523 U.S. 833 (1998)
On May 22, 1990, at approximately 8:30 p.m., Sacramento County sheriff’s deputy James Everett Smith responded to a call to break up a fight along with another officer, Murray Stapp.1 Upon returning to his patrol car, Stapp saw a motorcycle operated by 18-year-old Brian Willard carrying 16-year-old Philip Lewis as a passenger approaching at high speed.2 Neither boy had been involved in the fight that prompted the call.3
Stapp turned on his overhead rotating lights, yelled to the boys to stop, and pulled his patrol car closer to Smith’s in an attempt to pen the motorcycle in.4 Instead of pulling over, Willard slowly maneuvered the motorcycle between the two police cars and sped off.5 Smith immediately switched on his own emergency lights and siren, made a quick turn, and began pursuit at high speed.6 For 75 seconds over a course of 1.3 miles in a residential neighborhood, the motorcycle wove in and out of oncoming traffic, forcing two cars and a bicycle to swerve off the road, while the vehicles reached speeds up to 100 miles per hour with Smith following at a distance as short as 100 feet.7
The chase ended after the motorcycle tipped over as Willard tried a sharp left turn.8 By the time Smith slammed on his brakes, Willard was out of the way, but Lewis was not.9 The patrol car skidded into him at 40 miles per hour, propelling him some 70 feet down the road and inflicting massive injuries from which Lewis was pronounced dead at the scene.10
The District Court granted summary judgment for Smith.11 It reasoned that he was entitled to qualified immunity.12 Respondents could point to no state or federal opinion published before May 1990 supporting their view of a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right in the context of high-speed police pursuits.13
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.14 It held that the appropriate degree of fault to be applied to high-speed police pursuits is deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for a person’s right to life and personal security.15 The court concluded that the law regarding police liability for death or injury caused by an officer during the course of a high-speed chase was clearly established at the time of Philip Lewis’s death.16 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits over the standard of culpability on the part of a law enforcement officer for violating substantive due process in a pursuit case.17
Whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender?18
The substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by executive action only when it can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.19 In situations where actual deliberation is practical, the deliberate indifference standard may be used, but in circumstances where deliberation is not practical, such as high-speed chases with unforeseen circumstances demanding an immediate response, a higher standard of culpability applies.20 High-speed chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment, redressible by an action under §1983.21
No. Smith was faced with a course of lawless behavior for which the police were not to blame.22 The motorcycle then engaged in high-speed flight through a residential neighborhood at speeds up to 100 miles per hour, weaving in and out of traffic.23 The chase lasted only 75 seconds over 1.3 miles until the motorcycle tipped during a sharp turn.24 After that, Smith's patrol car unavoidably struck Lewis at 40 miles per hour.25
There is no evidence that Smith acted with any purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest or to worsen Lewis's legal plight.26 His response was an instinctive effort to perform his law enforcement duties amid rapidly evolving, life-threatening conditions that left no practical opportunity for deliberation.27
Deputy Smith's conduct during the high-speed chase does not shock the conscience and therefore does not violate Philip Lewis's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to life.28
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the opinion of the Court.29 He wrote separately to emphasize that the Court’s holding is limited to the circumstances of a high-speed chase.30 In other circumstances, the deliberate indifference standard may be appropriate.31
He underscored that the shocks-the-conscience test was the correct choice among the alternatives posed in the question presented.32 He also noted that this demanding standard had not been met on these facts.33 The county's petition assumed that the constitutional question was one of substantive due process, and the parties briefed the question on that assumption.34
Joined by O'connor, J.
Justice Kennedy joined the opinion and wrote to explain the objective character of substantive due process analysis.35 He stressed that history and tradition are the starting point but not always the ending point of the inquiry.36
Absent intent to injure, the police, in circumstances such as these, may conduct a dangerous chase of a suspect who disobeys a lawful command to stop when they determine it is appropriate to do so.37 He warned that any suggestion suspects may ignore such commands and then sue would increase flights and accidents.38 Neither our legal traditions nor the present needs of law enforcement justify finding a due process violation when unintended injuries occur after the police pursue a suspect who disobeys their lawful order to stop.39
Joined by Scalia, J.
Justice Breyer joined the Court's judgment and opinion.40 He wrote separately only to express agreement with Justice Stevens that Siegert v. Gilley should not be read to deny lower courts flexibility, in appropriate cases, to decide §1983 claims on qualified immunity grounds and thereby avoid wrestling with difficult or poorly presented constitutional issues.41
He pointed out his agreement that lower courts may adopt the normal procedure of deciding the case on the ground that appeared to offer the most direct and appropriate resolution.42
Justice Stevens would have reinstated the District Court's judgment on the ground that the relevant law was not clearly defined in 1990.43 He preferred to decide the case on qualified immunity without reaching the constitutional question because the issue was both difficult and unresolved.44
He noted that municipalities remain exposed to damages even when officers enjoy immunity, providing an avenue for doctrinal development.45 Sound reasons exist for encouraging the development of new constitutional doctrines in adversarial suits against municipalities, which have a substantial stake in the outcome.46
Joined by Thomas, J.
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment.47 He argued that the shocks-the-conscience methodology was an atavistic return to subjective analysis rejected in Washington v. Glucksberg.48 The Court should instead require a careful description of the asserted right and ask whether the Nation has traditionally protected it.49
Finding no textual, historical, or precedential support for a substantive due process right to be free from reckless police conduct during a car chase, he would reverse on that basis rather than on failure to shock the conscience.50 He would decline to fashion a new due process right out of thin air.51