538 U.S. 1, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2008)
Connecticut enacted a statute known as Megan's Law that applies to persons convicted of criminal offenses against a minor, violent and nonviolent sexual offenses, and felonies committed for a sexual purpose.1 Covered offenders must register with the Connecticut Department of Public Safety upon release into the community, providing personal information including name, address, photograph, and DNA sample, and must notify of changes and submit updated photographs periodically. The registration lasts ten years in most cases and for life for those convicted of sexually violent offenses.2
The statute requires the Department of Public Safety to compile the information and publicize it on an Internet website and in state offices. The registry must include a warning about misuse.3 Before the injunction, the website allowed searches by zip code or town name for name, address, photograph, and description, accompanied by a disclaimer stating that the registry is based solely on conviction record, that no determination of current dangerousness has been made, and that the purpose is to make information accessible.4
Respondent Doe, a convicted sex offender subject to the law, filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals against the state agencies and officials charged with the registry.5 He claimed the law violated the Due Process Clause by depriving him of a liberty interest without notice or opportunity to be heard, alleging he is not a dangerous sexual offender.6
The District Court granted summary judgment for Doe on the due process claim, certified a class, and permanently enjoined the public disclosure provisions.7 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment.8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.9
Whether the Due Process Clause entitles convicted sex offenders to a hearing to determine whether they are currently dangerous before their information is included in a publicly disclosed sex offender registry?10
In cases such as Wisconsin v. Constantineau and Goss v. Lopez, due process required the government to accord the plaintiff a hearing to prove or disprove a particular fact or set of facts, but only when the fact in question was relevant to the inquiry at hand.11 Here, the fact that respondent seeks to prove is of no consequence under Connecticut’s Megan’s Law because the law’s requirements turn on an offender’s conviction alone.12
No. The Connecticut statute requires registration and public disclosure based solely on the fact of conviction for specified offenses.13 The website disclaimer explicitly states that individuals are included solely by virtue of their conviction record and that no determination of current dangerousness has been made.14 Respondent Doe, as a convicted sex offender subject to the law, had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest his conviction in the criminal proceedings that led to his inclusion on the registry.15 The Court of Appeals had enjoined the disclosure provisions after finding a liberty interest arising from stigmatization implying current dangerousness combined with the extensive registration obligations.16 Even assuming arguendo that such a liberty interest exists, the statutory scheme makes the fact of current dangerousness immaterial to the disclosure requirement.17
Therefore, a hearing on that fact would be a bootless exercise because Connecticut has decided that the registry information of all sex offenders must be publicly disclosed regardless of dangerousness.18
The Due Process Clause does not entitle convicted sex offenders to a hearing to determine current dangerousness prior to inclusion in the publicly disclosed sex offender registry.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia joined the Court’s opinion.20 He added that even if the requirements of Connecticut’s sex offender registration law implicate a liberty interest of respondents, the categorical abrogation of that liberty interest by a validly enacted statute suffices to provide all the process that is due.21 This is just as a state law providing that no one under the age of 16 may operate a motor vehicle suffices to abrogate that liberty interest.22
Absent a claim that the liberty interest in question is so fundamental as to implicate so-called substantive due process, a properly enacted law can eliminate it.23
Justice Souter joined the Court’s opinion.24 He agreed with the observation that today’s holding does not foreclose a claim that Connecticut’s dissemination of registry information is actionable on a substantive due process principle.25 He wrote separately to note that a substantive due process claim may not be the only one still open to a test by those in the respondents’ situation.26
The statute allows some sex offenders the possibility of avoiding registration and reporting obligations or limiting dissemination to law enforcement purposes based on findings that registration or public dissemination is not required for public safety.27 The legislative decision to make courts responsible for granting exemptions belies the State’s argument that courts are unequipped to separate offenders who warrant special publication from those who do not.28 The line drawn by the legislature is open to challenge under the Equal Protection Clause.29