703 F. Supp. 511, 8 U.C.C.2d 363 (N.D. Miss. 1988)
Plaintiff, Crook Motor Company, Inc., a North Carolina corporation which has its principal place of business in Albemarle, North Carolina, filed suit against J.W. Goolsby of Myrtle, Mississippi. The defendant in turn impleaded James Cregar and Jim Cregar Corporation of Oxford, Mississippi; Charles D. “Buddy” Simmons of Water Valley, Mississippi; and National General Insurance Company. The suit concerns the sale of a truck tractor, sold by Goolsby to plaintiff and then resold by plaintiff, title to which was later discovered to be flawed. The truck, from some time prior to its sale to Crook Motors until it was confiscated by the FBI in February 1984, bore vehicle identification number (VIN) 1FUPYSYB6CP207957 (hereafter 207957). Crook Motors sues these defendants to recover the amount it has lost as a result of its purchase and resale of that truck including the purchase price of $48,000 paid to defendant Goolsby for the truck, plaintiff's lost profit on the subsequent sale of the vehicle to Battle Creek Ford, and damage to its business reputation, together with punitive damages, legal fees, costs, and interest.
Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332; it appears to this court that there exists in this court complete diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and all defendants, and that the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds the prerequisite $10,000 amount.
On June 15, 1983, a red 1982 Freightliner “conventional” tractor, bearing true VIN 1FUPYDYB6CH206409 (hereafter 206409) was reported stolen. The truck was owned by Steven Droke of Hornersville, Missouri, and at the time of the theft was being driven in connection with the business of Droke Brothers Trucking. The truck had been stolen on June 9, 1983, from the custody of a driver for Droke Brothers in West Memphis, Arkansas.
On July 12, 1983, Mr. Buddy Simmons purportedly1 sold to Mr. J.W. Goolsby a black2 1982 Freightliner “conventional” tractor, in need of a few additional components, for $30,000.00. Mr. Simmons is now a licensed dealer in salvage parts; at the time of the sale of the 1982 Freightliner to Mr. Goolsby, Mr. Simmons was unlicensed, and had been in the salvage business in his back yard for only eight to nine months.
He occasionally drove a “lowboy” truck for Mr. Cregar, collecting wrecks and salvaged parts which Mr. Cregar had purchased, and receiving as compensation for his services his pick of the salvaged parts at Cregar’s place of business. Simmons also bought salvage on his own account and occasionally these trips were for both Cregar’s and his own benefit. These transactions between the two men were strictly cash and no records were kept; nor were any records kept of where individual parts came from. Mr. Simmons claims that he took salvaged parts and built the truck which he sold to Goolsby. At this time, Mr. Simmons had no building in which to work, but was working outside. He testified that he was not sure how many other trucks he had built prior to that time, either one or two, nor did he recall who purchased those trucks. Mr. Simmons claims that he cut and welded the frames from two wrecked trucks to make the frame for the truck he sold to Goolsby, in the spring of 1983. He presented the testimony of the welder he employed to the effect that he did make such a weld for Simmons at about that time. Simmons also bought a salvaged cab and sleeper from Memphis Freightliner, and allegedly used the VIN from that cab on the title and the bill of sale, 207957. Mr. Simmons claims ignorance of how that cab number happens to match the number on the frame rail, which number was later found to be a restamp over the original VIN. Simmons further claims ignorance of how a forged specifications sheet came to be attached to the cab, which described VIN 207957 as having all the components of the truck as it then existed.3
Further, on Goolsby's title application, Cregar wrote down a prior Mississippi title number, 3583508-1-01. None of the defendants could recall at trial where that number came from. On the other application, he wrote no prior number, but marked the application as referring to a used truck. Having purchased the cab and sleeper as salvage, Simmons claims he took the VIN from one or two removable decals in the cab, and submitted those to the Mississippi Department of Motor Vehicles as the true VIN for the truck, not indicating that said truck was rebuilt from salvage nor indicating that another whole truck, bearing that VIN from the factory, was or could be still in existence elsewhere.4
The court finds it incredible that an inexperienced salvage dealer with limited resources and with no shop, shed, or enclosure built a completed truck from scratch out of wrecked parts in just 30 to 45 days; it is especially unbelievable that such a truck could then cause a salesman, who had over 20 years experience with a large used truck dealer, to remark that it was the most beautiful truck that he had ever seen. The likelihood of odd parts being put together to make a truck which could fool subsequent buyers and investigators into believing it to be a “whole” truck is very low. And finally, that such a truck built out of used parts from a myriad of other wrecked trucks could run well with few problems5 is particularly incredible.6
Thus, due to the inconsistencies in testimony, the demeanor of the witnesses, and the incredible nature of defendant’s theory of the case, this court finds that Buddy Simmons did not build such a truck from salvaged parts.7
Prior to the sale to Goolsby, Simmons had already been refused a title on the truck, so he attempted to bond his title. He was informed by the bonding company, National General, that he was not financially “strong enough”, and that he needed to get someone else to bond it for him. He called the insurer’s agent in Oxford, Mississippi, and arranged through him to have Jim Cregar use his bond for the title to this truck. Thus, National General Insurance Company issued a title bond in the amount of $36,000 on the strength of which Simmons was granted title by the State of Mississippi. This application for title was filled out by Buddy Simmons on July 12 at the time he, Goolsby and Cregar were filling out a title application in the name of J.W. Goolsby for the same truck. The same truck which was sold to Goolsby by Simmons, with some cosmetic work such as painting and additional accessories, was sold to Crook Motors on September 15, 1983. On September 12, 1983 while on his first delivery trip with the truck, Goolsby stopped across the street from Crook Motors in Albemarle, North Carolina. He was experiencing alternator problems and purchased an alternator from the part shop operated by Crook Motors. He replaced the alternator and then asked a salesman for help in jump-starting the truck. Robert Barringer, a salesman with over 20 years experience with Crook Motors, went to help, and remarked that the truck was the most beautiful he had seen. He asked Goolsby if he would consider selling the truck, was told that he might, and so Barringer proceeded to inspect the truck. Barringer testified that the truck was black, with black paint on the frame rails, but that there was red paint “under the rubbers.” Barringer was of the opinion that the truck was a “whole truck” (i.e. factory-built), as the major components had the Freightliner logo. Goolsby told him that the truck was not a “glider kit” (a truck rebuilt onto a factory-issued frame)8 and also gave no indication that the truck was rebuilt. Barringer testified that he was worried that the truck might be a “kit”, because that would seriously diminish the truck’s value. Goolsby and Barringer struck a bargain for $48,000, and Goolsby promised to return with the truck within the week to finalize the transaction when he received his title from the State of Mississippi. In the course of his inspection, Barringer checked the VIN on the decal in the cab against that on the left front frame rail9, and saw that the numbers matched.
After Goolsby left, Barringer called Freightliner to see if the truck with VIN 207957 was a “kit" and was informed that it was a whole truck, but was also told in passing that it had a Caterpillar 3046 model engine. When Goolsby returned on September 15, 1983, Barringer asked him about the engine. Goolsby responded that he had swapped engines with his brother because he preferred a Cummins’ engine. Barringer had a photograph taken of the truck that day, in the same location that Goolsby had parked it. Barringer testified, and this court so finds, that the same truck which Crook Motors purchased from J.W. Goolsby on September 15, 1983, cleaned up and with the right windshield replaced, was sold to Battle Creek Ford, of Battle Creek, Michigan, for $54,000.00.10
Battle Creek Ford had sent a salesman to Crook Motors with a prospective buyer, Mr. Dorsey Ferguson of Dyer, Indiana, who purchased the truck two to three days later on September 26, 1983, from Battle Creek Ford for $69,793.00. The truck was in the possession of Mr. Dorsey Ferguson from September 26, 1983 to February 24, 1984 when he brought the truck to Crook Motors for inspection by Sgt. William Sunday of the Criminal Investigation Section, Auto Theft Unit of the Michigan State Police, Special Agent Pamela Reyburn of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and John Reynauld of the National Auto Theft Bureau.11
The FBI had received a report that this truck might be a stolen truck; after examination of the truck on February 24, and February 29, 1984, by the three investigators, they determined it to be a stolen vehicle, and indeed to be the stolen Droke truck.1213
The investigators examined the truck in detail14 and discovered several VIN and serial numbers altered or removed. The VIN on the left frame rail, 207957, was misaligned and the numerals oversized. Further tests showed conclusively that the original VIN had been obliterated, probably by means of an oxyacetylene torch, hammering and grinding15 and a new, false VIN handstamped over the old VIN. The engine identification plate was missing, and according to testimony, had been missing since before the truck was purchased by Crook Motors. The engine serial number, stamped on the exterior of the engine, was a restamp;16 the VIN on the hood17 was that of the Droke vehicle, as was that inside the upholstery on both seats in the cab. VINs commonly placed in the liners of the cab and sleeper were missing, and there were marks of rubbing with solvents where those numbers should have been. Often the manufacturer would put the VIN on a piece of tape on the back of the speedometer, but that identifying feature was not in place on this truck. Officer Sunday searched the right frame rail for the VIN which was supposed to be there. He mistakenly removed the paint from one entire side of the rail; he saw no signs of welding. He then removed the paint from the area where the VIN had been placed on the other side of the rail, and found that the number had been obliterated and destroyed as it had on the left frame rail. Also, the serial plates from the twin rear axles had been removed; they had been attached in such a way that accidental loss of those plates would be extremely unlikely. The wheel base of the impounded truck was the same as that of the Droke vehicle, 240 inches. And finally, the vehicle specification decal in the cab was a forgery.18
This decal and the restamped frame rail were the only two places on the truck which bore VIN 207957. There may have been a second decal on the driver’s door frame, but it was not on the truck when it was inspected in February 1984.
Following confiscation of the truck, Battle Creek Ford refunded the purchase price paid by Mr. Dorsey Ferguson, and presented Crook Motors with a demand for repayment. Upon request of Crook Motors, Battle Creek Ford produced a copy of the FBI report which stated that the truck was a stolen vehicle. Crook Motors immediately refunded the $54,000 it had received from Battle Creek Ford.
The nine elements of a claim of fraud are well established in Mississippi. In order to establish fraud, the plaintiff must prove (1) a representation, (2) a falsity, (3) its materiality, (4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth, (5) its intent that it should be acted upon by the hearer and in the manner reasonably contemplated, (6) the hearer’s ignorance of its falsity, (7) his reliance on its truth, (8) his right to rely thereon, and (9) its consequent and proximate injury.
Franklin v. Lovitt Equip. Co., Inc., 420 So.2d 1370, 1373 (Miss.1982); Gardner v. State, 235 Miss. 119, 108 So.2d 592, (1959), quoting 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 3, p. 215. Furthermore, all elements of fraud must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
Beck Enterprises, Inc. v. Hester, 512 So.2d 672, 675 (Miss. 1987); Vogel v. American Warranty Home Service Corp., 695 F.2d 877 (5th Cir.1983).
Hamilton v. McGill, 352 So.2d 825 (Miss. 1977). As to the fraudulent statements which plaintiff has proven, as to whether the truck was rebuilt or “whole”19, whether the truck had been wrecked, and as to the disposition of the truck’s engine, there was no proof that such were material in and of themselves, nor was there proof of plaintiff’s reliance thereon, nor of its consequent and proximate injury.
Plaintiff further alleges a conspiracy between Goolsby, Simmons, Cregar, and the Jim Cregar Corporation to defraud the public. Again, plaintiff has failed in his proof of this alternate theory of fraud. Plaintiff has produced evidence of various odd circumstances, such as the unreported, unrecorded, cash transaction for the purchase of the truck from Simmons, and the unusual procedure of acquiring title. This evidence, though probative, circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy, Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F.2d 985 (5th Cir.1979) (Miss.), is not sufficient in the instant case to carry plaintiff’s burden of persuasion. The court is not convinced that defendant Goolsby entered into any agreement, explicit or implicit, to pursue an unlawful purpose or to achieve a lawful purpose by unlawful means.
Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So.2d 247 (Miss.1985).
Mississippi’s current law of fraud is derived from Gardner v. State, 235 Miss. 119, 108 So.2d 592, 594 (1959). Gardner cited 37 C.J.S., Fraud, § 3, p. 215 as authority for the nine elements it enumerated. Corpus Juris Secundum further speaks to liability under those elements for representations which are not made directly to the claimant.
[I]t is not essential to liability that there should be privity of contract or personal dealings between defendant and the injured party, and if defendant intended to do an act necessarily resulting in injury to plaintiff he will be held liable, although he lacked a specific intent to deceive the particular person injured.
37 C.J.S., Fraud, § 61(a), p. 347-48. Further,
[w]here misrepresentations are made to the public at large, or to a particular class of persons, with the intention of influencing any member of the public, or of the class, to whom they may be communicated, any one injured through proper reliance thereon may secure redress. In such a case it is not necessary that there should be an intent to defraud any particular person; but the representation must, of course, have been intended for the public, or for a particular class of persons to which complainant belonged.
37 C.J.S., Fraud, § 22(2), p. 262.
The court finds no reason to insulate the defendant from liability for the proximate results of his intentionally fraudulent statements on the basis of privity of contract.
Plaintiff also alleges “conspiracy, collusion, and connivance” and “aiding and abetting” by Cregar and Cregar Corporation in the fraud perpetrated by Simmons. Plaintiff has offered proof of several unusual circumstances, primary among which is Cregar’s gratuitous preparation of title applications, the use of his own bonding authority to allow Simmons to acquire a title certificate for the stolen truck, and the unrecorded, cash-only transactions between Cregar and Simmons for parts which this court has found Simmons did not use to build the truck sold to Goolsby as he had claimed. The court finds, however, that this circumstantial evidence, relevant though it may be, Wagley v. Colonial Baking Co., 208 Miss. 815, 45 So.2d 717 suggestion of error overruled, 46 So.2d 925 (Miss.1950), is not sufficient in the instant case to prove an agreement, explicit or implicit, between Simmons and either Cregar, or James H. Cregar Corporation.
See, e.g., Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F.2d 985 (5th Cir.1979) (Miss.).
(1) subject to sub-section (2) there is in a contract for sale a warranty by the seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or other lien or encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of contracting has no knowledge.
(2) a warranty under sub-section (1) will be excluded or modified only by a specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason to know that the person selling does not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell only such right or title as he or a third person may have____
Defendant Goolsby did not explicitly nor implicitly exclude or modify the warranty of title on the vehicle sold to Crook Motors, as would be required under Section 75-2-312(2). He therefore is deemed to have sold the stolen truck to Crook Motors subject to an ipso facto warranty of title, under sub-section (1).
See Gunderland Marine Supply, Inc. v. Bray, 570 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.Civ.App.1978). As it has been proven that Goolsby did not indeed have title to the truck, and that Crook Motors did not know that the truck was stolen, he has breached the warranty of title, and is liable therefor.
See Sarad v. Tatum, 492 P.2d 882 (Colo.App.1971). Indeed, it appears that it was unnecessary that plaintiff even show the truck was stolen, as long as he could show that the truck had been seized by police as a stolen vehicle.
Id.; John Street Auto Wrecking v. Motors Insurance Corp., 56 Misc.2d 232, 288 N.Y. S.2d 281 (1968). Even though Goolsby may have acted innocently in the sale of the truck which turned out to be stolen, he is liable to the buyer for breach of warranty of title.
Ricklefs v. Clemens, 216 Kan. 128, 531 P.2d 94 (1975).
Sarad v. Tatum, 492 P.2d 882 (Colo.App.1971).
Both defendant Goolsby in his third party complaint and plaintiff in its amended complaint, claim that National General Insurance Company was negligent in issuing the title bond without sufficient inspection of the truck. Leaving aside questions of law such as the existence and extent of a duty to inspect, the court rules that neither party has proven a breach of whatever duty exists, nor have they proven proximate causation of their injuries. The only witness who was called to testify as to the actions of National General was Winston Bruce, an independent insurance agent who took Simmons’ title bond application and who, at Simmons’ request, procured Cregar’s authorization to use the title bonding authority of James H. Cregar Corporation to allow Simmons to get title to the stolen truck. Mr. Bruce could only testify as to his own actions, and admitted his own failure to inspect the truck, but had no knowledge of the actions of any other representatives or agents of National General as regarded the truck. Nor was there any proof that, had National General inspected the truck, such inspection would have revealed that the truck was a stolen vehicle; given the facts that Goolsby, Crook Motors, Battle Creek Ford, and Dorsey Ferguson all subsequently inspected the same vehicle from the point of view of a prospective purchaser, and that no one among them discovered that the truck was stolen, the court cannot presume that the lack of yet another inspection by National General, if in fact they did not inspect the truck, proximately caused the losses complained of.
The court finds for defendant/third party defendant National General Insurance Company on the negligence claims brought against it by plaintiff Crook Motors and defendant J.W. Goolsby. In the absence of any defense, the court finds that National General is liable to the extent of $36,000 under the title bond it executed.
See Exhibit D-9.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under Section 75-2-715 may also be recovered.
Plaintiff argues for damages greatly in excess of those ordinarily provided for under this section, but has failed to show “special circumstances show[ing] proximate damages of a different amount.”
Compare Ricklefs v. Clemens, 216 Kan. 128, 531 P.2d 94 (1975) (plaintiff had undisturbed use of automobile for nine months before it was seized as a stolen vehicle; value of automobile at time possession lost — lower than purchase price — was proper damages); Ford Motor Company v. Fairley, 398 So.2d 216 (Miss.1981).
McDonald’s Chevrolet, Inc. v. Johnson, 176 Ind.App. 399, 376 N.E.2d 106 (1978) is cited by plaintiff for the proposition that the difference in value of the truck “as warranted” and “time value” was the correct measure of damages, plus “incidental and consequential damages including economic loss due to loss of good will and business reputation.” Plaintiff’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The opinion in that case speaks for itself more clearly and more accurately, though less expansively, than plaintiff’s attorney has done on its behalf.
McDonald’s Chevrolet actually holds only that the measure of damages in the case of the sale of a stolen car is equal to the amount paid for the vehicle, in that case $9,500.00.
Accord De La Hoya v. Slim’s Gun Shop, 80 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, 146 Cal.Rptr. 68 (1978); Kruger v. Bibi, 3 U.C.C.Rptr. 1132 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1967).
Plaintiff also claims entitlement to punitive damages against defendant Goolsby for the breach of warranty of title. Punitives may be granted in a proper case in a claim under the U.C.C.
Fedders Corp. v. Boatright, 493 So.2d 301, 310 (Miss.1986); see Beck Enterprises, Inc. v. Hester, 512 So.2d 672, 675 (Miss.1987) (no election of remedies bar under U.C.C.). The denial of punitive damages is within the discretion of the court.
Id. at 311-12; Tideway Oil Program, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So.2d 454, 461 (Miss.1983). The court finds that in this case plaintiff has failed to prove a “willful and intentional wrong, or ... such gross negligence and reckless negligence as is equivalent to such a wrong.”
Seals v. St. Regis Paper Co., 236 So.2d 388 (Miss.1970); see also Bounds v. Watts, 159 Miss. 307, 131 So. 804 (1931) (“willful and conscious wrong, or actual malice, are conduct so grossly negligent as to amount to a reckless disregard of the rights of the opposite party.”) Plaintiff is not entitled to recover exemplary damages from defendant Goolsby.
Section 75-2-715 does entitle plaintiff to incidental and consequential damages from Goolsby.
Ricklefs v. Clemens, 216 Kan. 128, 531 P.2d 94 (1975); Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Evans, 406 So.2d 15 (Miss.1981); Beck Enterprises, Inc. v. Hester, 512 So.2d at 675.
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller’s breach include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with affecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller’s breach include
(a) Any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) Injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.
Mississippi Code Annotated § 75-2-715 (1972).
Goolsby knew he was selling to a dealer in used trucks, and so he will be held liable for Crook Motors’ reasonable repairs and other expenses of putting the truck into condition for resale, John Street Auto Wrecking v. Motors Ins. Co., 56 Misc.2d 232, 288 N.Y.S.2d 281 (N.Y.D.C.1968), compare Ricklefs v. Clemens, supra (plaintiff was not a merchant), and Crook Motors’ lost profits on the resale of the vehicle, Alafoss v. Premium Corp. of America, Inc., 448 F.Supp. 95 (Minn.) aff'd in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 599 F.2d 232 (8th Cir.1979); Barney Machinery Co. v. Continental M.D.M., Inc., 434 F.Supp. 596 (W.D.Pa.1977). Loss of good will is generally too speculative to be allowed; proof in the instant case was such that, were loss of good will and business reputation allowable, such damages could not be awarded to plaintiff21.
Thus, defendant Goolsby is liable to plaintiff in the following amounts, proven in the instant case:
(a) For the purchase price of the stolen vehicle $48,000.00
(b) For reasonable and foreseeable expenses in preparing the truck for resale 450.57
(c) Lost profit on the resale of the vehicle 5,549.43
d) Total $54,000.0022
See Davidson v. Rogers, 431 So.2d 483, 485 (Miss.1983); Lloyd Ford Co. v. Sharp, 192 So.2d 398, 400 (Miss.1966); Hunt v. Sherrill, 195 Miss. 688, 15 So.2d 426 (1943). The rule states that “[i]n all cases of misrepresentation as to the amount, quality, kind and character of the property purchased, this rule applies, and allows the party defrauded to recover the difference between the real and the represented value of the property.”
Sharp, at 400. Mississippi Code Annotated § 75-2-721 further states that:
Remedies for material misrepresentation or fraud include all remedies available under this chapter for non-fraudulent breach. Neither recision nor a claim for recision of the contract for sale nor rejection nor return of the goods shall bar or be deemed inconsistent with a claim for damages or other remedy.
See also Beck Enterprises, Inc. v. Hester, 512 So.2d 672, 675 (Miss.1987). The general aim of fraud remedies is the compensation of the loss to the defrauded purchaser. 37 C.J.S., Fraud, § 142(a), at 470-72 and n. 74; InterOcean Oil Co., S.A. v. Ames, 149 La. 338, 89 So. 205 (1921).
As a general rule, ... it is not at all necessary that the particular damages shall have been contemplated or intended, but it is enough if they are the natural and direct consequence of the fraud; and if they are it will be considered that the party guilty of the fraud ought reasonably to have contemplated them, and they may be recovered whether actually contemplated or not.
37 C.J.S., Fraud, § 141(b).
Mississippi’s rule gives the defrauded person the “benefit of the bargain” by calculating damages not from the contract price, though that is often used to estimate the value in the absence of other evidence, Davidson v. Rogers, 431 So.2d 483, 485 (Miss.1983), but from the value of the goods as represented.
Lloyd Ford Co. v. Sharp, 192 So.2d 398, 400 (Miss.1966). In the instant case we are presented with evidence of an actual value in excess of the price which Simmons received from Goolsby. In just over ten weeks time, that same truck, involved in three sales, sold for $69,793 to Dorsey Ferguson. This amount, less the $6,000 spent by Goolsby to “complete” the truck which Simmons had sold him, is the best indication of the value of the truck as it was represented by Simmons. However, as the plaintiff, Crook Motors, sold the truck for $54,000 to Battle Creek Ford, that amount should act as a maximum recovery, reflecting the benefit of the bargain to Crook Motors; any more would be a windfall.
See Caffey v. Alabama Machinery & Supply Co., 19 Ala.App. 189, 96 So. 454 (1922), cert. denied sub nom Ex parte Alabama Machinery & Supply Co., 209 Ala. 466, 96 So. 459 (1923); Senn v. Manchester Bank of St. Louis, 583 S.W.2d 119 (Mo.1979).
Punitive damages are called for under the facts of this case, given the knowing misrepresentations made by Simmons in attempting to pass off the stolen vehicle23. Punitive damages are awarded as a punishment to the defendant and as a warning and example to deter him and others from committing like offenses in the future.
West Bros., Inc. v. Barefield, 239 Miss. 530, 124 So.2d 474 (1960). The amount of such damages shall be a matter within the discretion of the trier of fact, but must not be arbitrary or unreasonable.
Commodore Corp. v. Bailey, 393 So.2d 467 (Miss.1981); Planter’s Wholesale Grocery v. Kincade, 210 Miss. 712, 50 So.2d 578 (1951); Teche Lines, Inc. v. Pope, 175 Miss. 393, 166 So. 539 (1936). “The amount [of punitive damages] cannot be determined by any fixed rule.”
Commodore Corp., supra. The net worth of the defendant is relevant to the determination of the amount of punitive damages.
Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Keys, 317 So.2d 396 (Miss.1975). Indeed, punitive damages are meant to punish, but should not be allowed to ruin the defendant.
Miller v. Schnitzer, 78 Nev. 301, 371 P.2d 824 (1962). However, the financial net worth of defendant Charles D. “Buddy” Simmons is not in evidence in this case.24
The court, therefore, considering the nature of the offense, and all of the relevant evidence before it, concludes that punitive damages in the amount of $80,000 are proper in the instant case, and shall be awarded against Simmons in favor of plaintiff, Crook Motors.
Attorneys’ fees are recoverable in the instant case. The standard, in the absence of contractual or statutory liability therefor, is the existence of such a gross or willful wrong as to justify the infliction of punitive damages.
Equity Services Co. v. Hamilton, 257 So.2d 201, 207 (Miss.1972); Laurel v. Bush, 238 Miss. 718, 120 So.2d 149 (1960). The court hereby allows plaintiff twenty (20) days following the entry of this order in which to produce such materials as they may wish in support of its claim for reasonable attorneys’ fees, and thereafter allows to defendant Simmons fifteen (15) days in which to respond. Each party should therein address the factors enumerated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974), viewed in the light of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed. 2d 40 (1983); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); and Haferty v. Pulse Drug Co., Inc., 821 F.2d 261, 271-72 (5th Cir.1987).
See generally 2A Couch on Insurance 2d §§ 22.96 et seq. (Priorities to statutory deposits), 48:146-149 (automobile dealers bond).
Defendants Simmons and Goolsby are jointly and severally liable for plaintiffs’ actual damages in the amount of $54,000.00. Defendant Simmons is liable to defendant Goolsby for the amounts, if any, which Goolsby actually pays to the plaintiff. This liability is not to take precedence over Simmons’ liability to plaintiff.
Defendant Simmons is liable to plaintiff for punitive damages in the amount of $80,000 and for plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees, the amount of which shall be determined by the court after the submission of supporting evidence by the parties.
Defendant National General Insurance Company is liable to plaintiff solely on the title bond issued on the stolen vehicle, in the amount of $36,000.00.
The amount of the bond may be applied to plaintiff’s actual damages and/or plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, thus reducing the liability of the defendants) thereon. Funds received from defendant Simmons may be applied to that defendant’s liability for actual damages, punitive damages, or attorney’s fees, at plaintiff’s option.
Accordingly, judgment shall be entered.
Finally, the testimony is contrary to the highly credible testimony of Renauld, Reyburn, and Sunday, and the documentary evidence they have produced. It would be coincidence that somehow the damaged Droke hood were sold for salvage, was repaired, and was incorporated into this rebuilt truck. It would be unbelievable coincidence if, as defendants claim, that hood were by chance to be incorporated onto the same truck as two seats bearing the same VIN.
See exhibits P 43 and P 44. At trial, Mr. Cregar stated positively that, prior to the sale of the truck to Goolsby, he had not seen the truck. He also claims that he never inspected the vehicle or the VIN numbers. Plaintiff has otherwise ignored this admission, and thus no proof of its materiality, or plaintiffs rightful reliance thereon, or proximate injury therefrom was ever adduced at trial, let alone clear and convincing proof thereof.
Id. at 461.
See Western Surety Co. v. State of Miss., 330 So.2d 573 (Miss.1976).