393 Mass. 754, 473 N.E.2d 1084
Clara A. Mayo died in November 1981 at age fifty while employed as a psychology professor at Boston University.1 She had married James P. Mayo, Jr. in 1953 and the couple had no children, and her sole heirs at law were her parents, Joseph A. and Maria Weiss.2 In 1963 she executed a will naming Mayo principal beneficiary, and in 1964 and 1965 she named him beneficiary of her group annuity contract and Boston University retirement annuity contracts.3
Following a $300,000 gift from the Weisses in 1971, the Mayos executed new wills and indentures of trust on February 2, 1973.4 The decedent's trust named herself and John P. Hill as trustees, retained her power to amend or revoke, and divided the trust estate into Trust A, a marital deduction trust for Mayo, and Trust B, which provided a life interest for Mayo followed by benefits for the donor's nephews and nieces and remainder gifts to Clark University and Boston University.5 On the same day she changed the beneficiary of her Boston University group life insurance policy to the trustees, and one month later changed her retirement annuity contracts to name the trustees as beneficiaries.6 The trust received no funding at creation and its future assets were to consist solely of the insurance proceeds, annuity benefits, and the pour-over from the will's residuary clause.7
Mayo moved out of the marital home in 1975.8 In June 1977 the decedent changed the life insurance beneficiary to Marianne LaFrance, who had lived with the Mayos since 1972 and shared a close friendship with the decedent.9 Mayo filed for divorce in New Hampshire on September 9, 1977.10 The divorce was decreed on January 3, 1978 and incorporated a permanent stipulation in which Mayo waived any right, title or interest in the decedent's securities, savings accounts, savings certificates, retirement fund, furniture, furnishings and art.11 Mayo remarried on August 28, 1978 and later executed a new will favoring his second wife.12 The decedent died on November 21, 1981.13 Her will was allowed on November 18, 1982 and John H. Clymer was appointed administrator with the will annexed.14
The Weisses also appeal the judge’s November 16, 1983, dismissal of their petition to remove Clymer as administrator.15
Whether the decedent's inter vivos trust was validly created under G. L. c. 203, § 3B despite remaining unfunded until her death?16
G. L. c. 203, § 3B provides that a devise or bequest may be made to the trustee of a trust established or to be established by the testator, including a funded or unfunded life insurance trust, if the trust is identified in the will and the terms of the trust are set forth in a written instrument executed before or concurrently with the will, regardless of the existence, size or character of the corpus of the trust.17
Yes. The statute expressly authorizes pour-over trusts regardless of corpus existence at execution.18 The decedent executed her trust instrument and will on the same day, February 2, 1973, with the trust identified in the residuary clause of the will and the terms set out in the contemporaneous written instrument.19 The trust was to receive its assets solely at death through insurance proceeds, annuity benefits, and the will's residuary clause, satisfying the statutory conditions without any requirement for prior funding.20
The decedent established a valid inter vivos trust under G. L. c. 203, § 3B.21
Whether the Weisses had standing to petition for removal of the estate administrator?22
Only parties with a legal interest in the decedent's estate, such as legatees and creditors, have standing to seek removal of an administrator under G. L. c. 195, § 11, because courts are not established to enable parties to litigate matters in which they have no interest affecting their liberty, rights or property.23
No. Because a valid trust existed to receive the decedent's residuary estate, the Weisses' claim to the assets as sole heirs at law fails.24 The Weisses produced no evidence to support their charges of misconduct by the administrator, and their petition therefore lacked the requisite legal interest in the estate.25
The Weisses lacked standing to petition for removal of the estate administrator.26
Whether Mayo's interest in Trust A terminated as a result of the divorce?27
Probate courts may terminate or reform a trust in whole or in part where its purposes have become impossible to achieve and the settlor did not contemplate continuation of the trust under the new circumstances.28
Yes. The decedent's trust instrument divided the estate into Trust A and Trust B specifically to reduce estate tax liability under then-existing Internal Revenue Code provisions for a marital deduction.29 The Mayos' divorce rendered that tax objective impossible, and the settlor did not contemplate continuation of Trust A after divorce.30
Mayo's interest in Trust A terminated as a result of the divorce.31
Whether G. L. c. 191, § 9 revokes Mayo's beneficial interest in Trust B?32
G. L. c. 191, § 9 provides that if, after executing a will, the testator is divorced, the divorce revokes any disposition or appointment of property made by the will to the former spouse and any provision conferring a power of appointment on the former spouse, unless the will expressly provides otherwise, with property passing as if the former spouse had failed to survive the decedent.33
Yes. The decedent's will and trust were integrally related components of a single testamentary scheme executed on the same day.34 The unfunded trust received its assets only at death through the will's pour-over and insurance and annuity proceeds.35 Although the trust had independent significance under G.
L. c. 203, § 3B, for all practical purposes it spoke only at death.36 Therefore the statute's implied intent to revoke dispositions favoring a former spouse applies equally to Mayo's interest in Trust B.37
G. L. c. 191, § 9 revokes Mayo's beneficial interest in Trust B.38
Whether the Chamberlains and Hinman qualify as the decedent's nephews and nieces entitled to take under Trust B?39
It is axiomatic that the intent of the testator governs the interpretation of his will.40
Yes. The decedent had no blood siblings and therefore no blood nephews or nieces.41 When she executed the trust in 1973 her then-husband had two nephews and one niece.42 She maintained friendly relations with them and contributed to their education.43
The judge properly considered this extrinsic evidence of circumstances known to the decedent at execution.44 He determined that the Chamberlains and Hinman were her intended beneficiaries under the class gift in Trust B.45 The divorce did not revoke that gift.46
The Chamberlains and Hinman qualify as the decedent's nephews and nieces entitled to take under Trust B.47
Whether the award of attorney's fees should be reconsidered in light of the size of the estate and other factors?48
Under G. L. c. 215, § 39B, when a judgment is entered in a contested proceeding to determine the construction of a will or trust instrument, the probate court may in its discretion provide for payment of reasonable counsel fees out of the estate, taking into consideration the size of the estate, the merits of the claims, the benefit rendered to estate administration, and the degree of success achieved by the parties.49
Yes. According to the testimony of the court-appointed administrator, John Clymer, the value of the decedent's adjusted gross estate stood at approximately $249,000 at the time of the fee award.50 Assuming that Mayo did not take under the trust, Clymer estimated that the balance of Trust B, after taxes and additional payments, would amount to approximately $100,000.51 The judge did not take into consideration all relevant criteria in determining his fee award.52
Remand for reconsideration under the statutory factors is required.53
The award of attorney's fees should be reconsidered in light of the size of the estate and other factors.54