501 U.S. 722 (1991)
A Buchanan County, Virginia, jury convicted Roger Keith Coleman of rape and capital murder and fixed the sentence at death for the murder.1 The trial court imposed the death sentence, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed both the convictions and the sentence in Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 307 S. E. 2d 864 (1983).2 This Court denied certiorari in 1984.3
Coleman then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for Buchanan County, raising numerous federal constitutional claims that he had not raised on direct appeal.4 After a 2-day evidentiary hearing, the Circuit Court ruled against Coleman on all claims and entered its final judgment on September 4, 1986.5
Coleman filed his notice of appeal with the Circuit Court on October 7, 1986, 33 days after the entry of final judgment.6 Coleman subsequently filed a petition for appeal in the Virginia Supreme Court.7 The Commonwealth moved to dismiss the appeal on the sole ground that the notice had been filed late under Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:9(a), which requires filing within 30 days of final judgment.8 After the parties filed multiple briefs on the motion and on the merits, the Virginia Supreme Court on May 19, 1987 granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the petition for appeal.9 This Court again denied certiorari.10
Coleman next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia.11 In his petition, Coleman presented four federal constitutional claims he had raised on direct appeal and seven claims he had raised for the first time in state habeas.12 The District Court concluded that Coleman had procedurally defaulted the seven claims, but it addressed the merits of all eleven claims and denied the petition.13
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve several issues concerning the relationship between state procedural defaults and federal habeas review.15
Whether the Virginia Supreme Court's summary order dismissing Coleman's state habeas appeal as untimely fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law?16
No. The Virginia Supreme Court's three-sentence order granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss the petition for appeal.19 That motion was based solely on Coleman's failure to meet the 30-day time requirement under Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:9(a).20 There is no mention of federal law in the Virginia Supreme Court's three-sentence dismissal order.21 It fairly appears to rest primarily on state law.22
The presumption does not apply because the order does not fairly appear to rest primarily on federal law.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Marshall And Stevens
The majority's conclusion that the plain-statement rule of Michigan v. Long does not apply to a summary order defies both settled understandings and compassionate reason.24 Harris v. Reed expressly resolved that the rule applies to all cases where federal claims are presented to state courts.25 The Virginia Supreme Court's dismissal order adds some ambiguity that compels a federal habeas court to provide a forum for the consideration of Coleman's federal claims.26
The majority has lost sight of the animating principles of federalism by elevating abstract state interests over the vindication of fundamental constitutional rights.27 Federal habeas review serves to safeguard federal rights without invading state sovereignty when employed to correct constitutional violations.28 The considered exercise by federal courts of habeas jurisdiction exemplifies the full expression of this Nation's federalism rather than an abdication of responsibility.29
Whether the Virginia Supreme Court's application of its 30-day notice-of-appeal rule in this case was independent of federal law?30
Yes. Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:5(a) declares the 30-day requirement mandatory and unwaivable.33 The Virginia Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss based solely on that rule without applying any Tharp exception for constitutional claims.34 The facts show the order dismissed the appeal for late notice of appeal rather than petition for appeal.35 This confirms no antecedent federal ruling occurred.36
The procedural bar was independent of federal law.37
Whether the Virginia Supreme Court's 30-day notice-of-appeal rule was adequate to support the judgment?38
When a habeas petitioner does not petition for certiorari on the adequacy of a state procedural bar, the Court accepts the court of appeals' conclusion that the bar was adequate.39
Yes. The Fourth Circuit concluded that Virginia's 30-day notice-of-appeal rule constituted an adequate procedural bar under the circumstances of this case.40 Coleman did not include any challenge to the adequacy of that bar in his petition for certiorari.41 The Supreme Court therefore accepts the Fourth Circuit's determination without independent examination of whether the rule was firmly established and regularly followed by the Virginia courts.
The procedural bar was adequate to support the judgment.42
Whether attorney error in failing to file a timely notice of appeal from the denial of state habeas relief constitutes cause to excuse a procedural default under the cause-and-prejudice standard?43
Attorney error constitutes cause only when it amounts to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington.44 This requires a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.45 Because there is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings under Finley and Giarratano, attorney error in those proceedings cannot constitute cause.46
No. Coleman's attorney error in filing the notice of appeal thirty-three days after judgment was not constitutionally ineffective assistance.47 Coleman had no right to counsel on appeal from the state habeas trial court judgment.48 The facts show the default occurred in state collateral proceedings where the Buchanan County Circuit Court had already addressed the claims after an evidentiary hearing.49 Attorney error does not constitute cause to excuse the default.50
Attorney error does not constitute cause to excuse the default.
Related opinions on this issue
If there were nothing before us but the order granting the State's motion to dismiss for untimeliness, it would be clear enough that the dismissal was based on a procedural default.51 The state court did not grant the State's explicit request for an early ruling on the motion.52 Instead, the court delayed ruling on the motion to dismiss, and hence briefs on both the motion and the merits were filed.
The evidence is too scanty to permit a conclusion that the rule is no longer an adequate and independent state ground barring federal review.53 The fact that merits briefs were filed and considered does not justify a different conclusion.54
Whether the deliberate-bypass standard of Fay v. Noia continues to apply when a state prisoner defaults his entire state collateral appeal?55
The cause-and-prejudice standard applies uniformly to all independent and adequate state procedural defaults, including the failure to appeal at all in collateral proceedings.56 State procedural rules serve vital interests in finality and comity at every stage of the judicial process.57 Fay v. Noia undervalued those interests.58
No. Coleman's late filing defaulted his entire state collateral appeal.59 The facts establish that this was an inadvertent error rather than a deliberate bypass.60 The uniform cause-and-prejudice standard therefore governs because all of the State's interests in channeling claims, finality, and error correction are implicated whether a prisoner defaults one claim or all of them.61
The deliberate-bypass standard of Fay v. Noia does not apply; the cause-and-prejudice standard governs.62