414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974)
In the 1970-1971 school year, Jo Carol LaFleur and Ann Elizabeth Nelson were junior high school teachers employed by the Cleveland, Ohio Board of Education.1 Each informed her employer that she was pregnant.2 The Cleveland rule, first adopted in 1952, required every pregnant school teacher to take maternity leave without pay beginning five months before the expected birth of her child.3 Application for leave was due no later than two weeks prior to the departure date.4
Neither Mrs. LaFleur nor Mrs. Nelson wished to take an unpaid maternity leave.5 Each wanted to continue teaching until the end of the school year.6 Because of the mandatory rule, each was required to leave her job in March 1971.7 The two women then filed separate suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio challenging the constitutionality of the maternity leave rule.8 The district court tried the cases together and rejected the plaintiffs' arguments at 326 F. Supp. 1208.9 A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed at 465 F. 2d 1184.10
Susan Cohen was employed by the School Board of Chesterfield County, Virginia.11 That school board's maternity leave regulation requires that a pregnant teacher leave work at least four months prior to the expected birth of her child. Written notice must be given to the school board at least six months prior to the expected birth date. Mrs. Cohen informed the Chesterfield County School Board in November 1970 that she was pregnant and expected the birth of her child about April 28, 1971.12 She initially requested permission to continue teaching until April 1, 1971.13 She later suggested she be allowed to teach until January 21, 1971, the end of the first school semester.14 The school board rejected both requests and required her to leave her teaching job on December 18, 1970.15 She subsequently filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.16 The district court held that the school board regulation violates the Equal Protection Clause at 326 F. Supp. 1159.17 A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed.18 On rehearing en banc the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the challenged regulation in a 4-3 decision at 474 F. 2d 395.19
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases at 411 U. S. 947 to resolve the conflict between the Courts of Appeals regarding the constitutionality of such mandatory maternity leave rules for public school teachers.20
Whether the Cleveland Board of Education's mandatory maternity leave rule violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?21
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life, including the decision whether to bear a child, and forbids rules that needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge upon this liberty by employing irrebuttable presumptions that are not necessarily or universally true in fact when reasonable alternative means exist to achieve the state's legitimate objectives.22
Yes. In the 1970-1971 school year, Jo Carol LaFleur and Ann Elizabeth Nelson were junior high school teachers employed by the Cleveland, Ohio Board of Education. Each informed her employer that she was pregnant. The Cleveland rule, first adopted in 1952, required every pregnant school teacher to take maternity leave without pay beginning five months before the expected birth of her child, with application for leave due no later than two weeks prior to the departure date. Neither Mrs. LaFleur nor Mrs. Nelson wished to take an unpaid maternity leave. Each wanted to continue teaching until the end of the school year. Because of the mandatory rule, each was required to leave her job in March 1971. The two women then filed separate suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio challenging the constitutionality of the maternity leave rule. The district court tried the cases together and rejected the plaintiffs' arguments at 326 F. Supp. 1208. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed at 465 F. 2d 1184. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases at 411 U. S. 947 to resolve the conflict between the Courts of Appeals regarding the constitutionality of such mandatory maternity leave rules for public school teachers.
The Cleveland rule creates an irrebuttable presumption that every teacher reaching the fifth month of pregnancy is physically incapable of continuing work.23 The rule also creates an irrebuttable presumption that no mother is fit to return until her child reaches three months of age.24 These presumptions are neither necessarily nor universally true.25 Medical evidence establishes that the ability of any particular pregnant woman to continue working is an individual matter.26 Many teachers remain fully capable beyond the cutoff.27 The presumptions burden the protected liberty interest in deciding to bear a child without advancing the goals of instructional continuity or teacher fitness.28 Substantial advance notice permits planning.29 Individualized medical determinations provide a narrower alternative.30 The three-month return provision lacks any rational connection to continuity or fitness once a physician's certificate is required.31
The Cleveland mandatory leave and return rules violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell concurred in the result but would have decided the cases under equal protection analysis rather than irrebuttable presumption doctrine.33 He concluded that the four- and five-month prebirth cutoff dates and the three-month postbirth waiting period are irrational classifications.34 The classifications are counterproductive to the goal of continuity of instruction.35
They remove large numbers of capable teachers from the classroom without factual support.36 They rest on unsupported assumptions about pregnant teachers' abilities.37 Powell noted that the boards failed to demonstrate that legitimate interests such as teacher fitness or classroom safety were threatened by continued employment of pregnant teachers.38
He emphasized that any termination date serves planning needs and that forcing months of unemployment is unnecessary.39
Joined by Chief Justice Burger
Justice Rehnquist dissented.40 He contended that the majority's disfavor of irrebuttable presumptions constitutes an attack on the legislative function of drawing lines.41 Rehnquist argued that the regulations are valid because medical evidence indicates some risk of impairment at the stages selected.42
He stated that no judicial standard exists to invalidate the particular dates chosen by the boards when lines must be drawn short of the delivery room.43 Rehnquist observed that countless statutes draw similar lines based on age or other factors.44 He concluded that the preference for individualized determinations undermines the very notion of lawmaking itself.45
Whether the Chesterfield County School Board's mandatory maternity leave rule violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?46
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life, including the decision whether to bear a child, and forbids rules that needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge upon this liberty by employing irrebuttable presumptions that are not necessarily or universally true in fact when reasonable alternative means exist to achieve the state's legitimate objectives.
Yes. Susan Cohen was employed by the School Board of Chesterfield County, Virginia. That school board's maternity leave regulation requires that a pregnant teacher leave work at least four months prior to the expected birth of her child, with written notice given to the school board at least six months prior to the expected birth date.47 Mrs. Cohen informed the Chesterfield County School Board in November 1970 that she was pregnant and expected the birth of her child about April 28, 1971. She initially requested permission to continue teaching until April 1, 1971. She later suggested she be allowed to teach until January 21, 1971, the end of the first school semester. The school board rejected both requests and required her to leave her teaching job on December 18, 1970. She subsequently filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The district court held that the school board regulation violates the Equal Protection Clause at 326 F. Supp. 1159. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed. On rehearing en banc the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the challenged regulation in a 4-3 decision at 474 F. 2d 395.
The Chesterfield County rule imposes a conclusive presumption that every teacher is physically unfit to teach after the fourth month of pregnancy.48 Medical testimony in the record establishes that the capacity of any particular pregnant woman to continue working past a fixed date is an individual matter.49 Many teachers remain capable of performing their duties beyond the fourth month.50 The presumption therefore is not necessarily or universally true.51 Although the board possesses a legitimate interest in continuity of instruction and teacher fitness, the absolute cutoff date is not rationally related to those interests when advance notice is provided and individualized medical determinations remain available as a less burdensome alternative.52
The Chesterfield County mandatory leave rule violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.53
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell concurred in the result but would have decided the cases under equal protection analysis rather than irrebuttable presumption doctrine. He concluded that the four-month prebirth cutoff date is an irrational classification.54 The classification is counterproductive to the goal of continuity of instruction.55
It removes large numbers of capable teachers from the classroom without factual support.56 It rests on unsupported assumptions about pregnant teachers' abilities.57 Powell noted that the boards failed to demonstrate that legitimate interests such as teacher fitness or classroom safety were threatened by continued employment of pregnant teachers.
He emphasized that any termination date serves planning needs and that forcing months of unemployment is unnecessary.
Joined by Chief Justice Burger
Justice Rehnquist dissented. He contended that the majority's disfavor of irrebuttable presumptions constitutes an attack on the legislative function of drawing lines. Rehnquist argued that the regulations are valid because medical evidence indicates some risk of impairment at the stages selected.
He stated that no judicial standard exists to invalidate the particular dates chosen by the boards when lines must be drawn short of the delivery room. Rehnquist observed that countless statutes draw similar lines based on age or other factors. He concluded that the preference for individualized determinations undermines the very notion of lawmaking itself.
Whether the Cleveland and Chesterfield County school boards' return-to-work eligibility provisions violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?58
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life, including the decision whether to bear a child, and forbids rules that needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge upon this liberty by employing irrebuttable presumptions that are not necessarily or universally true in fact when reasonable alternative means exist to achieve the state's legitimate objectives.
Yes. The Cleveland return rule requires a teacher to wait until her child reaches three months of age before she becomes eligible to return, even after submission of a physician's certificate.59 This additional limitation embodies an irrebuttable presumption that no mother is fit to teach until that point.60 The presumption is neither necessarily nor universally true.61 The presumption is unnecessary once medical certification is required.62 The provision therefore arbitrarily burdens the protected liberty interest without advancing any legitimate state objective.63
The Chesterfield County return rule permits a teacher to become eligible for re-employment upon submission of a medical certificate from her physician, with return guaranteed no later than the beginning of the next school year.64 The medical certificate requirement constitutes a reasonable and individualized method of protecting the board's interest in teacher fitness.65 The possible deferral of return until the next school year serves the goal of preserving continuity of instruction without employing an unnecessary presumption that broadly burdens constitutional liberty.66
The Cleveland three-month return provision violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, while the Chesterfield County return rule is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.67
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell concurred in the result but would have decided the cases under equal protection analysis rather than irrebuttable presumption doctrine. He concluded that the three-month postbirth waiting period is an irrational classification.68 The classification is counterproductive to the goal of continuity of instruction.
It removes large numbers of capable teachers from the classroom without factual support. It rests on unsupported assumptions about pregnant teachers' abilities. Powell noted that the boards failed to demonstrate that legitimate interests such as teacher fitness or classroom safety were threatened by continued employment of pregnant teachers.
He emphasized that any termination date serves planning needs and that forcing months of unemployment is unnecessary.
Joined by Chief Justice Burger
Justice Rehnquist dissented. He contended that the majority's disfavor of irrebuttable presumptions constitutes an attack on the legislative function of drawing lines. Rehnquist argued that the regulations are valid because medical evidence indicates some risk of impairment at the stages selected.
He stated that no judicial standard exists to invalidate the particular dates chosen by the boards when lines must be drawn short of the delivery room. Rehnquist observed that countless statutes draw similar lines based on age or other factors. He concluded that the preference for individualized determinations undermines the very notion of lawmaking itself.