved by the City Council.14 Respondent, a real estate developer, had acquired an eight-acre parcel zoned for light industrial uses and applied for a change to permit a multifamily high-rise apartment building, which the Planning Commission and City Council approved before the referendum requirement was applied.15 The Ohio Supreme Court had reversed lower courts that sustained the provision, but the referendum is a means for direct political participation by the people rather than a delegation to an unaccountable body, and the procedure is valid under the Ohio Constitution's reservation of referendum power.16
The rejection of the rezoning in the referendum therefore does not amount to a violation of due process because the voters are exercising reserved power on a legislative matter.17
The city charter provision does not violate the due process rights of the landowner who applies for a zoning change.18
Related opinions on this issue
He acknowledged that submitting generally applicable legislative questions, including zoning provisions, to a popular referendum is proper and legal.19 However, this case concerned only the status of a single small parcel owned by a single person.20
The referendum procedure afforded the affected person no realistic opportunity to be heard, even by the electorate.21 Powell concluded that the spot referendum technique is fundamentally unfair and opens disquieting opportunities for local government bodies to bypass normal protective procedures for resolving issues affecting individual rights.22
He concluded that the Ohio Supreme Court correctly held the Eastlake charter provision violates the Due Process Clause.23 The mandatory referendum for a particular zoning change affecting one parcel is manifestly unreasonable.24
It submits the decision to thousands of voters with no interest in the property.25 The provision provides no standards or procedures for exempting particular claims from the referendum requirement.26 Stevens emphasized that the record contained no justification for using the procedure in this case.27
He respected the state judiciary's appraisal of the fundamental fairness of the decisionmaking process.28