405 U.S. 676 (1972)
Mrs. Richardson was hired as a research sociologist by the Boston State Hospital, where Cole served as superintendent.1 Soon after she entered on duty, she was asked to subscribe to the oath required of all public employees in Massachusetts.2 The oath provided: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and that I will oppose the overthrow of the government of the United States of America or of this Commonwealth by force, violence or by any illegal or unconstitutional method.”3
Mrs. Richardson informed the hospital’s personnel department that she could not take the oath because of her belief that it was in violation of the United States Constitution.4 Approximately 10 days later Cole personally informed her that under state law she could not continue as an employee unless she subscribed to the oath.5 Upon her refusal, her employment was terminated on November 25, 1968, and she was paid through that date.6
In March 1969 Mrs. Richardson filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts alleging the unconstitutionality of the statute and seeking damages and an injunction against its continued enforcement, along with a request for a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284.7 A three-judge District Court held the oath statute unconstitutional and enjoined the appellants from applying the statute to prohibit Mrs. Richardson from working for Boston State Hospital, though it denied the claim for damages.8
Appeals were brought to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.9 The Supreme Court remanded for consideration of whether the case was moot in light of a suggestion that Mrs. Richardson’s job had been filled.10 On remand the District Court concluded that the position had not been filled and that the hospital stood ready to hire her except for the problem of the oath, and in an unreported opinion dated July 1, 1970, it concluded that the case was not moot and reinstated its earlier judgment.11 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.12
Whether the Massachusetts statute requiring public employees to take an oath to uphold and defend the federal and state constitutions and to oppose the overthrow of the government by force, violence, or any illegal or unconstitutional method is constitutional?13
Oaths requiring public employees to uphold and defend the Constitution are constitutionally permissible.14 They reflect the constitutional oaths in Articles II and VI.15 They represent a commitment to abide by constitutional processes rather than imposing specific affirmative duties or restricting protected speech.16
Yes. Mrs. Richardson was hired as a research sociologist by the Boston State Hospital, where Cole served as superintendent. Soon after she entered on duty, she was asked to subscribe to the oath required of all public employees in Massachusetts. The oath provided the language requiring her to uphold and defend the constitutions and to oppose overthrow by force or illegal methods.17
Upon being asked to take the oath, Mrs. Richardson informed the hospital’s personnel department that she could not take the oath because of her belief that it was in violation of the United States Constitution.18 Approximately 10 days later Cole personally informed her that under state law she could not continue as an employee unless she subscribed to the oath. Upon her refusal, her employment was terminated on November 25, 1968, and she was paid through that date. In March 1969 Mrs. Richardson filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts alleging the unconstitutionality of the statute and seeking damages and an injunction against its continued enforcement, along with a request for a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284.
A three-judge District Court held the oath statute unconstitutional and enjoined the appellants from applying the statute to prohibit Mrs. Richardson from working for Boston State Hospital, though it denied the claim for damages. Appeals were brought to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. The Supreme Court remanded for consideration of whether the case was moot in light of a suggestion that Mrs. Richardson’s job had been filled. On remand the District Court concluded that the position had not been filled and that the hospital stood ready to hire her except for the problem of the oath, and in an unreported opinion dated July 1, 1970, it concluded that the case was not moot and reinstated its earlier judgment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the Massachusetts oath is constitutionally permissible.19 The Court determined that the oath represents a commitment to abide by the constitutional system without creating vague duties or chilling protected activity.20
The Massachusetts oath statute is constitutional.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice White
Justice Stewart joined the opinion and judgment of the Court.22 He observed that if the words uphold and defend are not vague or overbroad then the word oppose in the second clause cannot be either.23 He agreed that the oath does not impinge on conscience or belief except to the extent that oath taking as such may offend particular individuals.24
Stewart noted that Massachusetts law permits an affirmation rather than an oath for those individuals who might be troubled by the formalities of oath taking itself.25
Whether the second clause of the oath is unconstitutionally vague?26
The second clause requiring opposition to overthrow by force, violence, or illegal or unconstitutional method is not unconstitutionally vague.27 It is interpreted consistently with support oaths as a commitment not to use illegal means to alter the constitutional system.28 Perjury requires a knowing and willful falsehood providing fair warning.29
No. The facts establish that Mrs. Richardson refused the full oath at the Boston State Hospital and was terminated solely for that refusal after the District Court found the second clause fatally vague.30 The Court rejected a rigidly literal reading of oppose and held that the clause merely clarifies the first clause without expanding obligations or creating uncertainty that would deter protected activity.31
The second clause of the oath is not unconstitutionally vague.32
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissented and would have held the second half of the oath impermissibly vague and overbroad.33 He noted that it is unclear whether the final prepositional phrase modifies oppose or overthrow leaving an affiant uncertain whether the oath requires using every means including those prohibited by the constitutions already sworn to support.34 He further observed that the oath provides no guidance on when action is required or what form opposition must take.35
Justice Marshall noted that the oath is taken subject to the pains and penalties of perjury, and that the penalties may amount to one year in prison and/or a $10,000 fine.36
Whether a public employee discharged for refusing to subscribe to the oath is entitled to a hearing before termination?37
Because there is no constitutionally protected right to overthrow the government by force, violence, or illegal or unconstitutional means, no hearing is required before discharging an employee who refuses to take a valid oath committing to abide by the constitutional system.38
No. The facts show that Mrs. Richardson was terminated on November 25, 1968 without a hearing after refusing the oath at the Boston State Hospital and that the District Court denied damages while granting only injunctive relief.3940 The Court held that since the oath itself is valid and refusal provides a permissible basis for nonemployment no additional factual hearing is constitutionally mandated.41
A public employee discharged for refusing to subscribe to the oath is not entitled to a hearing before termination.42
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas dissented and would have affirmed the District Court judgment striking down the oath.43 He argued that the second clause makes advocacy of fundamental change a possible offense and that the promise of opposition exacted as a condition of public employment impairs freedom of expression.44 He further contended that even if only the second clause were invalid the entire oath must fall because the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had held similar two part oaths nonseverable under state law.45