531 U.S. 32 (2000)
In August 1998, the city of Indianapolis began operating vehicle checkpoints on its roads with the aim of interdicting unlawful drugs.1 Between August and November of that year, the city conducted six such roadblocks, stopping 1,161 vehicles and arresting 104 motorists, of whom 55 were arrested for drug-related crimes and 49 for unrelated offenses.2
At each checkpoint, officers stopped a predetermined number of vehicles, typically 10 to 15, asked the driver a few questions, examined the vehicle's interior, and walked a narcotics-detection dog around the exterior.3 If evidence of a drug violation was detected, officers could search the car without consent; otherwise, they provided the driver with a flyer explaining the program and allowed the driver to proceed.4 The stops generally lasted two to three minutes.5
Respondents James Edmond and Joell Palmer were each stopped at a narcotics checkpoint in late September 1998.6 They filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on behalf of themselves and a class of motorists, claiming the checkpoint program violated the Fourth Amendment.7
The District Court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed that decision.9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.10
Whether the Fourth Amendment permits the type of checkpoint program at issue here, under which the police stop vehicles at selected locations on city roads for the principal purpose of discovering and interdicting illegal drugs?11
The Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires individualized suspicion for a search or seizure, and while limited exceptions exist for brief suspicionless seizures at highway checkpoints whose primary purposes relate to border control or roadway safety, no exception applies to a program whose primary purpose is the detection of evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.12
No. The Indianapolis checkpoint program operated from August through November 1998 with the primary purpose of interdicting unlawful drugs.13 This is shown by the flyers given to drivers stating that the stop was made to detect illegal drugs and by the parties' stipulation describing the checkpoints as drug checkpoints.14 This purpose falls outside the recognized exceptions for border policing in Martinez-Fuerte and roadway safety in Sitz.15 Drug interdiction advances the general interest in crime control rather than any special need tied to the border or highway safety.16
The stops lasted two to three minutes, involved predetermined numbers of vehicles, exterior dog sniffs, and open-view examinations, yet lacked any individualized suspicion for the initial seizure.17 Application of the primary-purpose inquiry to the stipulated facts therefore requires the conclusion that the program is indistinguishable from the general crime-control stops the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent.18
The Fourth Amendment does not permit the checkpoint program because its primary purpose is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.19
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Scalia And Justice Thomas
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that the checkpoints served legitimate secondary purposes of checking driver's licenses and vehicle registrations and detecting driver impairment, purposes already approved in Prouse and Sitz.20 He argued that the addition of a narcotics dog did not lengthen the stops or increase the objective intrusion, that the stops remained brief and standardized, and that the 49 arrests for nondrug offenses confirmed the program's effectiveness in advancing those interests.21 Rehnquist maintained that the primary-purpose inquiry imported from special-needs search cases has no proper place in the distinct context of brief automobile seizures, where Brown v. Texas balancing of gravity of the public concern, degree of advancement of the interest, and severity of interference with liberty already supplies the governing standard.22
Justice Thomas joined the Chief Justice's dissent and wrote separately to observe that Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte together permit suspicionless roadblock seizures conducted according to a plan that limits officer discretion.23 He expressed doubt that the Framers would have considered reasonable a program of indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of wrongdoing, yet declined to urge overruling those precedents without briefing and argument.24 Thomas concluded that the Indianapolis program therefore should be upheld under the authority of the two controlling cases.25