477 U.S. 168 (1986)
On September 8, 1973, at about 5:30 p.m., a black adult male entered Carl's Furniture Store near Lakeland, Florida.1 The only other person present was proprietor Mrs. Turman, who lived with her husband in a house behind the store.2 Darden robbed her at gunpoint and shot arriving Mr. Turman between the eyes.3
Darden then sexually assaulted Mrs. Turman by demanding oral sex.4 He later shot 16-year-old Phillip Arnold three times when he came to help, though Arnold survived and reached a neighbor.5
Darden fled in a green Chevrolet and crashed into a telephone pole minutes later a few miles away while on prison furlough.6 Police recovered a .38 Smith & Wesson revolver near the crash site whose chamber arrangement matched the shots fired, and ballistics examination linked a bullet to that weapon type. Darden was arrested the following day at his girlfriend's house in Tampa.7 Mrs. Turman identified him at a preliminary hearing, and Phillip Arnold selected his photograph from a six-photo array.8
Darden was tried in January 1974 in the Circuit Court for Citrus County, Florida, on charges of murder, robbery, and assault with intent to kill.9 During voir dire the trial court excused prospective juror Murphy for cause after questioning about opposition to the death penalty.10 The jury convicted Darden, recommended death, and the judge imposed sentence after finding five aggravating factors.11 On direct appeal the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in 1976.12
Darden sought federal habeas corpus relief in the District Court for the Middle District of Florida, which denied the petition.13 A divided Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed, but after rehearing en banc the court reversed on the juror-exclusion claim.14 Following remand in light of Wainwright v. Witt the en banc court denied relief, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1985 while staying execution.15
Whether the trial court's exclusion for cause of prospective juror Murphy violated the standards set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois and Wainwright v. Witt?16
Under Witherspoon v. Illinois and Wainwright v. Witt, a prospective juror may be excused for cause if the juror's views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. The trial judge's factual determination of bias is entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.17
No. The trial court questioned Murphy after he had heard the correct standard applied repeatedly to other venire members during voir dire in the Citrus County courtroom.18 Murphy stated that he held strong moral or religious principles in opposition to the death penalty so that he would be unable to recommend it regardless of the facts.19 The trial court, aided as it undoubtedly was by its assessment of the potential juror's demeanor, was under the obligation to determine whether Murphy's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror.20 The established facts confirm that no specific objection was lodged beyond a continuing objection and that the context of the full voir dire supported the excusal.21
The presumption of correctness attaches to the trial court's finding because the record fairly supports it.22 Murphy's presence throughout the series of questions clarified the inquiry, and the court was not required to obtain a mechanical catechism response.23 The exclusion therefore complied with the constitutional standard.24
The trial court's exclusion of Murphy did not violate the Witherspoon-Witt standards.25
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Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, And Stevens
Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing that the trial judge applied an incorrect standard for excusing jurors that was indistinguishable from the one disapproved in Witherspoon.26 The trial judge's standard was essentially indistinguishable from the standard employed by Illinois and expressly disapproved by this Court in Witherspoon. Blackmun concluded that the record does not demonstrate that Murphy was unable to perform his duties as a juror.27
Instead, the excusal appeared to be based on the desire to finish jury selection expeditiously rather than a proper finding of substantial impairment under the Witt standard.28 He emphasized that the trial court's misunderstanding infected the entire context of the voir dire.29
Chief Justice Burger filed a concurring opinion to address the suggestion in Justice Blackmun's dissent that the Court rejected Darden's claims out of impatience with the progress of his challenges.30 Burger explained that his earlier dissent from the grant of certiorari was based on the meritless nature of the claims after extensive review by many judges, not impatience.31 He stressed that the thirteen years of judicial proceedings demonstrated substantial care and patience, and that finality must eventually be achieved in the case.32
Whether the prosecutor's closing argument at the guilt phase of the trial rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair in violation of due process?33
A prosecutor's closing argument violates due process only if the remarks so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process under Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, evaluated in the context of the entire trial including invited response, curative instructions, and the weight of the evidence.34
No. The prosecutors made improper remarks that condemned the Department of Corrections, expressed personal opinions of guilt, dehumanized Darden as an animal on a leash, and wished for his death by shotgun.35 These comments were evaluated against the defense summation that first used the term animal, blamed the sheriff's office, and alluded to the death penalty.36 The trial court instructed the jury multiple times that arguments were not evidence and that the decision must rest on the evidence alone.37 The established facts show overwhelming evidence including two eyewitness identifications, the matching revolver found near the crash site, and the ballistics linkage.38
Defense counsel made the tactical choice to reserve rebuttal and used it to turn the improper comments against the prosecution.39 Every court that reviewed the record concluded that the remarks, though deserving condemnation, did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.40
The prosecutor's closing argument did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.41
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, And Stevens
Justice Blackmun dissented on the ground that the prosecutors' remarks constituted a relentless and single-minded attempt to inflame the jury, violating professional standards against personal opinions, injecting extraneous issues, and appealing to passion.42 He concluded that the comments diverted the jury from deciding guilt on the evidence and that the evidence of identification and ballistics was not so overwhelming as to eliminate the prejudicial effect.43 The trial court's instructions were insufficient to cure the prejudice caused by these remarks given the emotional nature of a capital trial.44
Whether Darden was denied effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his trial?45
Under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant is denied effective assistance if counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and there is a reasonable probability that but for the errors the result of the proceeding would have been different, with a strong presumption that counsel's conduct constituted sound trial strategy.46
No. Defense counsel spent hundreds of hours preparing the case, including time investigating an alibi, obtaining a psychiatric report, and considering Mrs. Turman's opposition to the death penalty.47 Just before sentencing the trial court expressly informed counsel they could present any pertinent nonstatutory mitigating evidence.48 Counsel reasonably chose not to introduce evidence of Darden's background because it would have opened the door to his prior convictions and the psychiatric report describing him as sociopathic.49 The established facts show that counsel made a tactical decision to rely on a simple plea for mercy after consultation with Darden.50
Petitioner failed to overcome the presumption that the challenged conduct was sound strategy, and therefore did not satisfy the first prong of Strickland.51
Darden was not denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing.52
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Justice Brennan joined Justice Blackmun's dissent in full.53 He reiterated his longstanding view that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in all circumstances under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.54 Brennan therefore would vacate the death sentence imposed on Darden regardless of the other claims.55
This position reflects his consistent opposition to capital punishment as inherently violative of constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment, as first articulated in his Gregg v. Georgia dissent.56 Brennan's separate writing underscores that even if other constitutional claims fail, the death penalty itself is unconstitutional.57 He would not reach the merits of the specific errors but would set aside the sentence on this broader ground.58