544 U.S. 709 (2005)
In 2000 Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.1 Petitioners are current and former inmates of institutions operated by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction who adhere to nonmainstream religions including the Satanist, Wicca, and Asatru religions and the Church of Jesus Christ Christian.2 They initially filed suit against Ohio prison officials asserting claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.3
After enactment of the Act petitioners amended their complaints to add claims under Section 3.4 The inmates complained that prison officials failed to accommodate their religious exercise in a variety of ways including denying access to religious literature, denying opportunities for group worship granted to adherents of mainstream religions, forbidding adherence to dress and appearance mandates, withholding religious ceremonial items, and failing to provide a chaplain trained in their faith.5 For purposes of the litigation respondents stipulated that petitioners are members of bona fide religions and sincere in their beliefs.6
Respondents moved to dismiss the statutory claims arguing that Section 3 violates the Establishment Clause.7 Pursuant to statute the United States intervened in the District Court to defend the constitutionality of the Act.8 The District Court denied the motion to dismiss.9
On interlocutory appeal the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court determination.10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among Courts of Appeals on whether the institutionalized-persons provision of the Act is consistent with the Establishment Clause.11
Whether Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?12
This Court has long recognized that the government may accommodate religious practices without violating the Establishment Clause.13 There is room for play in the joints between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, allowing the government to accommodate religion beyond free exercise requirements.14 Section 3 of RLUIPA fits within the corridor between the Religion Clauses on its face.
No. The Act alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise by persons in institutions where the government exerts a degree of control unparalleled in civilian society.15 Petitioners, as stipulated, are sincere adherents of nonmainstream religions dependent on the government's permission for their religious exercise, as shown by their complaints regarding denial of group worship opportunities and ceremonial items.16 The Act does not differentiate among bona fide faiths.17 Lawmakers anticipated due deference to prison administrators' expertise in maintaining order and security.18
Thus, on its face, the institutionalized-persons provision qualifies as a permissible legislative accommodation.19
Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas joined the opinion but wrote separately to explain that a proper historical understanding of the Establishment Clause as a federalism provision leads to the same conclusion of constitutionality.21 He argued that the Clause prohibits Congress from interfering with state establishments of religion but does not preclude legislation respecting religion generally.22 RLUIPA is not a law respecting an establishment of religion because it does not require or prohibit state establishments and applies to rules of general applicability.23
The facial challenge therefore fails.24