435 U.S. 702, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978)
The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power administered retirement, disability, and death-benefit programs for its employees, with monthly retirement benefits computed as a fraction of salary multiplied by years of service.1 The Department required its 2,000 female employees to make monthly contributions to the pension fund that were 14.84% higher than those required of its 10,000 male employees, based on a study of mortality tables and its own experience showing that women on average live longer than men.2 This resulted in female employees taking home less pay than male employees earning the same salary, even though monthly benefits for men and women of the same age, seniority, and salary were equal and the plan was funded entirely by contributions from employees and the Department.3
In 1973, respondents brought this suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California on behalf of a class of women employed or formerly employed by the Department. They prayed for an injunction and restitution of excess contributions.4 While the action was pending, the California Legislature enacted a law prohibiting municipal agencies from requiring female employees to make higher pension fund contributions than males, and the Department amended its plan effective January 1, 1975, to draw no distinction in contributions or benefits on the basis of sex.5
On a motion for summary judgment, the District Court held that the contribution differential violated federal law and ordered a refund of all excess contributions made before the amendment of the plan.6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that judgment.7 We granted certiorari to decide whether this practice discriminated against individual female employees because of their sex in violation of § 703 (a) (1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.8 The case was argued on January 18, 1978.9
Whether the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power's practice of requiring its female employees to make larger contributions to its pension fund than its male employees discriminated against individual female employees because of their sex in violation of § 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?10
Section 703(a)(1) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation because of such individual's sex.11 The statute's focus on the individual precludes treatment of individuals as components of a sexual class.12 Even a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply.13
Yes. The Department's practice required its 2,000 female employees to contribute 14.84 percent more than its 10,000 male employees, resulting in female employees taking home less pay than male employees earning the same salary, even though monthly benefits for men and women of the same age, seniority, and salary were equal.14 This differential was based solely on the sex-based generalization that women as a class live longer than men, with no assurance that any individual woman would fit the generalization.15 The practice therefore treated individuals as components of a class rather than on their individual characteristics, directly conflicting with the statutory command to focus on the individual.16
The practice constituted discrimination in violation of § 703(a)(1).17
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun joined only Part IV of the Court's opinion and concurred in the judgment.18 He expressed discomfort that the decision cuts back on General Electric Co. v. Gilbert and inferentially on Geduldig v. Aiello.19 Although the lineup of justices participating in the majority might suggest consistency with those precedents, the votes of Justices Marshall and Stevens indicate the contrary.20
Blackmun concluded that the Court should have met the posture of the earlier cases head on rather than through thin rationalization that seeks to distinguish but fails in its quest.21
Whether the contribution differential was based on a factor other than sex within the meaning of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 as incorporated by the Bennett Amendment?22
The Bennett Amendment incorporates the Equal Pay Act exceptions into Title VII.23 That amendment authorizes a differential based on any other factor other than sex.24 Longevity is not such a factor when the contribution schedule distinguishes precisely between male and female employees rather than between long-lived and short-lived employees.25
No. The record contains no evidence that any factor other than the employee's sex was taken into account in calculating the 14.84 percent differential.26 Although any individual's life expectancy is based on several factors of which sex is only one, the Department's schedule distinguished only imperfectly between long-lived and short-lived employees while distinguishing precisely between male and female employees.27
The differential was not based on a factor other than sex.28
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Rehnquist
Chief Justice Burger dissented from Parts I, II, and III.29 He argued that gender-based actuarial tables have been in use since at least 1843 and their statistical validity has been repeatedly verified.30 It is rational to permit employers to rely on statistically sound disparities in longevity between men and women.31
The practice falls squarely under the Equal Pay Act exemption because longevity is the other factor other than sex under which all elements leading to differences in longevity are grouped and assimilated.32
Whether the rationale of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert requires reversal of the judgments below?33
In Gilbert the Court held that exclusion of pregnancy from a disability benefit plan did not constitute sex discrimination because the two groups were pregnant women and nonpregnant persons, the latter including members of both sexes, and the plan did not discriminate on the basis of gender as such.34 Here each group of employees is composed entirely of members of the same sex, so the plan discriminates on its face on the basis of sex.35
No. Unlike Gilbert, where the two groups of potential recipients were pregnant women and nonpregnant persons, each of the two groups of employees involved here is composed entirely and exclusively of members of the same sex.36 The Department's plan therefore discriminates on the basis of sex on its face, whereas the General Electric plan discriminated on the basis of a special physical disability.37
The rationale of Gilbert does not require reversal.38
Whether the District Court's award of retroactive monetary recovery to the entire class of female employees and retirees was justified?39
Although Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody establishes a presumption in favor of retroactive relief that can seldom be overcome, a district court must still determine that such relief is appropriate after considering the equitable nature of Title VII remedies, including the complexity of the issue, the absence of prior guidance, and the potential devastating impact on pension funds and innocent third parties.40
No. Although the Albemarle presumption favors retroactive liability, the District Court gave insufficient attention to the equitable nature of Title VII remedies.41 Conscientious administrators may reasonably have assumed the program was lawful, the courts had been silent, administrative agencies had conflicting views, and retroactive liability could be devastating for a pension fund by forcing diminished assets to meet unchanged obligations or disappointing the expectations of all retired employees.42
The award of retroactive monetary recovery was not justified.43
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall joined all of the opinion except Part IV.44 He agreed that the Albemarle presumption in favor of retroactive liability can seldom be overcome but disagreed that it should be deemed overcome here.45 The District Court found petitioners should have been placed on notice by the April 5, 1972 EEOC regulations.46
No claim was made that the modest award would threaten the plan's solvency, and the possibility of harm to innocent retirees or employees was largely chimerical.47 He would have affirm the judgment below.48