453 U.S. 654 (1981)
In November 1979, the United States Embassy in Tehran was seized and American hostages were taken.1 President Carter declared a national emergency and issued Executive Order No. 12170 blocking the removal or transfer of all Iranian assets subject to United States jurisdiction.2
Petitioner Dames & Moore is an American engineering firm that had contracts with the Government of Iran and various Iranian agencies.3 In December 1979, Dames & Moore filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California seeking damages for breach of contract.4 It obtained prejudgment attachments on property of Iranian banks.5
The Treasury Department issued regulations implementing the blocking order.6 These regulations initially permitted pre-judgment attachments.7 However, the regulations provided that licenses could be amended or revoked at any time.8
On January 19, 1981, the United States and Iran entered into the Algiers Accords.9 The Accords provided for the release of the hostages in exchange for the unfreezing of Iranian assets and the termination of litigation against Iran in United States courts.10 The Accords established an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to arbitrate claims.11
President Carter then issued Executive Orders Nos. 12277 through 12285.12 These orders revoked licenses authorizing rights in blocked Iranian property.13 They nullified all attachments and judicial process against Iranian assets.14 They required banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York.15 On February 24, 1981, President Reagan ratified those orders and issued Executive Order No. 12294 suspending all claims against Iran that could be presented to the Claims Tribunal.16
Dames & Moore subsequently filed suit in the District Court against the United States and the Secretary of the Treasury.17 The suit sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the Executive Orders and regulations.18 The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted but did not dismiss the action.19 On April 28, 1981, the District Court granted the petitioner's motion for summary judgment against the federal officials and ordered the funds subject to the attachments returned to the petitioner.20 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with directions to vacate the summary judgment and dismiss the complaint for want of jurisdiction.21 This Court granted certiorari.22
Whether the District Court had jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act over claims against the United States and federal officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief?23
The Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), grants district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions against the United States not exceeding $10,000 founded upon the Constitution or any Act of Congress and waives sovereign immunity for such claims, including those seeking declaratory and injunctive relief when the plaintiff alleges deprivation of property without just compensation.24
Yes. The Little Tucker Act has been construed to authorize actions for declaratory and injunctive relief against federal officials where the relief sought is not monetary.25 The claim must allege deprivation of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.26 Dames & Moore claimed that the actions of the President and the Secretary in nullifying the attachments and ordering the transfer of the assets constitute a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.27
The amount in controversy is less than $10,000.28 The District Court therefore had jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act. The action is not barred by sovereign immunity.29
The District Court had jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act.30
Whether the President was authorized under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to nullify attachments and liens on Iranian assets and to order their transfer to the Federal Reserve Bank?31
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1), authorizes the President during a declared national emergency to investigate, regulate, direct, compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit any acquisition, holding, use, transfer or exercise of any right or power with respect to any property in which any foreign country or national has an interest.32
Yes. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act gives the President broad authority to act in times of declared national emergencies with respect to foreign assets.33 Dames & Moore obtained prejudgment attachments after the blocking order but the regulations made clear that licenses could be amended or revoked at any time.34 President Carter issued Executive Orders Nos. 12277 through 12285 that nullified all attachments and required transfer of the assets to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York.35
These actions were taken pursuant to the Act to deal with the national emergency posed by the Iranian hostage crisis and were supported by the strongest presumptions of validity.36
The President was authorized under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to nullify the attachments and order the transfer of assets.37
Whether the President was authorized to suspend claims against Iran pending in United States courts?38
Although the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not directly authorize suspension of claims, longstanding congressional acquiescence in the practice of settling claims by executive agreement, as reflected in statutes such as the International Claims Settlement Act, supports the President's authority to suspend claims as a necessary incident to resolving a major foreign policy dispute.39
Yes. The President was authorized to suspend claims against Iran by the provision of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act that authorizes exercise of powers under the Trading With the Enemy Act.40 This authority is combined with congressional acceptance of executive claims settlement practice.41 The Algiers Accords established the Claims Tribunal as an alternative forum.42
Dames & Moore's claims can be pursued before the Tribunal. If not compensated there the company may pursue a Tucker Act claim against the United States.43 Congress has not disapproved of the action taken here.44
The President was authorized to suspend claims against Iran pending in United States courts.45
Whether the petitioner was entitled to a preliminary injunction preventing federal officials from complying with the Executive Orders and regulations?46
A preliminary injunction requires demonstration of a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury, balance of equities favoring the movant, and public interest weighing in favor of the injunction.47
No. The petitioner has not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits because the actions taken by the President were within his constitutional and statutory authority.48 Dames & Moore has not shown that the suspension of its claims will cause irreparable injury because it can pursue claims before the Claims Tribunal. The balance of equities does not favor the petitioner. The public interest weighs in favor of denying the injunction to implement the Algiers Accords and secure the release of the hostages.49
The petitioner was not entitled to a preliminary injunction.50
Whether the petitioner could challenge the President's actions as a taking of property without just compensation in this suit?51
A claim that suspension of claims constitutes a taking without just compensation is not ripe for review in this action. The petitioner has not been permanently deprived of property. It may pursue compensation in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act if the Claims Tribunal does not provide full recovery.52
No. The petitioner has not been permanently deprived of its property because the suspension of its claims is a temporary measure.53 Dames & Moore can pursue its claims against Iran in the Claims Tribunal established pursuant to the Algiers Accords. If the petitioner is not compensated by the Tribunal, it may then pursue its claims against the United States in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act.54 The question whether the suspension constitutes a taking is not ripe for review in this suit.55
The petitioner may not challenge the President's actions as a taking of property without just compensation in this suit.56
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion.57 In his judgment the possibility that requiring this petitioner to prosecute its claim in another forum will constitute an unconstitutional taking is so remote that he would not address the jurisdictional question considered in Part V of the Court's opinion. He joined the remainder of the opinion.58
Stevens viewed the risk of an unconstitutional taking from the requirement to litigate in the Claims Tribunal as too speculative to justify examining the jurisdictional issues separately.59 His concurrence allowed him to support the majority's resolution of the President's authority while avoiding unnecessary discussion of the taking claim's ripeness.60
I join the Court's opinion except its decision that the nullification of the attachments did not effect a taking of property interests giving rise to claims for just compensation.61 The nullification of attachments presents a separate question from whether the suspension and proposed settlement of claims against Iran may constitute a taking.62 I would leave both taking claims open for resolution on a case-by-case basis in actions before the Court of Claims.63
The facts of the hundreds of claims pending against Iran are not known to this Court and may differ from the facts in this case.64 I therefore dissent from the Court's decision with respect to attachments.65