532 U.S. 268, 121 S. Ct. 1508 (2001)
On October 21, 1994, her male supervisor met with her and another male employee to review the psychological evaluation reports of four job applicants.1 The report for one applicant disclosed that the applicant had once commented to a co-worker, “I hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand Canyon.”2
At the meeting, the supervisor read the comment aloud, looked at respondent, and stated that he did not know what that meant.3 The other employee then said that he would tell him later, and both men chuckled.4
Respondent complained about the comment to the offending employee, to Assistant Superintendent George Ann Rice, and to another assistant superintendent of petitioner.5 On April 1, 1997, respondent filed the present lawsuit against petitioner.6
On April 10, 1997, Assistant Superintendent Rice mentioned to Allin Chandler, Executive Director of respondent’s union, that she was contemplating transferring respondent to the position of Director of Professional Development Education.7 Respondent did not serve petitioner with the summons and complaint until April 11, 1997.8 Rice filed an affidavit stating that she did not become aware of the lawsuit until after April 11.9 The transfer was carried through in May 1997.10
The District Court granted summary judgment to petitioner on February 9, 1999.11 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on July 19, 2000.12 The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari to review the case.13
Whether the single incident involving a sexually explicit comment read aloud during a job applicant review meeting could reasonably be believed to violate Title VII?14
Title VII forbids actions taken on the basis of sex that discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.15 Sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII only if it is so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.16 Workplace conduct is not measured in isolation; instead, whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive must be judged by looking at all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.17 Hence, a recurring point in the opinions is that simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents unless extremely serious will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.18
No. The ordinary terms and conditions of respondent's job required her to review the sexually explicit statement in the course of screening job applicants.19 Her co-workers who participated in the hiring process were subject to the same requirement.20 Respondent conceded that it did not bother or upset her to read the statement in the file.21 Her supervisor's comment that he did not know what the statement meant, the co-worker's responding comment, and the chuckling of both are at worst an isolated incident that cannot remotely be considered extremely serious as the cases require.22
The single incident could not reasonably be believed to violate Title VII.23
Whether the timing of the employer's decision to transfer respondent relative to her filing of an EEOC charge and lawsuit, including issuance of a right-to-sue letter, established causation for a retaliation claim under Title VII?24
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action must be very close.25 Action taken twenty months later suggests by itself no causality at all.26 Employers need not suspend previously planned transfers upon discovering that a Title VII suit has been filed, and their proceeding along lines previously contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no evidence whatever of causality.27
No. Respondent did not serve petitioner with the summons and complaint until April 11, 1997, one day after Rice had made the statement contemplating the transfer, and Rice filed an affidavit stating that she did not become aware of the lawsuit until after April 11.28 The EEOC had issued a right-to-sue letter three months before Rice announced she was contemplating the transfer, but there is no indication that Rice even knew about the right-to-sue letter when she proposed transferring respondent.29 The underlying EEOC complaint had been filed on August 23, 1995, almost two years earlier, and both Title VII and its implementing regulations require that an employer be given notice within ten days of filing.30
The timing did not establish causation for the retaliation claim.31