413 U.S. 149 (1973)
The District Court for the District of Montana adopted Local Rule 13, which states that in all civil actions the jury shall consist of six members plus such alternate jurors as may be impaneled.1 Petitioner, the plaintiff in a diversity action for personal injuries, was assigned a trial date before a six-member jury pursuant to this rule. He moved to vacate the case assignment, contending that the local rule violated the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Rule 48, as well as the statute 28 U.S.C. § 2072 authorizing this Court to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2
The District Court denied the motion. Petitioner then sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to compel the District Court to vacate the order assigning the case for trial before a six-member jury.3 The Court of Appeals denied the writ, holding that the local rule did not violate the Seventh Amendment or any Act of Congress, as reported at 456 F.2d 1379 (1972).4
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question whether a civil jury of six members in a federal district court violates the Seventh Amendment or any federal statutory provision.5 The case reached the Court after the Ninth Circuit's denial of mandamus relief in the underlying diversity action originally filed in the District of Montana.6
Whether a civil jury of six members in a federal district court violates the Seventh Amendment?7
The Seventh Amendment preserves the right of trial by jury in suits at common law where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars.8 This right encompasses the substance of the common-law jury rather than every procedural incident such as a fixed number of twelve members.9 The essential purposes are served by an impartial panel drawn from the community that engages in group deliberation.10
No. The established facts demonstrate that the District Court for the District of Montana adopted Local Rule 13 establishing six-member juries for all civil actions.11 Petitioner, plaintiff in a diversity personal-injury action, received a trial assignment before such a jury and moved to vacate the assignment on Seventh Amendment grounds.12 The District Court denied the motion. Petitioner sought mandamus from the Ninth Circuit, which denied relief. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.13
Applying the rule to these facts shows that the local rule satisfies the Amendment.14 The number twelve was a historical accident at common law and is not required.15 A six-member jury fulfills the core functions of impartiality, community representation, and collective deliberation identified in Williams v. Florida, which the Court extends to civil cases.16 The re-examination clause addresses only the mode of review, not jury size.17
A civil jury of six members in a federal district court does not violate the Seventh Amendment.18
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Douglas, Stewart, And Powell
Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that the Seventh Amendment expressly preserves the common-law right to jury trial as it existed in 1791.19 At common law the jury consisted of twelve members as an essential feature rather than a historical accident.20 The textual command to preserve the right, combined with historical uniformity of twelve-person juries, requires adherence to that number in federal civil cases.21
Functional analysis cannot substitute for the historical test mandated by the Amendment's language.22
Justice Powell filed a separate dissent agreeing with Justice Douglas that local Rule 13(d)(1) is incompatible with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48.23 Rule 48 rests on the premise that a jury of twelve is required absent stipulation by the parties, yet the local rule mandates six jurors in every civil case regardless of any stipulation.24 Powell concluded that this statutory conflict alone required reversal of the Court of Appeals judgment.25
He expressly declined to reach the constitutional question whether six-member juries satisfy the Seventh Amendment, leaving that issue unresolved.26
Whether a local rule providing for a six-member jury in civil cases is inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. § 2072 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48?27
Section 2072 authorizes promulgation of rules of procedure that shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. The statute also requires that rules shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment.28 Rule 48 permits parties to stipulate to a jury of fewer than twelve but does not prohibit district courts from adopting local rules setting a reduced size when the parties have not stipulated otherwise.29
No. The established facts show that Local Rule 13 was adopted by the District Court for the District of Montana under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2071 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83.30 Petitioner contended that the rule violated section 2072 and Rule 48 because it fixed jury size at six without party stipulation.31 The District Court and Ninth Circuit rejected the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed.32
Applying the rule to these facts establishes consistency.33 The local rule is purely procedural and does not alter any substantive right.34 Section 2072's preservation language creates a statutory right coextensive with the Seventh Amendment itself, which the six-member jury satisfies.35 Rule 48 addresses only stipulations by the parties and does not preclude court rules that set a smaller jury size in the absence of stipulation.36
A local rule providing for a six-member jury in civil cases is not inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. § 2072 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48.37
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Powell
Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that Rule 48, promulgated pursuant to statute, rests on the premise that a jury of twelve is required absent stipulation.38 The local rule collides with that premise by mandating six jurors regardless of stipulation.39 Only Congress or the rulemaking process that created Rule 48 possesses authority to alter the number.40
He therefore would reverse without reaching the constitutional issue.41 He emphasized that district courts lack power to override the federal rule's clear presupposition of a twelve-member jury through local rulemaking.42