422 U.S. 66 (1975)
In August and September 1972, an advertisement captioned “I say let's keep the campaign honest. Mobilize ‘truth squads' ” appeared in national publications including Time, Newsweek, and U. S. News and World Report, as well as nineteen local newspapers in communities where Bethlehem Steel Corp. maintained plants.1 Reprints of the advertisement, which featured quotations from a speech by petitioner Stewart S. Cort, chairman of the board of directors of Bethlehem, accompanied the September 11, 1972, quarterly dividend checks mailed to the corporation's stockholders.2 The costs of the advertisements and mailings were paid entirely from Bethlehem’s general corporate funds.3
Respondent, who owned fifty shares of Bethlehem stock and was qualified to vote in the 1972 Presidential election, filed suit on September 28, 1972, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of himself and derivatively on behalf of Bethlehem.4 Count I of the complaint invoked jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 and sought relief under 18 U. S. C. § 610.5 Count II asserted a pendent claim under Delaware law alleging that the expenditures constituted an ultra vires act and a breach of duty by the defendants.6
The District Court denied respondent’s request for a preliminary injunction on October 25, 1972.7 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the denial solely on the ground that irreparable harm had not been shown.8 After the affirmance, petitioners moved for an order requiring respondent to post security for expenses under Pennsylvania law.9 The District Court declined to require security for the federal claim but ordered $35,000 security for the pendent state claim.10 Respondent then filed an amended complaint that eliminated Count II.11
The District Court granted petitioners’ motion for summary judgment.12 The Court of Appeals reversed that judgment, holding that a private cause of action existed under § 610 for both injunctive relief and derivative damage relief.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.14
Whether the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 require reversal of a holding that a citizen or stockholder may obtain injunctive relief against future violations of 18 U.S.C. § 610?15
When subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed. The court must decide according to existing laws at the time of its decision unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.16
Yes. The 1972 Presidential election is history, and respondent as citizen or stockholder seeks injunctive relief only as to future elections.17 In that circumstance, a statute enacted after the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, requires reversal of the holding of the Court of Appeals.18 The Amendments created a Federal Election Commission with primary jurisdiction over claimed violations of section 610 and established an administrative procedure for processing complaints alleging violations after January 1, 1975.19
A complainant seeking as citizen or stockholder to enjoin alleged violations of section 610 in future elections must henceforth pursue the statutory remedy of a complaint to the Commission.20 The complainant must invoke its authority to request the Attorney General to seek the injunctive relief.21
The Amendments require reversal of the Court of Appeals holding that a citizen or stockholder may obtain injunctive relief against future violations of section 610.22
Whether a private cause of action for derivative damages against corporate directors is implied under 18 U.S.C. § 610 in favor of a corporate stockholder?23
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted. Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one. Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff. And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law.24
No. Respondent owns fifty shares of Bethlehem stock and was qualified to vote in the 1972 Presidential election.25 He filed this suit derivatively on behalf of Bethlehem seeking damages for violation of section 610.26 The District Court granted petitioners’ motion for summary judgment without opinion.27 The Court of Appeals reversed that judgment.28
The protection of ordinary stockholders was at best a secondary concern of section 610.29 The primary purpose of the statute was to assure that federal elections are free from the power of money.30 It sought to eliminate the apparent hold on political parties which business interests seek by reason of liberal campaign contributions. There is no indication whatever in the legislative history of section 610 which suggests a congressional intention to vest in corporate shareholders a federal right to damages for violation of section 610.31
Recovery of derivative damages by the corporation for violation of section 610 would not cure the influence which the use of corporate funds in the first instance may have had on a federal election.32 It is entirely appropriate to relegate respondent to whatever remedy is created by state law governing the internal affairs of corporations.33
A private cause of action for derivative damages against corporate directors is not implied under section 610 in favor of a corporate stockholder.34