470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)
In 1979 the Cleveland Board of Education hired James Loudermill as a security guard.1 On his job application Loudermill stated that he had never been convicted of a felony.2 Eleven months later a routine check revealed that Loudermill had been convicted of grand larceny in 1968.3 By letter dated November 3, 1980 the Board's Business Manager informed Loudermill that he had been dismissed for dishonesty in filling out the employment application.4 Loudermill received no opportunity to respond to the charge or to challenge the dismissal before it took effect.5
Under Ohio law Loudermill was a classified civil servant who could be discharged only for cause and who could file an administrative appeal within ten days of receiving notice of dismissal.6 Loudermill filed an appeal with the Cleveland Civil Service Commission on November 12, 1980.7 A referee held a hearing on January 29, 1981 and recommended reinstatement.8 On July 20, 1981 the full Commission heard argument and upheld the dismissal.9
Richard Donnelly was hired as a bus mechanic by the Parma Board of Education in 1979.10 Donnelly had been fired by the same Board in 1977 for failing an eye examination but had been reinstated after appeal.11 On his new application Donnelly listed his prior employment with the Board but did not disclose the earlier discharge.12 When the omission was discovered Donnelly was again fired for dishonesty.13 He received no opportunity to respond to the charge before termination.14 Donnelly appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which affirmed the dismissal.15
Loudermill and Donnelly filed separate suits in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio alleging that the dismissal procedures violated their rights to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.16 The District Court dismissed both complaints for failure to state a claim.17 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part and remanded.18 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.19
Whether a classified civil service employee who may be discharged only for cause possesses a property interest in continued employment created by state law?20
Property interests are created by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.21 The Ohio statute providing that classified civil service employees can be dismissed only for misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office creates a property interest in continued employment.22
Yes. The Ohio statute plainly creates a property interest in continued employment. Classified civil servants like Loudermill and Donnelly were entitled to retain their positions during good behavior and efficient service.23 They could not be dismissed except for cause.24 The Ohio Supreme Court has confirmed that the statute gives such employees a continued right to employment during good behavior and efficient service.25
Respondents possessed a property interest in their employment.26
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Justice Rehnquist dissented on the property interest question.27 He argued that the Ohio statute must be read as a whole.28 The statute confers tenure during good behavior.29
It also prescribes the exact procedures by which that tenure may be terminated.30 Therefore the employee receives exactly the process the legislature provided and no more under the Due Process Clause.31 The Court should recognize the totality of the state's definition of the property right rather than seize upon one paragraph.32
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a public employee with a property interest in continued employment receive notice and an opportunity to respond before termination?33
The Due Process Clause requires that a deprivation of property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.34 A tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story before being terminated.35
Yes. Balancing the private interest in retaining employment, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government's interest shows that some kind of hearing must be provided prior to discharge.36 The pretermination hearing need not be elaborate.37 It must include notice and an opportunity to respond.38 The hearing should serve as an initial check against mistaken decisions.39
The Due Process Clause requires a pretermination opportunity to respond.40
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Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment but wrote separately.41 He emphasized that public employees discharged only for cause are entitled to more than notice and an opportunity to respond.42 They should have the chance to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.43
They should also present witnesses on their own behalf whenever substantial disputes exist in the testimonial evidence.44 The economic disruption from loss of wages can be devastating.45 The risk of error remains impermissibly high without such safeguards.46
Whether the pretermination procedures afforded to the employees in these cases satisfied the requirements of due process?47
No. The pretermination hearing given to respondents was minimal.50
It consisted of nothing more than an opportunity for them to present their side of the story orally before the administrative business manager who had made the decision to discharge them.51 Respondents had no opportunity to review the evidence or respond in writing.52 Such a limited hearing is insufficient to satisfy due process requirements.53
The procedures did not satisfy due process.54
Whether a nine-month delay in completing post-termination administrative proceedings violates due process?55
No. The complaint merely recites the course of proceedings.59
It concludes that the denial of a speedy resolution violated due process.60 This reveals nothing about the delay except that it stemmed in part from the thoroughness of the procedures.61 Loudermill offers no indication that his wait was unreasonably prolonged other than the fact that it took nine months.62
The nine-month delay did not violate due process on the facts alleged.63
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Justice Brennan concurred in part and dissented in part from the disposition of the delay claim.64 He argued that the record was insufficiently developed to permit an informed judgment.65 Loudermill's allegations described months-long gaps between filing, hearing, interim decision, and final decision.66
The statutory thirty-day hearing requirement and the absence of any explanation from the Commission made the allegations sufficient to require further evidentiary proceedings.67 The court should have applied the Mathews balancing test rather than summarily dismissing the complaint.68