403 U.S. 15 (1971)
Paul Robert Cohen was observed on April 26, 1968, in the Los Angeles County Courthouse in the corridor outside of division 20 of the municipal court wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" which were plainly visible.1 There were women and children present in the corridor.2 The defendant was arrested.3
Cohen was convicted in the Los Angeles Municipal Court of violating that part of California Penal Code § 415 which prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive conduct. . . ."4 He was given 30 days' imprisonment.5 Cohen testified that he wore the jacket knowing that the words were on the jacket as a means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft.6 The defendant did not engage in, nor threaten to engage in, nor did anyone as the result of his conduct in fact commit or threaten to commit any act of violence.7 The defendant did not make any loud or unusual noise, nor was there any evidence that he uttered any sound prior to his arrest.8
The Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the conviction, and the California Supreme Court declined review by a divided vote.9
Cohen appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which postponed consideration of the question of its jurisdiction over the appeal to a hearing of the case on the merits.10
Whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the public display of the words "Fuck the Draft" on a jacket worn in a courthouse corridor from conviction under California Penal Code § 415?11
The First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, protects the freedom of speech from arbitrary governmental interference, permitting regulation of the manner of expression only in narrow circumstances such as obscenity, fighting words directed at individuals, or speech that incites imminent lawless action, but not based on the offensiveness of the underlying message alone.12
Yes. Paul Robert Cohen was observed on April 26, 1968, in the Los Angeles County Courthouse corridor wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" plainly visible, with women and children present, yet he engaged in no violent acts, made no loud noises, and uttered no sounds prior to arrest.13 Cohen testified that he wore the jacket to inform the public of the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft.14 The conviction rested solely upon the asserted offensiveness of the words used to convey his message rather than any separately identifiable conduct.15
The words were not obscene, as they lacked erotic content, and were not fighting words, as they were not directed to the person of any hearer and produced no violent reaction.16 The State therefore lacked power to punish Cohen for the content of his message or for the manner of its peaceful public display.17
The First and Fourteenth Amendments protect Cohen's public display of the words on his jacket from conviction under the statute, requiring reversal of the judgment below.18
Whether a state may punish the public utterance of an offensive epithet as "offensive conduct" on the theory that its use is inherently likely to provoke violent reaction?19
A state may not punish speech as offensive conduct on the theory that it is inherently likely to provoke violent reaction. Absent evidence that the expression was directed to the person of the hearer or that it created a clear and present danger of imminent violence, such punishment is impermissible. Undifferentiated fears of disturbance are insufficient to overcome the right to freedom of expression.20
No. Cohen's jacket displayed the epithet in a courthouse corridor without any threat or act of violence by him or others.21 No evidence showed that anyone who saw the jacket was violently aroused or that Cohen intended such a result.22 The California Court of Appeal affirmed on the ground that it was reasonably foreseeable the words might cause others to commit violence.23 Yet this rationale reflects only an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance.24
No showing existed that substantial numbers of citizens stood ready to strike out physically at the expression.25 This renders the theory an insufficient basis for governmental power to force dissidents to avoid particular forms of expression.26
A state may not punish the public utterance of an offensive epithet as offensive conduct on the theory that its use is inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.27
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice And Mr. Justice Black
Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Black.28 He argued that Cohen's absurd and immature antic was mainly conduct and little speech.29 The California Court of Appeal had described it as such.30
He could not characterize it otherwise.31 The case appeared to him to be well within the sphere of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.32 There, the Court upheld a conviction for personally abusive epithets likely to provoke violent reaction.33
He viewed the majority's agonizing over First Amendment values as misplaced and unnecessary.34
Whether a state may criminalize the display of a single offensive word to maintain a suitable level of public discourse or to shield unwilling viewers in a public building?35
A state may not criminalize the public display of a single offensive word to maintain a suitable level of public discourse. Nor may it do so to shield unwilling viewers in a public building. The constitutional right of free expression removes governmental restraints from public discussion. Substantial privacy interests must be invaded in an essentially intolerable manner before government may shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it.36
No. The principle that the state may excise one scurrilous epithet from public discourse to maintain suitable levels of discourse is inherently boundless.3738 No readily ascertainable general principle exists for stopping short of cleansing public debate to the point where it is palatable only to the most squeamish.39 Persons in the courthouse corridor could avoid further exposure simply by averting their eyes.40 The statute evinced no concern with the special plight of captive auditors.41
Instead it swept indiscriminately within its prohibitions all offensive conduct that disturbs any neighborhood or person.42 Much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function.43 It conveys both ideas and otherwise inexpressible emotions.44 Forbidding particular words runs a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.45
A state may not criminalize the display of a single offensive word to maintain a suitable level of public discourse or to shield unwilling viewers in a public building.46
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice And Mr. Justice Black
Justice Blackmun further dissented on the ground that he was not at all certain that the California Court of Appeal's construction of section 415 remained the authoritative state construction.47 The Court of Appeal filed its opinion on October 22, 1969.48 The Supreme Court of California declined review by a four-to-three vote on December 17.49
A month later, on January 27, 1970, the State Supreme Court in another case construed section 415 for the first time in In re Bushman.50 Chief Justice Traynor wrote the majority opinion there.51 He held that the statute makes punishable only wilful and malicious conduct that is violent and endangers public safety or creates a clear and present danger that others will engage in violence.52
Cohen was cited in Bushman, but Blackmun was not convinced that its description and Cohen itself are completely consistent with the clear and present danger standard.53 Therefore, the case should have been remanded to the California Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of the subsequently rendered decision.54