413 U.S. 756 (1973)
In May 1972, the Governor of New York signed into law several amendments to the State's Education and Tax Laws.1 The amendments established three distinct financial aid programs for nonpublic elementary and secondary schools.2
Almost immediately after the signing of these measures a complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.3 The complaint challenged each of the three forms of aid as violative of the Establishment Clause. The plaintiffs were an unincorporated association known as the Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty and several individuals who were residents and taxpayers in New York.4
Some of the individual plaintiffs had children attending public schools.5 Named as defendants were the State Commissioner of Education, the Comptroller, and the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance.6 Motions to intervene on behalf of defendants were granted to a group of parents with children enrolled in nonpublic schools and to the Majority Leader and President pro tem of the New York State Senate.7
By consent of the parties a three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2283.8 The case was decided without an evidentiary hearing on the basis of the pleadings.9 The District Court held unanimously that the maintenance and repair grants and the tuition reimbursement grants were invalid.10 The court held that the income tax provisions did not violate the Establishment Clause.11 It found the provisions severable, enjoined implementation of the first two programs, and declared the tax provisions independently enforceable.12
The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court challenging the upholding of the tax provisions.13 The defendant state officials appealed the invalidation of the first two programs.14 The intervenor Majority Leader appealed those aspects as well.15 The intervening parents appealed only from the decision as to the tuition reimbursement program.16 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction over each appeal and ordered the cases consolidated for oral argument.17
Whether New York's maintenance and repair grants to nonpublic schools violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?18
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits laws that have a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.19 Under the Lemon test a statute must have a secular legislative purpose, a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.20 Direct unrestricted financial aid to sectarian elementary and secondary schools that are pervasively religious violates the primary-effect prong because it subsidizes religious activities.21
Yes. The May 1972 law's section 1 maintenance and repair grants authorize direct state payments of thirty or forty dollars per pupil to qualifying nonpublic schools without any restriction ensuring that the funds support only secular uses.22 The grants may be spent on chapels, classrooms where religion is taught, or other religious facilities.23 They inevitably subsidize the religious mission of the schools.24
The statutory ceiling of fifty percent of comparable public-school expenditures supplies no effective guarantee of secular use.25 The Court has rejected reliance on mere statistical assumptions that teachers or administrators will segregate religious from secular functions.26
New York's maintenance and repair grants violate the Establishment Clause because they have a primary effect of advancing religion.27
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice White And Justice Rehnquist (in Part)
Chief Justice Burger joined the portion of the opinion holding the maintenance and repair grants unconstitutional as direct aid to religion.28 He agreed that unrestricted payments to pervasively sectarian institutions cross the constitutional line.29 Burger emphasized that the Establishment Clause forbids direct financial support to religious institutions even when the funds are nominally for secular maintenance.30
He distinguished this direct aid from the indirect benefits to parents upheld in earlier cases such as Everson and Allen.31 Burger stressed that the principle separating direct institutional aid from general welfare benefits to individuals remains controlling even where the secular purpose of health and safety is undisputed.32
Whether New York's tuition reimbursement program for parents of children attending nonpublic schools violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?33
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits laws that have a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Under the Lemon test a statute must have a secular legislative purpose, a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. Tuition grants that reimburse parents for a portion of tuition paid to pervasively sectarian schools without any restriction ensuring secular use have the primary effect of advancing religion.34 This remains true even when the money passes through parents rather than directly to the schools.35
Yes. Section 2 of the May 1972 law provides tuition reimbursements of fifty or one hundred dollars to low-income parents who send their children to nonpublic schools.36 The great majority of these schools are church-affiliated and impose religious restrictions on admissions and faculty.37 The reimbursements are unrestricted as to use.38
They are designed to relieve the financial burden on parents so they may continue to choose religion-oriented schools.39 Because the grants cannot be given directly to the schools without violating the Establishment Clause, channeling the same unrestricted funds through parents does not change the constitutional result.40 The absence of coercion or any requirement that the money be spent only on secular education means the program has the impermissible primary effect of advancing religion.41
New York's tuition reimbursement program violates the Establishment Clause because it has a primary effect of advancing religion.42
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Burger And Justice White (in Part)
Justice Rehnquist dissented from the invalidation of the tuition reimbursement program.43 He argued that the aid reaches parents rather than schools and therefore stands on the same constitutional footing as the bus-fare and textbook programs upheld in Everson and Allen.44 Rehnquist stressed that the benefit is trebly attenuated because it flows first to parents and only indirectly to schools.45
He maintained that the majority's approach could not be reconciled with Walz and prior precedents permitting neutral aid to parents.46 Rehnquist concluded that the program effectuates a secular purpose of equalizing educational costs without direct institutional subsidy.47
Joined by Chief Justice Burger And Justice Rehnquist (in Part)
Justice White dissented from the invalidation of the tuition grant statutes.48 He contended that the primary effect of preserving secular educational services in sectarian schools outweighs any incidental benefit to religion.49 White argued that the statutes should survive facial challenge because they serve the legitimate secular purpose of relieving the public school system and equalizing educational costs for parents.50
He noted that many parochial schools provide substantial secular education and that incidental religious benefits do not invalidate the program.51 White emphasized the profound practical consequences of invalidating such efforts to sustain pluralism in education.52
Whether New York's income tax deduction program for parents of children attending nonpublic schools violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?53
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits laws that have a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Under the Lemon test a statute must have a secular legislative purpose, a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. Tax deductions that provide financial benefits to parents who send their children to pervasively sectarian schools, calculated without regard to actual tuition expenditures and flowing predominantly to parents of children in religious schools, have the primary effect of advancing religion.54
Yes. Sections 3 through 5 of the May 1972 law allow parents to subtract a designated amount from adjusted gross income for each dependent attending a nonpublic school.55 The deduction is unrelated to actual tuition paid and available only to parents who do not receive tuition reimbursement.56 The benefited class consists overwhelmingly of parents whose children attend church-affiliated schools that impose religious restrictions and pursue the inculcation of religious values.57
The practical identity between the tax benefit and the tuition reimbursement program means both have the same primary effect of providing financial support to sectarian institutions.58 Unlike the property-tax exemption upheld in Walz, this deduction is narrowly targeted at parents of nonpublic-school children and therefore increases rather than minimizes government involvement with religion.59
New York's income tax deduction program violates the Establishment Clause because it has a primary effect of advancing religion.60
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice White And Justice Rehnquist (in Part)
Chief Justice Burger dissented from the invalidation of the tax relief provisions.61 He maintained that they are indistinguishable in principle from the benefits upheld in Everson and Allen.62 Burger argued that the percentage of recipients who use the benefit for religious education is irrelevant to the primary-effect inquiry.63
He emphasized that government aid to individuals stands on a different footing from direct aid to institutions and that the statutes merely equalize costs between parents of public and private school children.64 Burger concluded that the programs reflect legitimate secular purposes of promoting pluralism without crossing into prohibited direct support.65
Joined by Chief Justice Burger And Justice White (in Part)
Justice Rehnquist dissented from the invalidation of the tax deduction plan.66 He argued that it is analytically no different from other flat-rate deductions and exemptions long permitted under Walz.67 Rehnquist stressed that the benefit is trebly attenuated because it reaches parents rather than the schools themselves.68
He concluded that the deduction constitutes mere abstention from taxation and stands on the same theoretical footing as other permitted religious deductions.69 Rehnquist noted that the regressive structure of the benefit aligns with the state's interest in aiding lower-income families exercising free-exercise rights.70
Joined by Chief Justice Burger And Justice Rehnquist (in Part)
Justice White dissented from the invalidation of the tax credit provisions.71 He contended that the primary effect of preserving secular educational services in sectarian schools outweighs any incidental benefit to religion. White argued that the statutes should survive facial challenge because they serve the legitimate secular purpose of relieving the public school system and equalizing educational costs for parents.
He noted that many parochial schools provide substantial secular education and that incidental religious benefits do not invalidate the program.