269 U.S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926)
The General Construction Company brought suit in federal court against state and county officers of Oklahoma.1 The suit sought to enjoin enforcement of sections 7255 and 7257 of the Compiled Oklahoma Statutes of 1921.2 The company was engaged in constructing bridges under contracts with the state.3 It employed several laborers, workmen, and mechanics.4
With each employee, the company had agreed upon wages for an eight-hour day that it considered reasonable and commensurate with the services rendered.5
The Commissioner of Labor investigated wages paid near Cleveland, Oklahoma, where one bridge was under construction.6 He compiled a list showing rates ranging from $3.00 to $4.05 per day among employers in the area.7 The commissioner asserted that the company was paying only $3.20 per day to some laborers while the current rate was $3.60.8 He gave notice that enforcement action would follow unless the company complied.9 The company's own scale for its twenty-five laborers ranged from $3.20 to $6.50 per day, with most receiving $3.60 or more.10 The commissioner threatened criminal prosecutions against the company and its officers.11
The bill alleged that wages varied depending on the class and kind of labor and the efficiency of workmen.12 Rates had changed since the contracts began.13 It was impossible to determine whether the amounts paid by the company or designated by the commissioner constituted the current per diem wage in the locality.14 The bill further averred that the term locality was uncertain.15 Under the penalty provisions making each day a separate offense, maximum penalties could aggregate thousands of dollars in fines and years of imprisonment.16 The company challenged the statutes on grounds including lack of an ascertainable standard of guilt.17
A court of three judges heard the bill and a motion to dismiss treated as a demurrer.18 The court granted an interlocutory injunction under section 266 of the Judicial Code.19 The court took the allegations of the bill as true.20
Whether sections 7255 and 7257 of the Compiled Oklahoma Statutes 1921 create an ascertainable standard of conduct by requiring payment of not less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed?21
The terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.22 A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.23
No. The words current rate of wages do not denote a specific or definite sum.24 They encompass minimum, maximum, and intermediate amounts that vary from time to time.25 These amounts depend upon the class and kind of work done and the efficiency of the workmen.26 This is as the bill alleges in respect of the territory surrounding the bridges under construction.27
The commissioner's investigation showed wages ranging from $3.00 to $4.05 per day.28 The construction company's scale ranged from $3.20 to $6.50 per day.29 The statutory phrase cannot be confined to any one of these amounts since it imports each and all of them.30
The statutory requirement fails to create an ascertainable standard of conduct and the provision is invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31
Whether the term locality is fatally vague and uncertain when used in a criminal statute imposing cumulative penalties?34
The terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.
No. Who can say with any degree of accuracy what areas constitute the locality where a given piece of work is being done.35 Two men moving in any direction from the place of operations would not be likely to agree upon the point where they had passed the boundary separating the locality of that work from the next locality.36 The word neighborhood is quite as susceptible of variation as the word locality.37 Both terms are elastic and may be equally satisfied by areas measured by rods or by miles depending upon circumstances.38
The result is that the application of the law depends not upon a word of fixed meaning.39 It rests instead upon the probably varying impressions of juries as to whether given areas are or are not to be included within particular localities.40
The term locality is fatally vague and uncertain when used in a criminal statute imposing cumulative penalties, rendering the provision invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.41