548 U.S. 735, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 165 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2006)
In the early hours of June 21, 2000, Officer Jeffrey Moritz of the Flagstaff Police responded in uniform to complaints that a pickup truck with loud music blaring was circling a residential block.1
When he located the truck, the officer turned on the emergency lights and siren of his marked patrol car.2 This prompted petitioner Eric Clark, the truck’s driver (then 17), to pull over.3
Officer Moritz got out of the patrol car and told Clark to stay where he was.4 Less than a minute later, Clark shot the officer.5 The officer died soon after but not before calling the police dispatcher for help.6 Clark ran away on foot but was arrested later that day with gunpowder residue on his hands.7 The gun that killed the officer was found nearby, stuffed into a knit cap.8
Clark was charged with first-degree murder under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–1105(A)(3) for intentionally or knowingly killing a law enforcement officer in the line of duty.9 In March 2001, Clark was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to a state hospital for treatment.10 Two years later the same trial court found his competence restored and ordered him to be tried.11 Clark waived his right to a jury, and the case was heard by the court.12
At trial, Clark did not contest that he shot the officer or that the officer died.13 He relied on his own undisputed paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the incident to deny that he had the specific intent to shoot an officer or knowledge that he was doing so.14 The prosecutor offered circumstantial evidence that Clark knew the victim was a police officer.15 The prosecutor also offered testimony indicating that Clark had previously stated he wanted to shoot police and had lured the victim to the scene to kill him.16
In presenting the defense case, Clark claimed mental illness.17 He sought to introduce it for two purposes.18 First, he raised the affirmative defense of insanity.19 This put the burden on himself to prove by clear and convincing evidence that at the time of the crime he was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that he did not know the criminal act was wrong.20 Second, he aimed to rebut the prosecution’s evidence of the requisite mens rea.21
Ruling that Clark could not rely on evidence bearing on insanity to dispute the mens rea, the trial court cited the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Mott.22 That decision refused to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent.23 It held that Arizona does not allow evidence of a mental disorder short of insanity to negate the mens rea element of a crime.24 As to his insanity, Clark presented lay testimony describing his increasingly bizarre behavior over the year before the shooting.25 This included testimony that Clark thought Flagstaff was populated with aliens trying to kill him and that bullets were the only way to stop them.26
A psychiatrist testified that Clark was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia with delusions about aliens when he killed the officer.27 The psychiatrist concluded that Clark was incapable of luring the officer or understanding right from wrong and was thus insane at the time of the killing.28 In rebuttal, the State’s psychiatrist gave his opinion that Clark’s paranoid schizophrenia did not keep him from appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct before and after the shooting.29
The judge then issued a first-degree murder verdict.30 The judge found that Clark had not established that his schizophrenia distorted his perception of reality so severely that he did not know his actions were wrong.31 Clark moved to vacate the judgment and life sentence.32 He argued that Arizona’s insanity test and its Mott rule each violate due process.33 The trial court denied the motion.34 Affirming, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the State’s insanity scheme was consistent with due process.35 The court read Mott as barring the trial court’s consideration of evidence of Clark’s mental illness and capacity directly on the element of mens rea.36 The Supreme Court of Arizona denied further review.37 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.38
Whether due process prohibits Arizona from using an insanity test stated solely in terms of the defendant’s inability to tell right from wrong?39
Due process does not prohibit a State from defining its insanity defense solely in terms of moral incapacity.40 States possess considerable leeway in formulating the standard.41 The moral-incapacity formulation is consistent with the widely accepted M'Naghten test that the Court has long approved.42
No. Arizona's statute requires a defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, as a result of mental disease or defect, he did not know the criminal act was wrong.43 This moral-incapacity test matches the second prong of M'Naghten and is one of several historically accepted variants that States may choose.44 No particular formulation has evolved into a baseline for due process.45 The substantial variation among jurisdictions confirms that no single formulation is fundamental.46
Clark's evidence of cognitive incapacity was in fact admitted and considered under the moral-incapacity standard, satisfying due process.47 The trial court acknowledged Clark's serious mental illness yet found he failed to carry his burden on the insanity defense after weighing the facts of the crime, expert evaluations, Clark's actions before and after the shooting, and observations of those who knew him.48
Arizona's insanity test does not violate due process.49
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Ginsburg concurs in the Court's holding that due process does not prohibit Arizona from using an insanity test stated solely in terms of the defendant's inability to tell right from wrong.50 She joins Parts I, II, and III of the majority opinion addressing the constitutionality of Arizona's moral-incapacity formulation of the insanity defense.51 Her agreement rests on the recognition that States have long enjoyed latitude to define the contours of the insanity defense without offending fundamental principles of justice.52
The moral-incapacity standard Arizona adopted is one of several variants historically employed across jurisdictions and is consistent with the M'Naghten framework the Court has previously approved.53 Ginsburg does not depart from the majority on this threshold due-process question.54
Justice Breyer concurs in much of the Court's analysis of the insanity-test issue.55 He agrees that due process permits Arizona to define its insanity defense solely in terms of moral incapacity.56 Breyer nevertheless writes separately to note that the test as applied in this case raised concerns about whether Clark received a meaningful opportunity to present a defense.57
His separate opinion focuses primarily on evidentiary questions but acknowledges the validity of the moral-incapacity standard itself.58 Breyer reserves judgment on whether the abbreviated test deprived Clark of due process in the particular circumstances of this prosecution.59
Joined by Stevens, Ginsburg
Justice Kennedy does not reach the merits of whether Arizona's abbreviated insanity test violates due process.60 He would reverse the judgment on the separate ground that the trial court improperly excluded evidence relevant to mens rea.61 Kennedy notes that the constitutionality of Arizona's moral-incapacity formulation was not the central focus of his dissent.62
Because he finds the evidentiary restriction independently unconstitutional, he declines to decide whether the insanity standard standing alone would satisfy due process.63 His opinion emphasizes that the case can be resolved without addressing the insanity-test question.64
Whether the Arizona trial court violated due process by excluding expert testimony about Clark’s mental illness and its effect on his capacity to form the mens rea for first-degree murder?65
A State may restrict mental-disease and capacity evidence to the insanity defense without violating due process when the restriction preserves the State's chosen insanity standard.66 The rule also avoids jury confusion.67 It rests on legitimate reasons such as the controversial character of some mental-disease diagnoses and the risk that capacity judgments will mislead.68
No. The Mott rule channels expert mental-disease and capacity evidence to the insanity issue on which the defendant bears the burden of persuasion.69 Allowing the same evidence to rebut mens rea would undermine the insanity defense by creating an easier avenue for acquittal that bypasses the clear-and-convincing standard.70 The risks of misleading jurors through professional debate over diagnoses, the suggestive power of disease labels, and the tenuous leap from psychological to legal concepts justify confining the evidence.71 Observation evidence of Clark's behavior was not clearly excluded on mens rea grounds in a manner that presents a preserved due-process claim.72
The trial court applied Mott to bar consideration of expert testimony on mens rea while still receiving and weighing Clark's lay and expert evidence on the insanity defense.73 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed that limitation as consistent with due process.74
The exclusion of expert testimony on mens rea did not violate due process.75
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Ginsburg dissents from the Court's conclusion that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony on mens rea satisfied due process.76 She would hold that the restriction violated Clark's right to present a complete defense on an element the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.77 Ginsburg concludes that relevant expert testimony bearing directly on whether Clark possessed the requisite knowledge or intent should have been considered.78
In her view, the categorical bar imposed by Mott and applied by the trial court deprived Clark of a meaningful opportunity to rebut the State's evidence of mens rea.79 She would reverse the judgment in part on this ground.80
Justice Breyer concurs in part and dissents in part from the disposition of the evidentiary issue.81 He would remand the case to the Arizona courts for a determination whether state law, as set forth in Mott and subsequent decisions, properly distinguishes among categories of evidence and whether the trial court correctly applied that distinction.82 Breyer accepts the majority's categorization of observation evidence, mental-disease evidence, and capacity evidence.83
He remains concerned, however, that the lower courts may not have focused with sufficient precision on the distinction when applying Mott to Clark's proffer.84 Breyer also reserves the question of the burden of persuasion when a defendant produces evidence of mental illness severe enough to prevent formation of any relevant intent.85
Joined by Stevens, Ginsburg
Justice Kennedy dissents on the ground that Arizona's categorical exclusion prevented Clark from introducing critical and reliable evidence that he lacked the knowledge or intent required for first-degree murder.86 The exclusion denied Clark a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense on an element the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.87 Kennedy rejects the majority's narrowing of the claim to exclude observation evidence and concludes that the trial court refused to consider mental-illness evidence on the mens rea issue.88
He would reverse the judgment because the per se bar is arbitrary, disproportionate to any legitimate purpose, and inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of a meaningful opportunity to present a defense.89