461 U.S. 95 (1983)
On October 6, 1976, at approximately 2 a.m., Adolph Lyons was stopped by Los Angeles Police Department officers for a traffic violation involving a burned-out taillight.1 The officers ordered Lyons to exit his vehicle, face it, spread his legs, and place his hands on his head.2 After a patdown search, one officer applied a chokehold to Lyons, rendering him unconscious, causing him to lose control of his bodily functions, and resulting in injuries to his larynx.3 Lyons was issued a traffic citation and released.4
On February 7, 1977, Lyons filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against the City of Los Angeles and four police officers.5 The complaint sought damages for the incident as well as injunctive and declaratory relief against the City's alleged policy of authorizing the use of chokeholds in situations where suspects posed no threat of deadly force.6 Lyons alleged that the officers acted pursuant to official City policies, customs, and practices.7
The District Court initially granted the City's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings with respect to the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.8 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that determination.9 On remand, after considering affidavits, depositions, and government records, the District Court found that the City authorized chokeholds in non-life-threatening situations, that such use posed a high risk of injury or death, and that Lyons had been subjected to a department-authorized chokehold without provocation.10 The District Court entered a preliminary injunction barring the use of the holds except where death or serious bodily injury was threatened, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.11
During the course of the litigation, the number of reported deaths resulting from the application of chokeholds by Los Angeles police officers increased, with at least sixteen such deaths by 1982, twelve involving Black males.12 In May 1982, the Chief of Police prohibited the bar-arm chokehold entirely, and the Board of Police Commissioners imposed a six-month moratorium on the carotid-artery chokehold except in situations authorizing deadly force.13 The City suggested the case might be moot, but the Supreme Court reserved that question after denying a motion to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the standing issue in the context of the request for injunctive relief.15
Whether a plaintiff subjected to a chokehold during a traffic stop has standing to seek injunctive relief against a municipal policy authorizing chokeholds in non-life-threatening situations?16
To establish standing for injunctive relief under Article III, a plaintiff must demonstrate a real and immediate threat of future injury that is not conjectural or hypothetical. Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.17
No. Lyons was subjected to a chokehold on October 6, 1976, during a traffic stop but has not alleged or shown any realistic threat that he will again be stopped for a traffic violation and subjected to a chokehold without provocation.18 The record contains no evidence of such a threat.19 The mere possibility that Lyons might again be stopped and subjected to a chokehold is not sufficient to establish standing for injunctive relief under the standard set forth in O'Shea v. Littleton.20
Lyons lacks standing to seek the injunction against the City's chokehold policy.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun, And Justice Stevens
Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that the Court's decision rests on a misapplication of standing doctrine.22 Lyons has shown that he was subjected to a chokehold pursuant to a City policy that authorizes the use of chokeholds in non-life-threatening situations.23 The fact that Lyons has already been subjected to the practice is strong evidence that it may happen again.24
The City's policy is an ongoing one that applies to all citizens.25 Lyons is a citizen of Los Angeles and is subject to the City's police practices.26 Justice Marshall would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.27
Justice Brennan joined Justice Marshall's dissent.28 The Court's decision unduly restricts the ability of citizens to obtain injunctive relief against unconstitutional police practices.29 The standing requirement should not be used as a barrier to prevent citizens from protecting themselves against ongoing unconstitutional conduct by the government.30
The facts of this case demonstrate the real and immediate threat that Lyons faces.31 He was subjected to a chokehold without provocation.32 The City has a policy that permits such conduct.33
There is nothing to suggest that the policy will not be applied to Lyons again in the future.34
Whether intervening events including a moratorium on the bar-arm and carotid-artery chokeholds rendered the request for injunctive relief moot?35
No. The Chief of Police prohibited the bar-arm chokehold entirely. The Board of Police Commissioners imposed a six-month moratorium on the carotid-artery chokehold except in situations authorizing deadly force. The moratorium by its terms is not permanent. Intervening events have not irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.38
The case is not moot.