178 U.S. 186
Julia H. Clarke, wife of Henry P. Clarke, died leaving a will.1 At her death she owned real estate situated in Connecticut.2 The will was presented to the courts of South Carolina where Nancy B. Clarke, the surviving sister of Julia and a minor at the time, was a party to the proceedings through a guardian ad litem.3 The South Carolina court adjudged that the will converted the real estate wherever situated into personalty.4
Henry P. Clarke was appointed administrator in Connecticut of the estate of his deceased daughter Julia Clarke.5 He applied to the Connecticut probate court to determine entitlement to the real estate in Connecticut owned by the intestate.6 The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut determined that the will did not convert the Connecticut real estate into personalty, with the result that Nancy B. Clarke inherited the entire interest under Connecticut law to the exclusion of her father.7
The dispute reached the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of error, the plaintiff in error contending that the Connecticut decision failed to accord full faith and credit to the South Carolina decree.8
Whether the decree of the South Carolina court construing the will of Julia H. Clarke as converting real estate in Connecticut into personalty was entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of Connecticut?9
The law of the state in which real property is situated exclusively governs the rules of its descent, alienation, and transfer, as well as the construction and effect of wills and other instruments affecting title to such land.10 This principle, rooted in the sovereign authority of each state over property within its borders, prevents courts of other states from rendering decrees that directly control the devolution of title to foreign real estate.11 Even when a will is construed by the courts of the testator's domicile, that construction cannot bind the situs state with respect to land located there, particularly where the proceedings involve a minor whose interests in out-of-state property require separate representation under the law of the situs.12
No. Because the law of Connecticut as the situs of the real estate controlled its transmission, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut correctly applied its own rules to determine that the will of Julia H. Clarke did not convert the Connecticut land into personalty.13 The South Carolina decree, although binding on personal property and on parties properly before that court, could not extend to real estate in Connecticut or bind the minor Nancy B. Clarke with respect to her interests in that land.14
The Connecticut court therefore properly disregarded the South Carolina construction when it adjudicated entitlement under Connecticut intestacy law, and no violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause resulted from this independent determination.15 The application of the situs rule to the established facts shows that the Connecticut real estate remained subject to Connecticut law at all times.16 Julia H. Clarke's ownership of land in Connecticut at her death meant that any question of conversion by will or passage by intestacy fell exclusively within the province of Connecticut courts.17
The participation of Nancy B. Clarke through a guardian ad litem in South Carolina did not confer authority on that court to adjudicate interests in Connecticut land.18 A guardian appointed in one state has no power over real property located in another.19 Consequently, the Connecticut judgment stands without constitutional infirmity.20
The decree of the South Carolina court was not entitled to full faith and credit in the Connecticut proceedings concerning the real estate located in Connecticut.21