379 U.S. 536 (1965)
On December 14, 1961, 23 students from Southern University were arrested in downtown Baton Rouge for picketing stores that maintained segregated lunch counters as part of a general protest movement against racial segregation directed by the local chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality.1
That evening appellant Reverend B. Elton Cox, a Field Secretary of CORE, and Ronnie Moore spoke at a mass meeting at the college where the students resolved to demonstrate the next day in front of the courthouse in protest of segregation and the arrest and imprisonment of the picketers.2
The next morning approximately 2,000 students left the campus five miles from downtown Baton Rouge to march to the courthouse.3 After Moore was arrested at the campus entrance Cox assumed leadership of the demonstration and drove to the city to keep the event orderly.4 Upon arrival, 1,500 of the students were assembling at the old State Capitol grounds two and one-half blocks from the courthouse.5 Police officers approached Cox and requested that the group disband.6 After Cox refused, the students marched in an orderly file to the courthouse.7
Chief Wingate White directed them to the west sidewalk 101 feet across the street from the courthouse steps.8 The students lined up five deep along the sidewalk.9 They sang songs including God Bless America and We Shall Overcome, pledged allegiance to the flag, and recited the Lord's Prayer.10 Cox delivered a speech urging them to go to twelve stores and sit in at lunch counters.11 A crowd of 100 to 300 white onlookers gathered on the east sidewalk and courthouse steps while 75 to 80 police officers stood between the groups.12
After Cox's speech the Sheriff ordered the demonstrators to disperse immediately.13 When they did not break up within two to five minutes police deployed tear gas.14 The crowd dispersed, and no demonstrators were arrested that day.15 Cox was arrested the following day and charged with criminal conspiracy, disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing before a courthouse.16
In a consolidated trial before a judge without a jury Cox was acquitted of conspiracy but convicted of the other three offenses.17 He was sentenced to cumulative terms of four months and a $200 fine for disturbing the peace, five months and a $500 fine for obstructing public passages, and one year and a $5,000 fine for picketing before a courthouse.18 The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed all three convictions in two judgments.19 The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of the appeals challenging the constitutionality of the three statutes on their face and as applied.20 The conviction for picketing before a courthouse was reviewed on appeal in the companion case, No. 49.21
Whether the Louisiana disturbing the peace statute is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the appellant's conduct during the demonstration?22
The First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects peaceful expression and assembly even when it invites dispute or stirs anger. A statute that is vague and overbroad enough to punish such protected activity is unconstitutional.23
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that Reverend Cox led approximately 2,000 students in an orderly demonstration that included singing, praying, and a speech, with no violence or threats from the demonstrators themselves.24 The cheering and applause in response to the jailed students singing remained within the bounds of protected activity, as the film evidence and multiple state witnesses confirmed the group stayed well controlled throughout.25 The trial judge convicted on the ground that bringing the group to protest was inherently dangerous, yet the record shows only muttering from onlookers separated by dozens of armed officers.26
The Louisiana Supreme Court's definition of breach of the peace as any agitation or interruption sweeps in constitutionally protected speech and assembly in the same manner as the charge rejected in Terminiello v. Chicago.27
The conviction for disturbing the peace must be reversed because the statute is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to the appellant's conduct.28
Whether the Louisiana obstructing public passages statute is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the appellant's conduct during the demonstration?29
A statute that on its face bars all street assemblies but is enforced through the completely unfettered discretion of local officials to allow some parades and prohibit others operates as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech and assembly. Such a statute also denies equal protection of the laws.30
Yes. The established facts show that city officials initially directed the demonstrators to the west sidewalk and permitted the meeting to proceed. Yet the statute supplies no standards for granting or withholding such permission and the Baton Rouge practice left officials free to decide which groups could assemble.31 This system of selective enforcement permits suppression of disfavored ideas and invites invidious discrimination among speakers, exactly the danger the Court has long condemned in cases involving discretionary licensing of public expression.32
The conviction for obstructing public passages must be reversed because the statute as applied and enforced is unconstitutional.33
Whether the Louisiana courthouse picketing statute is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the appellant's conduct during the demonstration?34
The opinion in this case does not address or provide a legal rule for the constitutionality of the Louisiana courthouse picketing statute.35
No. The established facts contain no analysis or holding regarding the constitutionality of the courthouse picketing statute because that conviction was reviewed in the companion appeal. The opinion provided resolves only the disturbing-the-peace and obstructing-public-passages convictions. This case, No. 24, involves the convictions for disturbing the peace and obstructing public passages, while No. 49 concerns the conviction for picketing before a courthouse.36
The record in this opinion does not resolve the constitutionality of the courthouse picketing statute.37